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Abstract 
This thesis consists of three essays on financial crises. The key contribution is on 
disentangling the potential political economy factors in explaining the duration and 
possible mitigation of a variety of financial crises experienced by a large number of 
countries. More specifically, the thesis builds upon emerging literature on 
institutional aspects of financial crises and extends the line of work by incorporating 
political regime type, government popularity, time to elections and political 
constraints into standard macroeconomic models. 
The first essay examines the hitherto underexplored relationship between political 
regime types and the probability of experiencing banking, currency or sovereign debt 
crisis. Using data for 56 countries for the period 1960-2010, the paper compares 
autocracy and democracy, and also examines the potential impact of transitions 
between these political arrangements. The analysis indicates that being autocratic or 
democratic, per se, does not affect the probability of facing any financial crisis. 
However, the most vulnerable group of countries to experience a crisis is those 
transiting from autocracy to democracy. Transitions from democracy to autocracy do 
not lead to any crisis like situation. Further, the essay sheds light on the 
heterogeneous impact of a political regime’s duration on crisis. For instance, a 
prolonged autocratic rule diminishes the chances of financial crisis, whereas a 
sustained democratic regime seems to enhance the likelihood of banking crisis. 
Taking a cue from the above, the second essay investigates the factors behind 
banking crises within democracies. The essay takes a two pronged approach. First, it 
establishes a causal link between credit growth and banking crisis. Second, it 
explains why incumbents may allow for unsustainable credit growth. In terms of 
credit growth, the paper finds that the growth of household credit has a bigger impact 
on the probability of banking crisis than the enterprise credit growth. To be specific, 
the results show that a 1 per cent increase in domestic credit enhances the likelihood 
of banking crisis by 6 to 8 percent, whereas, the same increase in enterprise credit 
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growth increases the probability of banking crisis by only 1.7 to 2.8 percent, 
depending on the econometric specification used.   
To explain the penchant for household credit growth, we resort to the channel of 
domestic political conditions such as government approval ratings and time to 
elections in the empirical framework. In the presence of well-functioning, 
independent central bank, political factors may have lower impact on the domestic 
credit growth. Hence, the analysis takes on board the central bank independence as a 
‘pacifier’ variable for household credit boom. The findings show that when the 
incumbent government is concerned about their approval ratings, there is a higher 
likelihood of a credit boom, which in turn increases the probability of banking crisis. 
We also find that the chance of banking crises diminishes in the lead up to elections, 
which can be attributed to the policies adopted by the incumbents in order to enhance 
the prospects of retaining the power after the elections. Central bank independence, 
however, works well as a dampening factor as conjectured before. The results show 
that the presence of independent central bank reduces the probability of banking 
crisis by controlling the likelihood of unsustainable credit boom.  
The third essay concentrates on the mitigation of financial crises and investigates the 
role of fiscal policy initiatives along with political economy factors during financial 
crises. The effectiveness of stimulus measures is then assessed at times of economic 
recessions as there is evidence that financial crises and economic recessions are often 
intertwined and the appropriate policy designs should address both of the above 
ailments simultaneously. Our analysis reveals differential impact of fiscal stimulus 
on the probability of exiting financial crises and economic recessions. The results 
indicate that expansionary fiscal policy has a one year lagged effect in ending 
financial crises, while it takes two years for the fiscal stimulus to guide countries out 
from economic recessions.  
In addition, the essay investigates possible political factors influencing countries 
decisions to implement stimulus measures. Since most of the stimulus packages are 
subject to parliamentary approval, we collect data on political constraints which 
show the ability of one party to alter legislation. Interestingly, the results suggest that 
political constraints do not have any bearing in determining fiscal stimulus at times 
xv
of crises. However, during economic recessions, political constraints tend to reduce 
the probability of expansionary fiscal policy.   
Overall, the thesis suggests that disregarding political and institutional variables in 
explaining financial crises may result in limited understanding of the driving forces. 
It makes a convincing case for political regime stability, independent central banks, 
and swift response to financial crises.  
1 
Introduction Chapter 1:
The years since the 1970s saw extraordinary volatility in commodity prices, 
exchange rates, stock returns and the real estate market (Kindleberger and Aliber, 
2011). These developments found their repercussions in increased number of 
financial crises across advanced and emerging market economies (Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2011). The frequency of crises during the 1945-1971 periods was near zero, 
whereas after 1971, the financial crises have become more prevalent (Schularik and 
Taylor, 2012). Leaven and Valencia (2012) study all systemic banking, currency and 
sovereign debt crises both in developing and developed countries from 1970 to 2011. 
The authors identify 147 banking, 218 currency and 66 sovereign debt crisis during 
this time span.  
In addition, the crisis events of the past two decades have reinforced the notion that 
no country is immune from financial crises. Banking crises in the UK and Nordic 
countries in early 1990s, subprime lending crisis in the USA in 2007-2008 and the 
recent Eurozone debt crisis have shown that advanced economies are as vulnerable to 
financial crises as emerging economies. Reinhart and Rogoff (2014) conclude that 
per capita GDP of the most advanced economies is still below than it was before the 
onset of the 2008-09 financial crisis.  
Moreover, due to interconnectedness of the global economy, regional financial crisis 
ended up having an impact in global scale. For instance, regional crisis in the Latin 
America in 1982 spread the contagion to the other emerging and advanced 
economies. As a result, global economy saw 0.8 per cent decline in the output 
(Cleassens and Kose, 2014).  Similarly, the subprime lending crisis that started in the 
housing sector of the USA rapidly spread to other countries. As a result, world per 
capita output contracted by 1.9 per cent in 2009. 
Apart from output effect, financial crises have their lingering effects over the public 
finances. Reinhart et al. (2012) consider the group of 22 advanced and 48 emerging 
market economies and conclude that the GFC has left a legacy of high public debt. 
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Increased government spending, high inflation, bailout of banks, reduction in the 
growth rates and many other factors were among the contributors to public debt 
overhang. 
Due to the high frequency and associated damage to the real economy, financial 
crises have been one of the central topics in the empirical and theoretical literature. 
The majority of the empirical studies focus on the macroeconomic causes. For 
instance, Goldfajn and Valdes (1998) examine data from 17 developed and 9 
developing countries from 1984 to 1997 and find that overvaluation of the exchange 
rate has a predictive power in explaining currency crises. Demirguc-Kunt et al. 
(1998) consider factors contributing to incidence of systemic banking crises in a 
large number of emerging and advanced economies. The major finding of the paper 
is that weak economic fundamentals, particularly, high inflation and weak economic 
growth are the major predictors of banking crisis. Similarly, Manasse and Roubini 
(2009) put most of the blame on a number of macroeconomic factors1 in predicting 
the sovereign debt crises. 
While the weak macroeconomic fundamentals have been identified as key 
contributors to financial crises, potential political and institutional factors that may 
explain poor macroeconomic policy choices before, during or after the crises 
received limited attention in the literature.  This may lead to incomplete 
understanding of the causes and consequences of financial crises as political factors 
determine the manner in which economic policies are chosen and implemented 
(Horowitz and Heo, 2001).  
In this thesis we examine different institutional and political dimensions of financial 
crises, along with standard macroeconomic causes. Particularly, the thesis 
contributes to the understanding of financial crises by incorporating political and 
institutional factors such as regime type, domestic approval rates, time-to-elections, 
central bank independence and political constraints.  
                                               
1  The variables identified to have a predictive power are total external debt-to-GDP ratio; short-term 
debt-to-reserves ratio; real GDP growth; public external debt-to-fiscal revenue ratio; CPI inflation; 
number of years to the next presidential election; U.S. treasury bills rate; external financial 
requirements (current account balance plus short-term debt as a ratio of foreign reserves); exchange 
rate overvaluation; and exchange rate volatility. 
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There are a handful of papers focusing on the political roots of financial crises. For 
example, Shimpalee and Breuer (2006) argue that despite being initiated by large 
scale capital outflows, it is the institutional factors that set the preconditions for 
capital outflows. In particular, the authors find that corruption, weak government 
stability, de facto fixed exchange rate and weak rule of law are among key 
contributors to the incidence of currency crisis. Similarly, Herrera et al. (2014) 
conclude that domestic political circumstances may lay the fundamentals for banking 
crises. The authors suggest that the incumbent governments in emerging market 
economies may allow for unsustainable credit growth to improve their popularity, 
which may expose the country to banking crises. Kraay and Nehru (2006) show that 
the quality of policies and institutions are among the factors explaining a substantial 
fraction of variations in the incidence of debt crises. These papers posit that in the 
absence of political and institutional checks and balances, there is a high probability 
that the incumbent might avoid implementing necessary policies for reforming the 
economy due to high political costs. In the context of this paper, this suggests that the 
government may delay painful economic reforms to avoid or mitigate the effects of 
financial crises to keep its constituency satisfied and increase the chances of re-
election (Horowitz and Heo, 2001).  
The role of political veto players has also been widely discussed with regards to the 
conduct of expansionary fiscal and monetary policy. On one hand, it is believed that 
the presence of political constraints helps the economy by improving the quality of 
public policies. Political veto players ensure that governments are not engaged in 
opportunistic fiscal stimulus programs. On the other hand, political constraints may 
be a significant obstacle for exiting economic downturns. For example, Ha and Kang 
(2014) argue that in the presence of political gridlock, the effects of both fiscal and 
monetary policy are lower. The authors use data for veto power and conclude that 
political constraints may result in delaying necessary reforms.  
Another important dimension that needs to be taken into account is the time-to-
elections. One strand of the literature reports evidence in favour of political business 
cycles which suggests that governments may manipulate fiscal and monetary policy 
to attract voters. Shi and Svensson (2006) use the dataset covering 85 countries and 
conclude that governments tend to increase spending in the lead up to elections and 
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hoping to get rewarded by the electorate. On the contrary, Brender (2003) finds that 
tightening government balance before elections increases the prospects of re-
election. The arguments of above mentioned papers are valid when the countries 
under inspection are democracies, where the government is accountable for its 
actions. As a result, people have the power to punish the incumbent.   
In the light of the discussions above, this thesis studies financial crises putting 
particular emphasis on a broader array of institutional and political variables. It 
consists of three empirical chapters. Each of the chapters contributes to the literature 
by identifying issues that have not been addressed before.  
Chapter 2 examines the effect of political regime type on the probability of 
experiencing banking, currency or sovereign debt crisis. Existing papers studying the 
role of regime type in financial crisis context have considered the role of autocracies 
and democracies. In this chapter we compare these opposite regime types along with 
considering the effect of transition between these political arrangements. Studying 
the effect of experiencing political regime transition on the probability of financial 
crises is the novelty of this chapter. The second important contribution of the chapter 
is to incorporate the duration of the regime in our model, which has largely been 
ignored in this context. Finally, the chapter attempts to tackle potential endogeneity 
problem by employing instrumental variables probit model and synthetic control 
method.   
In the baseline empirical specification, we consider combined crisis dummy. If in a 
given year a country experiences at least one of the banking, currency or sovereign 
debt crisis, the dependent variable takes the value of 1, and 0, otherwise. We 
consider 58 countries from 1960 to 2010. The data for financial crises have been 
taken from the influential paper by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). To perform 
robustness check, we consider the return on long-term government bond (LTGB) or 
long-term government bond yield as a dependent variable. Existing studies argue that 
materialized or prospective financial crisis has a negative effect on sovereign bond 
values (Mody and Sandri, 2012; Lane, 2012). Our data also provides anecdotal 
evidence that there is a strong correlation between vulnerability to financial crises 
and return on sovereign bond. Hence, the idea of using alternative dependent variable 
5 
relies on assumption that when countries experience any sort of financial crisis, 
markets will react by increasing the yield on LTGB.  
Initial estimates show that being an autocracy or democracy, per se, does not affect 
the probability of experiencing any crisis. Rather, it is the duration of the regime that 
affects this relationship. For instance, the empirical estimations suggest that the 
longer the duration of autocracy, the lower the probability of financial crises. 
Duration of democracy, however, has no statistically significant impact on 
experiencing any crisis in the baseline analysis.  We then disentangle aggregate crisis 
dummy into banking, currency and sovereign debt crisis dummies and use each of 
them as a dependent variable. The estimations show that duration of democracy 
increases the likelihood of banking crises and has no effect over the probability of 
other types of financial crises. 
To check the robustness of earlier findings, we use LTGB yields as a dependent 
variable. The results indicate that the duration of democracy variable is still 
statistically significant.  In other words, the spell of democracy reduces the yields on 
LTGB. This result could be interpreted as a support for the “democratic advantage” 
hypothesis (Schulz and Weingast, 2003). According to this theory, due to the 
apparent advantages of democratic regimes, such as transparency, better access to 
financial markets, accountability to electorate, the incumbent governments are 
expected to make more credible commitments to the creditors. Hence, on average 
democracies pay less interest on the government bonds. Our finding confirms the 
“democratic advantage” hypothesis and reveals that despite having no bearing on the 
probability of banking crisis, duration of democracy reduces the return on LTGB.   
Finally, we also find that the most vulnerable group of countries to experience 
financial crises are those that are transitioning from autocracy to democracy. 
Interestingly, when the country transfers from democracy to autocracy, the change in 
the probability of experiencing crisis is not statistically significant.  
Having concluded that the duration of democracy increases the propensity of 
experiencing banking crisis, the third chapter of the thesis revisits the determinants of 
banking crises in advanced economies. Given all 22 countries have been democratic 
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throughout the estimation period (1995 to 2013) we aim to investigate the political 
economy dimension of banking crisis after controlling for macroeconomic factors.  
There are a number of reasons for the exclusive focus on banking crisis.  First and 
foremost, there is evidence that banking crises are prevalent in the advanced 
economies in comparison to other financial crises (Laeven and Valencia, 2012). 
Second, the effects of banking crisis are quite pervasive as they adversely affect the 
real economy in a country. For example, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) find that in the 
aftermath of banking crises, the output declines on average by nine per cent, whereas 
unemployment increases by seven per cent, revealing the magnitude of the banking 
crisis. Third, banking crisis often foreshadows the sovereign debt crisis, thus making 
the banking crisis event as a harbinger of the debt problem countries may face (see, 
inter alia, Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011).  
Empirical literature has identified unsustainable credit growth as one of the key 
determinants of banking crises (Schularik and Taylor, 2012; Aikman et al., 2014). 
However, not all credit booms are unsustainable (see, Mendoza and Terrones, 2012; 
Dell’Ariccia, 2014). Martin and Ventura (2014) argue that the credit boom may 
become the credit bubble when expansion in credit is not motivated by the future 
growth in profit, but by the availability of future credit.  
The first part of the chapter investigates the impact of credit growth on the likelihood 
of banking crises. We use data on aggregate lending to investigate this impact.  We 
then proceed with explaining the driver of the result established in the previous 
section. For this purpose, we disentangle the data on domestic credit into household 
credit and enterprise credit. This split has been employed by Beck et al. (2012) in the 
economic growth context, but has not been used to analyse banking crisis. Moreover, 
the paper carefully addresses endogeneity problem which is one the shortcomings 
identified from the extant literature.  
Analysing the above mentioned important issues, this chapter makes several key 
contributions. First, we incorporate important institutional and political variables, 
including time-to-elections, government stability, and central bank independence, to 
explain the determinants of credit boom. Second, we split the aggregate lending 
measure into enterprise and household credit to reveal the differential impact of these 
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two credit measures. Third, the paper employs unique methodology, the bivariate 
probit model, to account for joint determination of credit boom and banking crises in 
a system of equations which addresses the potential endogeneity problem.     
The results reveal that the household credit has a bigger impact on the probability of 
experiencing banking crisis than the enterprise credit. To be precise, a 1 per cent 
increase in enterprise credit increases the probability of banking crisis by 1.7 to 2.8 
per cent, whereas similar increase in household credit increases the probability of 
banking crisis by 6 to 8.2 per cent, depending on the econometric specification. 
We also find that if the governments are concerned about their domestic approval 
rates, then there is a higher likelihood of credit boom, which in turn increases the 
prospect of banking crisis. In other words, the lower the domestic approval rates, the 
higher the probability of banking crisis through the unsustainable domestic credit 
growth channel. However, the presence of an independent and well-functioning 
central bank reduces the opportunistic behaviour of the governments. The findings 
point that independent central banks are vital for safeguarding financial stability.  
Having examined the causes of financial crises in the earlier chapters, in chapter 4 
we concentrate on possible factors which enhances countries prospects in getting out 
from the financial quagmire. Given the interconnectedness of the financial crises and 
economic recessions (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Claessens et al., 2010), the 
paper then reassesses the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus- fiscal expansion at times of 
economic recessions.  
The results of the chapter suggest that expansionary fiscal policy is more effective in 
ending both financial crises and economic recessions. However, its usefulness is 
more immediate at times of financial crises, i.e. expansionary fiscal policy helps a 
country to exit financial crisis after one year. On the other hand, at times of economic 
recessions the effect of expansionary fiscal policy comes with two year lag. Fiscal 
expansion undertaken in a given year is expected to increase the likelihood of exiting 
crisis next year by 18 to 42 per cent depending on the empirical models used.   
Furthermore, we analyse the impact of political constraints on the likelihood of the 
approval of fiscal stimulus. To concentrate on the countries that have engaged in 
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fiscal stimulus, and to address potential endogeneity problem partially, this paper 
uses a probit model with Heckman selection. The exogenous variables are used to 
explain the decision to implement expansionary fiscal policy in the first stage. The 
second stage of the system of equations establishes the relationship between fiscal 
stimulus and ending financial crises or recessions. Hence, probit model with 
Heckman selection helps to reduce potential bias coming from reverse causality.  
We find that political constraint, which is the proxy for the number of political veto 
players, reduces the likelihood of expansionary fiscal policy at times of economic 
recessions. This suggests that high number of political veto players may affect the 
process of approving expansionary measures. On the contrary, political constraints 
have no effect in determining fiscal stimulus at times of financial crises.  
The paper also employs panel vector autoregression (PVAR) model as another way 
of addressing the endogeneity problem. The results obtained from this method are 
consistent with the previous results.  
In general, the thesis highlights the importance of political economy and institutional 
variables in investigating financial crises. The thesis identifies several shortcomings 
in the literature and contributes to the stock of knowledge by addressing these gaps. 
More specifically, it studies the impact of political regime transition on the 
probability of financial crises, explains political determinants of credit booms and 
assesses the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus at times of financial crises and economic 
recessions. Overall, the thesis establishes the beneficial effect of independent central 
banks, political stability and rapid response to financial crises. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we investigate how 
political regime type affects the probability of experiencing financial crises. The 
chapter also addresses the effect of regime duration and transition between regimes 
on vulnerability to crises. Chapter 3 discusses the relationship between credit growth 
and banking crises and explores political and institutional factors behind 
unsustainable credit growth. Finally, in Chapter 4 we analyse the role of 
expansionary fiscal policy in mitigation financial crises and economic recessions. 
Chapter 5 concludes the thesis. 
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Political Regimes and Financial Crises Chapter 2:
2.1 Introduction 
Financial disruption to the subprime mortgage market in the US rapidly escalated 
and transformed into a full-fledged GFC in 2008 (Mishkin 2011). The most 
distinguishing feature of the GFC is that it originated in advanced economies. Until 
2007–2008, there was a belief that advanced economies were less vulnerable to 
financial crises compared to emerging market economies (Reinhart and Rogoff 
2014). However, the subprime crisis and the following European debt crisis proved 
that this presumption was wrong. The crisis hit advanced economies first and quickly 
spread through developing countries. As a result, following below-trend output 
growth in 2008, the global economy declined by 1.8 per cent in 2009. This was the 
largest contraction in world GDP since World War II. 
Such a widespread crisis underlines the importance of having a solid understanding 
of financial crises (Claessens et al. 2014). The large body of literature on the causes 
and consequences of crises has mainly focused on the economic determinants (for 
seminal papers, see Krugman 1979; Diamond and Dybvig 1983; Minsky 1975; 
Kindleberger 1978; for more recent analysis, see Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999; 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 1998; for an excellent overview of financial crises, 
see, inter alia, Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). However, since the early 2000s, more 
researchers have integrated the quality of economic and political institutions into 
their studies. For example, Shimpalee and Breuer (2006) argue that, while currency 
crises are directly initiated by large-scale capital outflows, it begs the question: 
‘What causes large-scale capital outflows?’ Van Rijckenghem and Weder (2009) 
conclude that political institutions are important in explaining internal and external 
debt crises. Herrera et al. (2014) study the relationship between credit growth and 
banking crises and find that political conditions may play a central role in setting the 
pre-conditions for crises. Horowitz and Heo (2001) claim that, despite having similar 
macroeconomic indicators, governments with different ideologies may deliver 
different economic outcomes. That is, the economic fate of a country depends on 
economic fundamentals, as well as on the political regime in the country. 
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In light of this discussion, this chapter studies the relationship between regime types 
and the probability of experiencing a financial crisis. There are both empirical and 
theoretical grounds for expecting a significant effect of regime type on the incidence 
of financial crises. Authoritarian and democratic regimes differ in many ways, 
including choice of economic policy, attitude towards electorate, individual liberties, 
transparency and political participation. For example, by definition, democratic 
governments are expected to serve diverse interest groups, while authoritarian 
leaders implement economic policies that benefit concentrated interest groups. That 
is, non-democracies are controlled by the rich elite (Acemoglu and Robinson 2001). 
Hence, authoritarian leaders are more likely to compromise long-term growth 
objectives if political or personal ties are involved. For example, Horowitz and Heo 
(2001) note that during the authoritarian rule of president Suharto in Indonesia, 
despite technocrats’ efforts to liberalise the economy, those efforts fell short of 
challenging vested interests. The authors argue that the president often blocked 
liberalisation plans in sectors where the business interests of his family and allies 
would suffer. 
In this regard, a lack of autonomy under democratic regimes may result in 
unsustainable macroeconomic policies. That is, concerned about being punished by 
the electorate, democratic governments may choose unnecessary but popular 
economic policies to sustain their domestic popularity. For instance, Koesel et al. 
(2015) find that democratic leaders who are worried about delivering economic 
growth are keener to pursue inflationary monetary policy, overvalue the exchange 
rate and hold small foreign reserves. These are important pre-conditions for currency 
crises. Moreover, the authors highlight the importance of the lag between 
distortionary policies and the occurrence of currency crises. That is, by the time 
distortionary policies result in a currency crisis, the incumbent government that is 
responsible for the crisis no longer holds the post. 
Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) consider the impact of the economic policies 
under democratic and non-democratic setup on economic growth. The author cites 
several papers arguing that pressure for redistributive policies in democratic regimes 
induce higher taxes, which results in slower economic growth. The authors use non-
democratic East Asian countries as an illustrative validation to this theoretical 
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conjecture. In other words, the authors believe that neglecting pressure for 
redistributive purposes and safeguarding foreign investment were among the most 
important determinants of high growth rates in non-democratic countries of East 
Asia.  
Motivated by a different set of constraints discussed above and policy choices under 
an authoritarian and democratic setup, this chapter examines how being an autocracy, 
democracy or transitioning between these opposing political regimes affects the 
probability of a financial crisis. This chapter considers three major types of financial 
crises: banking, currency and sovereign debt. 
This chapter contributes to the existing literature by identifying and addressing the 
following shortcomings. First, the extant literature typically concentrates on two 
extremes: autocracy versus democracy (Przeworski et al. 2000). To the best of our 
knowledge, the current study is the first to explore the effects of being in transition
from a non-democratic to a democratic state and, vice versa, the effects of reverse 
transition from a democratic to an authoritarian regime. We show that transitioning 
economies are the most vulnerable group of countries in experiencing financial 
crises. Conversely, reverse transition is not statistically significant in the baseline 
specification. However, when we control for potential endogeneity, the results 
indicate that the transition from a democracy to an autocracy reduces the likelihood 
of a financial crisis. 
Moreover, in addition to considering the effects of political regimes, per se, this 
chapter studies the effect of the tenure of political regimes. Van Rijckenghem (2009) 
concludes that regime tenure is an important factor in preventing autocratic countries 
from defaulting. However, the author only studies debt crises. This chapter 
investigates the relationship between regime duration and the probability of 
experiencing at least one of the major financial crises considered. Hence, the second 
contribution of this paper is to incorporate the tenure of the regime into the empirical 
analysis. 
Third, we overcome the potential endogeneity that might arise from reverse causality 
or omitted variables bias. For example, the relationship between regime type and 
crisis may run from the political regime to the crisis and in the reverse direction. 
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Gasirowski (1995) argues that economic crises may undermine the legitimacy of 
political regimes in both autocracies and democracies. Hence, crises may trigger the 
breakdown of political regimes. Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) show that regime 
changes are more likely to occur during recessionary periods. Haggard and Kaufman 
(1995) conclude that there were many transitions to democracies in Latin America 
during economic crises. 
To control for endogeneity, this chapter uses the average Polity score of the region 
lagged by five years as an instrument for the country’s current Polity score. The 
rationale behind the instrument choice is that the Polity score of the neighbouring 
country does not directly affect the probability of a financial crisis in the country. 
However, it may affect the country’s Polity score, which may in turn trigger a 
financial crisis. In addition, the correlation between regional and country Polity 
scores is 0.6, which is statistically significant. Hence, the instrument is relevant and 
satisfies the exclusion restriction. Koesel et al. (2015) choose a similar instrument. 
This chapter employs different econometric techniques to establish the relationship 
between political regimes and financial crises. Given that the dependent variable is 
the binary crisis indicator, the baseline specification consists of estimating the binary 
logit model. We then proceed with replacing the crisis dummy with the number of 
crises experienced in a country in a given year. Given that we consider banking, 
currency and sovereign debt crises, the dependent variable takes a value from 0 to 3 
(0 corresponding to a year when no crisis took place, 3 corresponding to a year when 
all three crises occurred). In this case, the binary logit model is no longer appropriate. 
Hence, we employ the ordered logit model to scrutinise the effect of political factors 
on the number of crises. 
We perform several robustness checks to confirm our findings. First, we replace the 
binary crisis indicator with a continuous long-term government bond (LTGB) yields 
variable. The empirical and theoretical literature suggests that adverse developments 
in macroeconomic conditions have repercussions for returns on LTGBs 2  (Lane 
2012). When a financial crisis occurs, the LTGB yield is expected to increase to 
                                               
2 Note that terms “return on LTGB” and “LTGB yield” are used interchangeably. 
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reflect the increasing sovereign risk. Therefore, as a robustness check, instead of a 
binary crisis dummy, we use the continuous yield variable as a dependent variable. 
As a starting point, the relationship between political regimes and the LTGB yield is 
estimated by employing the OLS model. However, acknowledging that this method 
could suffer from the endogeneity problem, we employ the method proposed by 
Lewbel (2012). The Lewbel (2012) method helps to overcome the endogeneity 
problem by estimating an equation with an instrumental variables technique when 
sufficient instruments are not available. 
To perform the robustness check for the results associated with transition economies, 
this chapter uses the synthetic control method (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003). This 
method is useful for assessing the effects of one-off events on certain outcomes. In 
the context of the present study, we employ the synthetic control method to assess 
the effects of political transition on LTGB yields. Given the binary nature of the 
crisis variable, the synthetic control method is not applicable for the baseline 
specification. Therefore, the method is applied in the model where the dependent 
variable is the continuous LTGB yield variable. It is worth noting that, due to data 
availability, the synthetic control method is only applied to a subset of the countries.3
As a final robustness check, we separate the crisis dummy into banking crisis, 
currency crisis and debt crisis dummies and use each one as a dependent variable. 
This helps us to test whether the results of the baseline specification hold for each 
type of financial crisis. 
Our estimations show that being in an autocracy or democracy per se does not affect 
the probability of experiencing a financial crisis. Interestingly, the most vulnerable 
group of countries to a crisis are those that are in transition from an autocracy to a 
democracy. This finding is also confirmed when we gauge the effects of transition on 
the LTGB yield by running a falsification exercise using the synthetic control 
method. Specifically, we show that if countries remain in an autocracy, they will 
have a lower return on LTGB. This suggests that the transition to a democracy is 
associated with a higher sovereign risk. 
                                               
3  The countries under scrutiny are Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Thailand, Portugal, UK, and US.   
16 
Our logit estimations show that the transition to an autocracy does not tend to affect 
the likelihood of a crisis. However, when we control for endogeneity, the results 
show that switching to authoritarian rule reduces the probability of a crisis. 
The other major finding is that the longer the duration of the autocratic regime, the 
lower the probability of experiencing a financial crisis. That is, even though being an 
autocracy does not increase the probability of a crisis per se, its duration reduces this 
probability. Duration of democracy does not have a statistically significant 
coefficient in our baseline model. Interestingly, when the dependent variable is the 
LTGB yield, the tenure of both democracies and autocracies has a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient. Given that the tenure of both political regimes 
reduces the return on bonds, this result can be interpreted as markets putting more 
emphasis on the regime’s stability rather than its type. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 provides a broad 
overview of the relevant theoretical and empirical literature and highlights the major 
findings. Section 2.3 describes the relevant data and descriptive statistics. Section 2.4 
explains the econometric methodology. Section 2.5 discusses the results and findings 
from the benchmark models and Section 2.6 concludes the chapter. 
2.2 Literature Review 
A strand of the literature has explored the channels through which political regimes 
affect the choice of economic policy. In addition, a number of scholars have tested 
the predictions of theoretical literature in empirical analysis. We discuss the major 
findings of the theoretical literature in the first subsection and then proceed with a 
discussion of the empirical research.
2.2.1 Theoretical literature 
Attitudes towards electorates have been one of the widely discussed factors that 
shape the behaviour of the incumbent government. Consequently, most of the 
theoretical literature has highlighted this channel with regards to policy choice across 
different political regimes. 
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One of the major differences between autocracies and democracies is their 
accountability to the electorate. By definition, voters have the power to punish the 
government for poor macroeconomic performance in democracies. Therefore, a 
strand of the literature argues that democratic governments are more committed to 
avoid financial crises to elude being punished. For instance, Schultz and Weingast 
(2003) argue that democracies are expected to be more committed to paying back 
their debt due to higher political costs. According to the authors, breaking 
international agreements and obligations will result in the loss of constituency and a 
lower chance of re-election. Moreover, the authors contend that, due to higher 
credibility, democracies have the ability to borrow large sums at lower interest rates. 
Conversely, accountability may well become a disadvantage for democratic regimes 
by pushing them to implement policies that are not necessary but that deliver rapid 
results. Similarly, democratic governments may choose to avoid or postpone 
necessary painful economic reforms to avoid a loss of constituency (Horowitz and 
Heo 2001). In contrast, their choice of policies may serve to boost their domestic 
popularity and increase their chance of re-election, even at the expense of harmful 
economic policies. From this perspective, accountability makes democracies more 
fragile to financial crises by creating dangerous pre-conditions. For example, Koesel 
et al. (2015) study the relationship between political regimes and currency crises. 
The authors posit that, due to political costs and benefits, some policymakers avoid 
prudent macroeconomic policies and lack strong incentives to prevent currency 
crises. Such governments usually choose inflationary monetary policies, overvalue 
the exchange rate and keep small foreign reserve holdings, as most of the domestic 
constituencies benefit from these policies in the short run. However, over the long 
run, these policies increase the likelihood of currency crises. This study finds that 
autocracies are less prone to currency crises than democracies. Moreover, the authors 
differentiate between different types of dictatorships and conclude that currency 
crises are rarest among monarchic dictatorships. 
In this regard, the greater autonomy that authoritarian leaders enjoy may help them to 
deliver effective economic policies. However, authoritarian leaders are not fully 
autonomous either; they are usually concerned about maintaining credibility among 
what they consider crucial interest groups, such as their friends, family and 
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influential businesspeople. The prospect of maintaining legitimacy among crucial 
interest groups often leads incumbent governments to interfere with the autonomy of 
central banks and other economic agencies (Horowitz and Heo 2001). Disruption to 
the autonomy of technocrats and economic policies that only benefit elites are among 
the factors that make authoritarian regimes vulnerable to crises. 
Another important difference between autocracies and democracies in regard to the 
conduct of economic policy relates to the time horizon of the incumbent government. 
Easterly (2002) argues that if autocracies only expect to stay in power for a short 
period, they will value the future less than democracies; hence, they have little 
incentive to implement economic stabilisation programs. Koesel et al. (2015) 
confirm this finding and claim that, due to the lagged effect of distortionary policies, 
short-sighted incumbent governments may have few incentives to prevent crises. 
Further, Mansfield and Snyder (2002) conclude that different policy choices in 
democracies and autocracies result from mutually reinforcing a set of institutional, 
informational and normative characteristics such as accountability to cost-conscious 
voters, transparency of facts and preferences in policy debates, and attitude towards 
civil liberties. Oatley (2010) argues that autocrats spend a smaller share of borrowed 
money on investments compared to democracies. In other words, under autocracies 
borrowed money becomes less productive and over time, autocracies accumulate 
more external debt than democratic regimes. 
String of the literature explain how per capita income affects the probability of 
switching from autocracy to democracy or vice versa. Being aware of this 
relationship, leaders in both political regimes may pursue such economic policies 
that minimizes the risk of economic crisis. For example, Przeworski (2005) develops 
a theoretical model where political parties compete under democratic setup and 
decide whether to comply with the outcome or to launch a struggle for dictatorship. 
One of the key findings of the paper is that democracies prevail in sufficiently wealth 
countries. The author shows that no democracy was replaced by autocracy in a 
country where per capita income is higher than that of Argentina in 1975, $6055. 
This result shed lights on the role of economic crisis in undermining democracy. 
More specifically, economic crises negatively impact per capita income, which 
increases the likelihood of autocratic transition. Desai et al. (2008) argue that fall in 
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income reduces the “authoritarian bargaining power”4. Hence, the author argues that 
authoritarian leaders try to avoid economic crises to prevent disloyalty and rapid loss 
of legitimacy and manage to stay in the power for long period of time by rigging the 
elections (McFaul, 2002). To summarize, not only the regime type, but also regime 
duration may have an impact on the probability of experiencing crisis.   
2.2.2 Empirical literature 
The empirical literature has highlighted various links between types of political 
regimes and financial crises. Giordano and Tommasino (2011) study the effect of 
political institutions on domestic debt crises and show that some sovereign borrowers 
are more prone to default than others due to features of their political and monetary 
institutions. According to the authors, a sovereign default is the outcome of a 
political struggle among different groups of citizens. It is less likely to occur if 
domestic debt-holders are politically strong. Similarly, Kraay (2006) studies the 
sustainability of external debt and confirms that non-financial variables are key 
determinants of debt distress—especially the quality of policies and institutions. The 
regression results provide clear evidence in favour of this relationship. Van 
Rijckeghem (2009) explores a large number of political and macroeconomic 
variables using a non-parametric technique to predict safety from default. The author 
concludes with different findings for dictatorial and democratic regimes, suggesting 
that in the presence of effective checks and balances (which is the case for 
democracies and parliamentary systems) and strong economic fundamentals, the 
probability of a sovereign debt crisis is very low. For autocratic regimes, regime 
tenure and high political stability keep countries away from default in the presence of 
strong liquidity. Kohlscheen (2010) provides evidence in favour of parliamentary 
democracies and coalition governments. As a key factor, the author highlights the 
number of veto players and regime tenure. Saeigh (2009) concludes that coalition 
governments are less crisis-prone compared to single-party governments. 
The literature also documents the indirect effects of the political environment on the 
probability of a crisis. For example, according to the ‘democratic advantage’ thesis 
(Schultz and Weingast 2003), democracies should pay lower interest rates than 
                                               
4 This term refers to implicit arrangements between ruling elites and citizens where people abandon 
their political rights in an exchange to government spending.  
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authoritarian regimes because they are better able to make credible commitments. 
Lower interest rates and higher credit ratings on government debt decrease the 
probability of external default by reducing debt servicing costs. 
2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Due to the availability of data, we use a panel of 58 countries with annual 
observations from 1960 to 2010.5 The list of countries that we include in the dataset 
is provided in the Appendix. 
2.3.1 Dependent variables 
This thesis studies the effects of political regimes on the probability of experiencing 
a financial crisis. We consider a combined crisis indicator, which equals 1 if a 
country experiences at least one of the major crisis types—banking, currency or 
sovereign debt—in a given year. Consequently, the dependent variable is the crisis 
dummy, which takes the value of 1 or 0.6
The rationale behind considering a combined crisis index is that we are interested in 
capturing the effects of political regimes on countries’ vulnerability to different 
economic crises. The data used to construct the crisis dummy are mostly derived 
from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).7 The authors study different types of financial 
crises for 70 countries from 1800 to 2010. However, we do not limit ourselves to 
only this dataset; we also derive crisis data from Caprio and Klingebiel (2008) and 
Laeven and Valencia (2012).8 Following Ranciere (2008) and Cavallo and Cavallo 
                                               
5 Some transition countries (e.g., Russia, Ukraine) were excluded from the analysis due to a lack of 
data (in particular, data on government finances and LTGB yields were missing for most of the years). 
However, to avoid sample selection bias, we included 34 countries that have been an autocracy at 
some point (or across the dataset) and 24 pure democracies. Further, the dataset contains both crisis-
prone (e.g., Argentina, Mexico) and non-crisis-prone countries (e.g., Australia, Sweden, Norway).
6 For example, according to data sources, in 1962 Argentina experienced both currency crisis and debt 
crisis. In the baseline specification we code dependent variable, i.e., combined crisis dummy as 1. In 
other words, dependent variable differentiates only between crisis and tranquil periods.  
7 The authors define banking crises as events in which a bank run leads to closure, merging or a 
takeover by the public sector of one or more financial institutions. Currency crises are defined as 
annual depreciation versus the US dollar of 15 per cent or more. Sovereign debt crises are defined as a 
failure to meet the principal or interest on the due date, or rescheduling sovereign debt with less 
favourable terms to the lender. 
8 Caprio and Klingebiel (2008) study banking crises, and Laeven and Valencia (2012) update their 
work and identify 124 systemic banking crises over the period 1970–2007. 
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(2010), we deem that a country has experienced a financial crisis if at least two 
sources agree that it has occurred. 
Empirical evidence suggests that financial crises alter the return on government 
bonds. Adverse economic developments in a country are immediately reflected in 
higher bond yields (Lane 2012). Hence, as a robustness check, we replace the binary 
crisis dummy with a continuous LTGB yield variable. For this purpose, we collect 
the data from Thomson Reuter’s Datastream, Eurostat and the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics dataset. 
2.3.2 Explanatory variables 
The variables of interest are an indicator of political regimes and their tenure (i.e., 
Polity score and regime duration). The data for these variables are taken from the 
Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2011), which is a widely used dataset in 
political economy literature (Acemoglu 2003; Aisen 2013). We use the Polity index 
as the barometer of political regimes.9 This index is calculated by subtracting a 
country’s autocracy score (0–10) from its democracy score (0–10). Hence, the Polity 
index ranges from -10 to 10. However, to avoid negative values, which may be 
problematic in non-linear specifications, we transform the original Polity variable so 
that our variable takes on values from 0 to 20. Yang (2011) considers a country 
autocratic if its’ Polity score is less than 0 (in our case 10), and democratic otherwise. 
The author claims that crossing this threshold on the Polity index is usually 
associated with significant improvements in institutions. We follow previous studies 
and consider a country democratic if its transformed Polity score is above 10. 
Horowitz and Heo (2001) define a dividing line between democracies and transition 
countries: if the first democratic government has been peacefully succeeded by an 
opposition-led government according to democratic rules, the country may be 
classified as an established democracy. Similarly, Brueckner and Ciccone (2011) 
                                               
9 We focus on the democratic nature of a regime. Obviously this is only one dimension of institutions 
in any country. 
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consider a country in transition if, and only if, democratic improvements lead to the 
country being upgraded to a democracy.10
Hence, to differentiate between countries switching from an autocracy to a 
democracy, we create a transit dummy for transition countries and code it 1 for the 
next five years after the transition takes place. That is, if an authoritarian country 
becomes democratic in a given year (i.e., its Polity score increases from the 0–10 
interval to 11–20), we consider it in transition for the next five years. 
For example, Algeria’s Polity score was 7 in 2003 and increased to 12 in 2004. 
Hence, we consider Algeria in democratic transition from 2004 to 2008 (i.e., a five-
year transition period). We code the year 2009 and onwards as a democratic regime 
in Algeria, as the regime has been around for more than five years. 
To allow for longer periods of transition, we also create the transit10 dummy, which 
is coded 1 for the first 10 years after transition. We also capture reverse transitions 
(the reversetransit dummy in the empirical specifications to be discussed later). The 
variable equals 1 when the country moves from a democracy to an autocracy (i.e., the 
Polity score becomes less than or equal to 10 in a given year). 
In our dataset, 27 countries out of 58 experienced a change in their political regime 
from autocratic to democratic at least once between 1960 and 2010. That is, almost 
half of the countries in the sample have experienced this transition. In contrast, 20 
countries experienced a reverse transition—from a democracy to an autocracy (see 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2). This experience needs to be formally taken into account in the 
modelling part of this paper. 
2.3.3 Control variables 
We include data on debt, domestic credit, trade, external balance, official reserves 
and savings as control variables in our econometric estimations. Data for these 
                                               
10A small improvement in the Polity score may lead us to consider a country in transition, while large 
jumps in the Polity score may not. For example, Algeria’s Polity score improved from 1 to 8 in 1989. 
Seven-point gains in our dataset do not affect the transition dummy, as the Polity score is still below 
10. In contrast, El Salvador’s Polity score improved from 10 to 12 in 1982; hence, we consider 1982–
1986 transition years. To capture this factor, we perform a robustness check and define a democratic 
transition as an increase of three points or more, and an autocratic transition as a decrease of three 
points or more in the Polity score. This does not affect our main results.
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variables are derived from different sources, including the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics, the World Bank’s World Development Index, Eurostat, 
Datastream and other national and regional data agencies. Moreover, this study uses 
financial openness to capture the possible contagion effect. Following Aizenman and 
Noy (2013), we use the Chinn-Ito de-jure index for financial openness.
2.3.4 Descriptive statistics 
It is widely accepted that the distribution of financial crises has been uneven 
throughout the twentieth century. There have been few crises in the post-World War 
II period, when the liquidity hoards were ample and leverage was low. Since 1971, 
crises have become more frequent (Schularick and Taylor 2012). Therefore, this fact 
should be taken into account while building an econometric model. 
Conversely, there has also been a global trend towards democratisation since the 
1970s. Figure 2.2 shows the average Polity score of countries in our dataset from 
1960 to 2010. A steady upwards trend starting in the mid-1970s is visible. 
To capture the frequency of financial crises for different political regime types, we 
calculate the average number of crises for each year. A crisis tally may range from 0 
to 3 for a country in a given year. For example, in 1984, Argentina experienced both 
currency and debt crises. Hence, its crisis tally equals 2 for 1984. Figure 2.3 depicts 
the average crisis tally for different political regimes. 
The average crisis tally is lower in democratic countries. In our sample, countries 
with a Polity score over 10 experienced 0.34 crises per year on average. According to 
Figure 2.3, autocracies have experienced a slightly higher number of crises (on 
average 0.42 crises a year). Interestingly, autocratic countries are not the most 
vulnerable group to financial crises. In our dataset, the average crisis tally during the 
first five years of transition is 1.15. If we allocate 10 years for transition, it decreases 
to 1.12. Thus, on average, countries that have a shift in their political regime 
experience at least one financial crisis per year. Countries that experience a transition 
from a democracy to an autocracy do not seem to be as vulnerable. The average 
crisis tally in these countries is slightly higher than those of autocratic regimes. 
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2.4 Econometric Methodology 
2.4.1 Binary logit model 
Given the binary nature of the crisis variable, we estimate the effect of political 
regimes on the occurrence of financial crises by employing a binomial logit 
specification. 
The issue of incidental parameters needs to be taken into account when we use the 
binomial model with country and time fixed effects. This problem arises for non-
linear and/or dynamic models with panel data for fixed T and Nĺ. Estimation of 
the model parameters cannot generally be separated from the estimation of individual 
effects (Fernandez-Val 2009). For linear models, the structural coefficients can be 
estimated consistently using within transformation, which is not the case for non-
linear models (Baltagi 2001). Heckman (1981) argues that in such models, the 
inconsistency in the estimator for the fixed effects is transmitted to the estimator for 
the structural parameters. The author mentions that, in particular, the fixed effects 
probit estimator suffers from this defect. However, Monte-Carlo evidence by Wright 
and Douglas (1976) shows that when T is higher than 20, a fixed effects logit 
estimator performs as well as other consistent estimators. The other way of 
addressing this issue is to use dummies for fixed effects. 
As a result of this discussion, we use the logit model. The econometric specification 
takes the following form: 
݈݋ ݃ ቀ ௉ሺ஼௥௜௦௜௦ୀଵሻଵି௉ሺ஼௥௜௦௜௦ୀଵሻቁ ൌ ߜ௜൅߮௧ ൅ ߚଵ݌݋݈݅ݐݕʹ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶ݀݀ݑݎ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷܽ݀ݑݎ௜௧ିଵ൅ߚସݐݎܽ݊ݏ݅ݐ௧ିଵ ൅
൅ߚହݎ݁ݒ݁ݎݏ݁ݐݎܽ݊ݏ݅ݐ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚࢄ ൅ ߝ௜௧
(1)
where crisis is a binary dependent variable that takes the value of 1 if a country 
experiences one of the major financial crises (BC, CC, DC) in a given year.ܲ݋݈݅ݐݕʹ is 
the Polity score of a country, which is used as a proxy for the country’s political 
regime. The ddur and adur variables represent the duration of democracies and 
autocracies, respectively. These variables are simply the interaction of the 
democracy/autocracy dummies and the existing regime duration from Polity IV. 
Transit is a dummy variable for countries experiencing a transition from an 
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autocratic regime to a democratic regime, while reversetransit denotes the transition 
from a democracy to an autocracy. For simplicity, we focus on the transit5 variable 
specified in the previous section. However, the results of the estimation do not 
change significantly when we use transit10. ࢄᇱ represents the vector of 
macroeconomic and financial variables used as controls. The selection of control 
variables is based on the findings of extensive literature on financial crises. As the 
dependent variable is a combined crisis index, we try to include at least one major 
explanatory variable for each crisis type. Hence, we use public debt-to-GDP ratio, 
domestic credit growth, logarithm of official reserves, external balance of goods and 
services as a percentage of GDP, financial openness index, trade volume as a 
proportion of GDP and GDP growth as control variables. Finally, ߜ௜ and ߮௧  are 
country and time fixed effects respectively. Including country dummies controls for 
time-invariant country characteristics, whereas time dummies are included to 
attribute events that are common to all countries across the dataset. 
Note that both the explanatory and control variables are lagged by one period to 
overcome possible endogeneity bias resulting from reverse causation. Moreover, the 
potential correlation of individual errors within countries is corrected by adjusting 
standard errors for clustering at the country level in all regressions. 
2.4.2 Ordered logit model 
As mentioned in the data section, a country may experience 0 to 3 crisis episodes in a 
given year. That is, if a country experiences sovereign debt, banking and currency 
crises in a given year, then its crisis tally equals 3.11 A higher crisis tally may be an 
indicator of the severity of a country’s economic downturn. In the baseline 
specification, we ignored the crisis tally and focused on the binary crisis indicator. In 
this section, we use the crisis tally as a dependent variable to exploit the difference 
between having one or more crises. 
For this purpose, we use the ordered logit model. This model is used when the 
dependent variable takes more than two categorical values, and the values of each 
category have a meaningful sequential order (i.e., larger values are assumed to 
                                               
11 In our dataset there are 36 observations where crisis tally equals 3. This is just 1.29 per cent of total 
observations.
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correspond to ‘higher’ outcomes). In our setup, the ‘crisis tally’ is a dependent 
variable that takes the following values: 
ܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏݐ݈݈ܽݕ௜௧ ൌ ൞
Ͳ݂݅݊݋ܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ݄ܽ݌݌݁݊ݏ݅݊ܿ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ݅݅݊ݕ݁ܽݎݐ
ͳ݂݅ͳܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ݄ܽ݌݌݁݊ݏ݅݊ܿ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ݅݅݊ݕ݁ܽݎݐ
ʹ݂݅ʹܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ݄ܽ݌݌݁݊ݏ݅݊ܿ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ݅݅݊ݕ݁ܽݎݐ
͵݂݅͵ܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ݄ܽ݌݌݁݊ݏ݅݊ܿ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ݅݅݊ݕ݁ܽݎݐ

Accordingly, the higher the value of the dependent variable, the larger the scope of 
the crisis. Figure 3.4 shows the percentage of observations when different regime 
types experience 0, 1, 2 or 3 crises in a given year. The crisis tally equals 0 for 
almost 70 per cent of observations for autocratic and democratic regimes. Most cases 
where the crisis tally equals more than 1 are in transition economies. 
2.4.3 Instrumental variables for probit model 
The baseline model should be treated cautiously. Potential endogeneity of some of 
the explanatory variables may result in inconsistent estimates of coefficients of 
interest. The problem of endogeneity might appear as a result of omitted variables or 
reverse causality. Empirical evidence suggests that economic problems may result in 
changes in political regimes. Interestingly, the literature shows that economic crises 
not only undermine the legitimacy of democratic regimes, but also autocratic regimes 
(Gasirowski 1995; Markoff and Baretta 1990). Hence, economic crises may trigger 
the breakdown of political regimes in either direction. 
To overcome potential endogeneity, we use all explanatory and control variables in 
Equation (1) in a one-year lagged form in order to decrease the issue of reverse 
causality. However, this approach may not be sufficiently adequate. Although one-
year lagged explanatory variables are useful to reduce the bias resulting from reverse 
causality, it is difficult to conclude that a one-year lag is enough to address the 
problem. There is still room for omitted variable bias and reverse causality. 
This section addresses the issue of potential endogeneity. For this purpose, we use 
instrumental variables for probit as an estimation method by assuming that the error 
terms are normally distributed. The most challenging part of this task is to find a 
good instrument for the political regime indicator. Most studies of the relationship 
between political regimes and probability of crisis have ignored this issue. 
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Nevertheless, a significant amount of research has proposed instruments for 
democracy. 
In this paper, we use a spatial lag variable as an instrument for the Polity score. More 
specifically, we use the average Polity score for the past five years of the country’s 
region as an instrument for Polity. Koesel et al. (2015) use a similar methodology as 
an instrument for monarchic regimes. The authors argue that when a country’s 
neighbours are monarchies, the prevalence of the monarchy in that country becomes 
more feasible. 
Similarly, to gauge the effect of democracy on reforms Guilano et al. (2012) use 
democracy in neighbouring countries as an instrument for democracy score of a 
country. The authors argue that democracy in political allies has direct influence on 
domestic democracy and indirect impact on country’s ability to reform. 
For the purposes of this chapter, the instrument satisfies two conditions for a good 
instrument. First, it is relevant, meaning that it is correlated with the endogenous 
variable. In our dataset, the pairwise correlation between Polity and the regional 
Polity score is 0.60, and it is statistically significant. Second, the instrument satisfies 
the exclusion restriction, meaning that it does not affect the dependent variable 
directly, but through its effect on the endogenous variable. In our case, there is no 
reason to expect that an increase in the five-year lag of Polity of a neighbouring 
country will affect the probability of a financial crisis in other countries. 
There could be an argument about how a wave of democratisation might affect other 
countries in the region, similar to Latin America and former socialist bloc countries. 
However, we expect that the democratisation trend in the region will not directly 
affect the probability of a crisis in a given country, but via increasing the Polity score 
of that country. For example, in the early 2000s, there was a wave of revolutions in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The “Rose Revolution” in Georgia in 2003 resulted 
in the collapse of the autocratic regime and the acquisition of power by democrats. In 
2004, similar events took place in the Ukraine. In this section, we argue that the 
change in Georgia’s Polity score does not directly affect economic crises in Ukraine. 
However, political events in Georgia may have affected economic outcomes in the 
Ukraine by affecting its political situation. Therefore, we believe that the instrument 
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satisfies the exclusion restriction. With this in mind, we divide the countries in the 
dataset into seven regions (Europe, Latin America, North America and Caribbean, 
Australia and Oceania, Africa, Southeast Asia, and the rest of Asia) and calculate the 
average Polity scores. 
We do not use instrumental variables for the logit, as it is difficult to define the 
bivariate distribution of error terms. Therefore, even in the presence of a valid 
instrument, the estimates can still be biased. Conversely, the maximum likelihood 
estimators used for the probit model assume the normal distribution of the error term. 
Further, the derivation of two-step estimators also assumes bivariate normal errors. 
2.4.4 Alternative estimation strategy 
In this section, we discuss alternative estimation strategies employed to cross-
validate our results established in the previous specifications. 
2.4.4.1 OLS model 
We first proceed with replacing the binary crisis indicator with the LTGB. The 
rationale for this method is that once a country experiences a financial crisis, markets 
re-evaluate the solvency of the government. This usually means that the credibility of 
the government decreases as a result of the financial crisis and the yield on its LTGB 
increases. In this regard, one can expect that LTGB yields could be used as an 
alternate measure for vulnerability to financial crises. Consequently, our a priori
expectation is that increasing bond yields are associated with the higher probability 
of a crisis. Figure 3.5 shows that our expectations are correct. It shows the average 
return on LTGBs from 1960 to 2010 (using five-year periods) and the average crisis 
tally in the world for this period. As shown, a higher crisis tally is associated with 
higher bond yields. 
This strategy allows us to use OLS to estimate the following equation: 
ݕ݈݅݁݀ ൌ
ߜ௜൅߮௜ ൅ ߚଵ݌݋݈݅ݐݕʹ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶ݀݀ݑݎ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷܽ݀ݑݎ௜௧ିଵ ൅
൅ߚସݎ݁ݒ݁ݎݏ݁ݐݎܽ݊ݏ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚହݐݎܽ݊ݏ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚࢄ ൅ ߝ݅ݐ
(2)
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In Equation (2), the dependent variable is yield, which represents returns on LTGB, 
while Polity2 is a country’s Polity score, and ddur and adur are the duration of 
democracy and autocracy, respectively. Transit and reversetransit represent the 
transition from an autocracy to a democracy and from a democracy to an autocracy. 
We also include the vector of control variables ሺࢄሻ. Finally, ߜ௜ and ߮௜ are the country 
and time dummies. 
2.4.4.2 Lewbel’s method 
The problem with estimating Equation (2) using OLS is that it is also vulnerable to 
the endogeneity problem. More specifically, yields may be affected by the variables 
that are not captured in Equation (2). This may lead to omitted variables bias. Lewbel 
(2012) proposes a unique method of identification in models with endogenous 
regressors. This technique is useful for estimating an equation with instrumental 
variables where sufficient instruments may not be available. It is useful even in the 
presence of an exogenous instrument, and it serves as a supplement to improve the 
efficiency of the IV estimator. Emran and Hou (2013) employ this method to 
evaluate the effect of access to domestic and international markets on consumption in 
rural China. Using the same identification approach proposed by Lewbel, Chuan et 
al. (2009) jointly estimate the effect of inequality on growth and vice versa. 
In the simplest setup, the instruments generated are constructed from the residuals of 
the first stage of the regression multiplied by each of the exogenous variables in 
mean-centred form: 
 ௝ܼ ൌ ሺ ௝ܺ െ ܺሻതതത כ ߝ (3) 
In this equation, Z is the generated instrument, ௝ܺ and തܺ are exogenous variables and 
their mean-centred form, and İ is the vector of residuals from the first stage of the 
regression of each endogenous regressor on all exogenous regressors, including a 
constant vector. 
2.4.4.3 Synthetic control method 
Finally, to assess how the transition from an autocracy to a democracy affects the 
return on LTGB, we employ the synthetic control method. More specifically, by 
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treating transitions as a one-off external shock, we evaluate their effect on LTGB 
yields by executing the falsification exercise. 
The synthetic control method allows us to estimate the effect of one-off events (e.g., 
policy changes, government intervention and acceptance to international 
organisations). The method was first proposed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003). 
Consider a dataset consisting of N units (this could be countries, regions, cities etc.). 
Now assume that in year ܶ ൌ ݐ଴, unit ܰ ൌ ݊ଵ experiences an exogenous shock that 
does not affect other N-1 countries in the dataset. That is, unit ݊ଵ becomes treated in 
year ݐ଴ . Assuming that the sample consists of both pre-intervention and post-
intervention observations, we rely on the synthetic control method to build an 
‘artificial unit’ that most resembles the characteristics of the treated unit. That is, this 
strategy gives weights (ݓ ) to different non-treated units. Hence, we define the 
synthetic control group as the weighted average of the units in the control group. It is 
important to note that, unlike the regression analysis, this method does not rely on 
extrapolation (i.e., Ͳ ൑ ݓ௜ ൑ ͳǡand ݓଶ ൅ ݓଷ൅Ǥ Ǥ ݓ௡ ൌ ͳ) (Abadie et al. 2014). 
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) apply this method to examine the effect of terrorism 
on the Basque Country’s per capita GDP using other Spanish regions as the control 
group. The authors use this method to calculate the per capita GDP that the Basque 
region in Spain would have experienced in the absence of terrorism by creating a 
‘synthetic Basque Country’ (i.e., synthetic control group) that consists of weighted 
averages of each unit in the control group. 
In summary, this method calculates counter-factual outcomes that may be used as a 
proxy for estimating the effects of the treatment. However, the synthetic control 
method is suitable for models with a continuous dependent variable. Given the nature 
and availability of the data, we employ this empirical method to assess the effect of 
transition on the LTGB yields. Due to a lack of data from earlier periods across a 
number of countries, this section focuses on 21 countries12 for the period 1970–2010. 
We will provide anecdotal evidence from Spain and Portugal, as both countries 
                                               
12 These countries are: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
India, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, 
UK and US.
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experienced a political regime transition, as well as the data for the major dependant 
and explanatory variables that are available for these countries. 
It is worth mentioning that synthetic control exercises should be treated as a further 
cross validation check in our study. Obviously, it would have been better to have a 
control group matching the actual outcomes for more than 10 years. The primary 
reason for this is to give the method enough observations to minimise mean squared 
percentage errors. However, in most of our examples, we have fewer matching years 
due to lack of data. Conversely, it is believed that this technique works better when 
control groups are the regions within a country rather than applying it to cross-
country studies and using other countries as a ‘donor pool’. This is because a 
country’s regions share common external shocks, policy movements etc. However, 
as mentioned above, we treat these results as further evidence to prove the findings 
of the endogeneity-corrected specifications and extensions. 
2.4.4.4 Separating the crisis variable 
To check the robustness of the baseline specification, we replace the combined crisis 
indicator as a dependent variable with individual crisis dummies. That is, we run 
Equation (1) three times after replacing the dependent variable with BC, CC and DC 
dummies. In addition to the explanatory variables already present in Equation (1), we 
add the two remaining crisis dummies as explanatory variables for each crisis 
equation. That is, when the dependent variable is BC, we include the lagged values 
of CC and DC in the equation. This helps to account for the interconnectedness 
between financial crises. Given that the model with the control variables and time 
and country dummies is of primary interest, we will only discuss the results of this 
model. 
2.5 Results and Discussions 
This section highlights the results of the empirical estimations and discusses the 
major findings.
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2.5.1 Results of the binary logit model 
Given that the relationship between the dependent variable and the explanatory 
variables is non-linear, the coefficients from the logistic regression are not directly 
interpretable as in the OLS model. As marginal effects are more intuitive, in this 
section we present the marginal effects of each variable when the rest of the variables 
are in their mean.13 For reasons discussed in the previous sections, specifications that 
include both time and country fixed effects are of primary interest. The results of 
Equation (1) is presented in Table 2.3. 
Before estimating the full model, simple regressions without control variables are 
estimated (both with country and time fixed effects). As mentioned above, all 
explanatory variables are used in the lagged form. It is worth mentioning that we use 
the Polity variable together with the democracy or autocracy dummy in columns (1) 
to (4). In doing so, we are trying to capture two different effects: being a particular 
regime type and experiencing a change in the Polity score. That is, the regime 
dummy captures the effect of being an autocracy or a democracy on experiencing 
financial crises, while the Polity variable measures the effect of change in the Polity 
score (note that a country may experience a nine-point drop in the Polity score while 
still remaining a democracy). 
Column (2) shows that the Polity score of the country is negatively associated with 
the probability of a financial crisis. However, it is not statistically significant. 
Interestingly, the sign of autocracy duration is negative in column (1), meaning that 
the greater the duration of an authoritarian regime, the lower the probability of a 
financial crisis. The marginal effect of the latter increases when fixed effects are used 
in column (2). However, the autocracy dummy stays statistically insignificant. This 
result shows that, without controlling for macroeconomic variables, being an 
autocracy does not necessarily affect the probability of a crisis.
In columns (3) and (4), we present the results for the analogous specification with a 
democracy dummy and democracy duration. Surprisingly, the Polity variable is 
positive and statistically significant. Further, the democracy dummy is negative, 
                                               
13 The coefficient estimates of Equation (1) are presented in Appendix.
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meaning that democratic countries are less crisis-prone. However, statistical 
significance fades away once we add fixed effects. 
In columns (5) and (6), we estimate Equation (1) without control variables. The 
results are in line with our expectations. The Polity variable becomes statistically 
significant at the 1 per cent level and is negatively associated with the probability of 
a crisis. The duration of the autocratic regime decreases the probability of a crisis by 
0.6 and 0.8 per cent in columns (5) and (6), respectively. The duration of a 
democracy does not have a statistically significant coefficient. Finally, transitioning 
from an autocracy to a democracy increases the risk of economic turbulence by 6.8 
per cent in specification (6). However, the coefficient is not statistically significant. 
In columns (7) and (8), we present the results of equations where we control for 
macroeconomic and financial variables. In column (7), we use only the transition 
from an autocracy to a democracy, while in column (8), we use both transition 
dummies. Columns (9) and (10) are replications of columns (7) and (8) with country 
and time fixed effects. 
Summarising the results, we see that the Polity variable enters most of the 
specifications with a negative sign and a high t-score. Further, the duration of an 
autocracy also tends to be a consistent predictor of a financial crises. The negative 
sign that appears before autocracy duration in most specifications shows that the 
longer the duration of the autocratic regime, the lower the probability of a financial 
crisis.
The other interesting finding is that the transition from an autocracy to a democracy 
increases vulnerability to a crisis. Quantifying this effect increases the probability of 
a financial crisis from 11 to 14.9 per cent.
However, transitioning from a democracy to an autocracy does not enter any model 
with a statistically significant coefficient.14 Finally, it is worth mentioning that the 
signs of the control variables are in line with our a priori expectations. Debt to GDP 
and domestic credit growth enter both equations with a positive sign. It makes sense 
                                               
14 As a robustness check, we exclude Poland, Romania, China and Hungary from our dataset. The aim 
is to check to what extent the coefficient of the transition dummy is driven by centrally planned 
economies. The results do not change.
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because increasing public debt makes a country vulnerable to a sovereign debt crisis, 
while increasing domestic credit increases the probability of a banking crisis. In 
contrast, GDP growth and positive external balance make a country less vulnerable 
to macroeconomic fluctuations. 
2.5.2 Results of ordered logit model 
The dependent variable in the ordered probit model is the crisis tally, which ranges 
from 0 to 3. As in the binary logit model, the results of the ordered logit model are 
presented in the form of marginal effects. Table 2.4 presents the marginal effects of 
each major explanatory variable on the probability of experiencing 0–3 crises in a 
given year. 
For example, a coefficient of 0.7 for a Polity score in column (1) suggests that a one 
point increase in the Polity score will increase the likelihood of experiencing no 
financial crisis in a given year (i.e., crisis tally equals 0). 
The most interesting finding is that, even though the signs of transition and reverse 
transition dummies are consistent with the baseline specification, their statistical 
significance fades away. However, the Polity score and duration of an autocracy 
remain powerful predictors of the crisis tally. Specifically, a one-year increase in the 
duration of an autocracy increases the chance of experiencing no crisis by 0.4 per 
cent, while a one percentage point increase in the Polity score increases it by 0.7 per 
cent. Further, an increase in the Polity score and autocracy duration reduces the 
probability of experiencing one or two crises in a given year. For a crisis tally of 3, 
the marginal effect of the Polity score is very small. The duration of a democracy 
also has an insignificant marginal effect. 
2.5.3 Results of the probit model after addressing endogeneity 
The results of the IV probit estimation are presented in Table 2.5 (column (3)). 
Columns (1) and (2) contain the results of the baseline specification with all control 
variables for logit and probit estimates. This is to compare the coefficients derived 
from these models and to show that the statistical significance of the variables is not 
affected by the choice of the binary model. Having confirmed that logit and probit 
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models can be used interchangeably, we are confident in the results of the IV probit 
strategy. 
Several important results can be derived from the endogeneity-corrected probit 
model. First, the Wald test rejects the null hypothesis of no endogeneity. Moreover, 
the F-statistic for the test for joint significance of coefficients in the first stage of the 
equation rules out the issue of a weak instrument. 
The coefficients of the second stage of the equation suggest that all important 
findings from the logit specification with the crisis dummy as a dependent variable 
remain valid. More specifically, even after controlling for endogeneity, the tenure of 
an autocracy reduces the likelihood of a crisis, whereas a transition from an 
autocracy to a democracy increases the probability of a crisis. 
The reason for this relationship might be an uneven development of institutions and a 
lack of established procedures in transition countries. Mansfield and Snyder (2002) 
argue that the early stages of democratisation unleash intense competition among 
myriad social groups and interests. Transition economies lack state institutions that 
are sufficiently strong and coherent to effectively regulate this political competition. 
That is, they are characterised by a sudden increase in political participation, while 
there is no increase in the quality of institutions to regulate this participation. It takes 
some years (or decades) until a country’s political regime stops being an obstacle to 
economic growth (Roland 2002). Kaplan (2000) put forward a similar argument, 
stating that ‘if a society is not in reasonable health democracy can be not only risky 
but disastrous’. In our dataset, it is potentially the wave of transitions in Latin 
America, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union Republics that drive these 
results. Countries such as Poland and Hungary experienced macroeconomic 
turbulence with surging inflation and unemployment, as well as declining output. 
Another interesting finding from the probit model with the instrumental variables is 
that, the coefficient of the transition from a democracy to an autocracy is negative 
and statistically significant. This result indicates that when countries transition to 
autocracy, they are less likely to experience a financial crisis. Note that, reverse 
transition dummy was statistically insignificant in the baseline specification. As the 
methodology section highlighted, the baseline specification may suffer from 
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endogeneity of regime-related variables. Hence, we have more confidence in the 
results obtained from endogeneity-corrected model. 
Overall, results of endogeneity-corrected model reveals that both transition to and 
duration of authoritarian regime reduces the likelihood of economic crises. This 
could be explained by different political weight put on economic security by 
authoritarian and democratic leaders. Desai et al. (2008) use term “authoritarian 
bargain” to refer to the system where citizens relinquish their political rights for 
economic security. However, poor economic performance, including incidence of 
financial crisis reduces the bargaining power of the autocrats, which in its turn 
increases the power of opposition against existing regime. Therefore, financial crises 
pose a significant problem for authoritarian leaders.  
Furthermore, mobilization of political power, wealth and decision-making process 
are among other factors that helps authoritarian leaders to stay resilient to financial 
crises.  
2.5.4 Results of alternative estimation strategies 
2.5.4.1 Results of OLS regression 
We first discuss the results of the OLS specification, where the dependent variable is 
the return on LTGB. The coefficient estimates are presented in Table 2.6. We run the 
regression with and without the time and country dummies and all control variables. 
Interestingly, the coefficients of the duration of both democracies and autocracies are 
negative and statistically significant in the models with country and time dummies. 
This result suggests that regime tenure is perceived as political stability in a country, 
and hence it is associated with a reduced risk. Consequently, the duration of the 
political regime reduces the LTGB yield. 
2.5.4.2 Results of Lewbel’s method 
The results from the OLS regression may be biased due to potential endogeneity. 
Therefore, we present the results of the regressions with the application of Lewbel’s 
(2012) method. 
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Columns (1) to (3) of Table 2.7 present the results for standard IV, generated 
instruments and standard IV augmented with generated instruments, respectively. 
That is, column (1) shows the results when Polity is instrumented by the regional 
Polity score, column (2) shows the coefficients when generated instruments are used, 
and column (3) shows the results when standard IV results are augmented by 
generated instruments. From the regression statistics, we can see that the Hansen J 
statistic is 7.03 and 9.13 in columns (2) and (3), respectively. Hence, we do not reject 
the null hypothesis and conclude that over-identification restrictions are valid. 
Coefficient of autocracy duration is negative and statistically significant, which is in 
line with the results from baseline regression. On the contrary, the duration of 
democracy does not come with statistically significant coefficient in the logistic 
regression. However, in the model with LTGB yield as a dependent variable it is 
negative and statistically significant. Given the predictions of empirical and 
theoretical literature and correlation between LTGB yields and crisis dummy in our 
dataset, getting different results for the same variable could be surprising. However, 
it is worth mentioning that although these variables are related and could be used 
alternatively, they are not exactly the same. One important difference for this 
particular result is as follows. While crisis dummy reflects the outcome of economic 
event, i.e. occurrence of financial crisis, LTGB yield reflects the risk associated with 
particular country. In other words, the latter variable embeds market expectations 
about future. Therefore, negative and statistically significant effect of duration of 
democracy on LTGB yield could be explained as a support for “democratic 
advantage” hypothesis,15 suggesting that, despite having similar economic conditions, 
market rewards established democracies with lower interest rates compared to non-
democratic regimes or young democracies. Moreover, negative coefficient of the 
Polity score suggests that an increase in the democracy score reduces the return on 
bonds, which confirms that markets have lower perceived risks associated with 
democratic regimes.   
Overall, negative coefficients of duration of both autocracies and democracies 
suggests that political stability (proxied by the tenure of the regime) is associated 
with a reduced perception of the risk in financial markets. Further, models with 
                                               
15 See section 3.2 
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generated instruments and generated instruments augmented by standard IV in line 
with the Lewbel’s method indicate that countries’ returns on government bonds 
decline when they transition from an autocracy to a democracy, whereas the same 
does not hold for countries transitioning from an autocracy to a democracy. 
That is, democracies are considered more accountable and committed to paying back 
their debts. Hence, they are expected to pay less on these liabilities. 
2.5.4.3 Results of the synthetic control method 
The results of the synthetic control method confirm the finding on transition that we 
established in previous sections. In particular, we find that in countries that 
experience a transition from an autocracy to a democracy, the return on LTGB would 
have been lower in comparison to the actual yields (see Figures 2.6 and 2.7). In this 
section, we discuss these results and provide anecdotal evidence from Spain and 
Portugal. 
Portuguese dictator Antonio Salazar established a ‘New State’ in 1951, which ruled 
the country until 1974. In contrast, General Francisco Franco’s authoritarian rule in 
Spain lasted from 1939 to 1975, when he passed away. According to the available 
data, during the authoritarian rule in Spain and Portugal, the average returns on 
government liabilities were 10.03 and 4.64 per cent, respectively. However, during 
the first five years of the transition, these figures were 13 per cent for Spain and 14 
per cent for Portugal. These statistics hint that sudden changes can be tracked to the 
political transition in the peninsula. Hence, we employ the synthetic control method 
for Spain and Portugal and use the other 20 countries16 as a ‘donor pool’. 
According to our dataset, the transition in Portugal took place in 1975, when the 
Polity score moved from 7 to 13. We present the LTGB yield for Portugal before and 
after the transition took place. In Figure 2.6, the solid line is the actual yield, while 
the dashed line is the yield for the synthetic control countries. As shown, until the 
treatment year—the year of transition—the path of the synthetic group and the actual 
outcome for Portugal are similar. After the transition year, these lines rapidly 
diverge. That is, according to this technique, if the transition did not occur, the return 
                                               
16 Due to the limited availability of data on the LTGB yield going back to 1960, the number of 
countries in the analysis decreases significantly.
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on the LTGB yields for Portugal would have been smaller. The synthetic control 
method shows similar results for Spain, where the solid and dashed lines diverge 
quite remarkably after the transition took place. 
More interestingly, both countries experienced financial crises soon after the 
transition. In 1976–1978, Portugal experienced a currency crisis. Similarly, Spain 
had a banking crisis in 1977–1978. Figures 2.8 and 2.9 depict similar studies for 
Korea and Thailand, respectively. Korea experienced a transition from an autocracy 
to a democracy in 1987, and a similar transition took place in Thailand. The results 
for both countries suggest that the LTGB yield would have been smaller in the 
absence of the transition. Moreover, Thailand experienced a banking crisis three 
years after the transition. 
Overall, in all cases, the actual outcomes are higher than our falsification analysis 
(i.e., the ‘what if’ scenario). The transition to a democratic regime occurred in all 
three countries mentioned above, and the year of transition is marked by a vertical 
dashed line in Figures 2.8 and 2.9. 
2.5.4.4 Results with the separated crisis variable 
Several interesting findings emerge from estimating Equation (1) with individual 
crisis dummies. Most importantly, two major findings from the baseline specification 
show up in the banking crisis equation. More specifically, we find that the duration 
of an autocracy reduces the probability of banking a crisis, whereas the transition 
between an authoritarian regime and a democratic setup is associated with a sharp 
increase in the likelihood of a banking crisis. In addition, we find that the duration of 
the democracy variable has a positive and statistically significant coefficient. This 
result suggests that established regimes are more prone to financial crises. 
Interestingly, the sign of the democracy duration variable changes when we run the 
currency crisis equation. All other explanatory variables tend to be insignificant in 
this model. 
An interesting finding that emerges from the debt crisis equation relates to the 
reverse transition dummy. Its coefficient is negative, suggesting that when countries 
make a transition from an autocracy to a democracy, the likelihood of a banking 
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crisis decreases. In contrast, when a transition is made in the opposite direction, the 
likelihood of a debt crisis is not affected. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter analyses the effects of political economy variables on the probability of 
experiencing at least one of the major financial crises: sovereign debt, banking and 
currency. There is limited theoretical and empirical research on how regime types 
can affect the probability of experiencing a financial crisis. We examine the 
behavioural differences among autocratic and democratic regimes to motivate our 
research question theoretically. 
A long strand of the literature argues that democratic regimes are more accountable, 
more transparent and more respectful of individual liberties. In addition, they 
generally serve diverse interest groups. Further, due to the ‘fear’ of punishment by 
their electorate, democratic leaders enjoy little or no autonomy in terms of pursuing 
painful economic reforms. In contrast, autocratic leaders have more autonomy due to 
a lack of accountability to the population. However, this autonomy becomes a 
drawback, as the incumbents do not use their autonomy to the country’s benefit. 
Limiting the autonomy of economic agencies can also result in poor economic 
policies. Conversely, even autocracies are not fully autonomous, as they serve the 
interests of particular groups and face difficulties in maintaining legitimacy among 
these groups. 
Given the differences in philosophy of autocracies and democracies, we aim to 
investigate which policies under these two opposing regime types lead to more 
financial crises. Moreover, this chapter studies the effects of transition from one 
regime to another. 
We use data from 58 countries over the period 1960–2010. The analysis mostly 
concentrates on the effects of regime variables on the binary crisis indicator. We use 
different econometric techniques, including binary and ordinal logit, instrumental 
variables probit model to establish the relationship. In contrast, as a robustness 
check, we replace the binary crisis dummy with a continuous return on LTGB. The 
rationale for this replacement is discussed in this chapter. 
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The estimations reveal that being an autocracy or democracy per se does not affect 
the likelihood of a crisis. In contrast, we find that the longevity of a political regime 
affects this relationship. In particular, the duration of the autocracy has a negative 
and statistically significant coefficient in most of the specifications. This result 
suggests that, as the duration of the autocracy increases, it is less likely that the 
country will experience a crisis. In addition, we find that the duration of the 
democracy increases the likelihood of a financial crisis. The longevity of democratic 
regime may contribute to excessive liberalization and fuel excessive leverage 
(Lipscy, forthcoming), which may lead to higher risk of banking crisis.  
Moreover, the estimations underline that the most vulnerable group of countries to 
financial crises are those that make a transition from an autocratic to a democratic 
setup. Being in transition significantly increases the probability of financial distress 
(from 5–14 per cent, depending on different model choices). When controlling for 
endogeneity, the transition from a democracy to an autocracy tends to reduce the 
probability of a financial crisis. 
To complete the transition analysis, this chapter employs the synthetic control 
method. This falsification exercise helps to calculate the return on long-term bonds in 
the absence of transition. The analysis shows that the return on LTGB would have 
been significantly lower if the transition had not taken place. This result suggests that 
when countries experience transition, there is an increased risk of economic 
downturn. Hence, markets require a higher premium on the government debt of 
transition economies. 
Another interesting finding is that regime duration is an important determinant of 
financial crises. The duration of an autocracy reduces the likelihood of a crisis and 
return on the LTGB yield, while the duration of a democracy decreases the latter 
only. The fact that a longer tenure of political regime is associated with a lower bond 
yield suggests that markets are more interested in the stability of political regimes 
rather than their type. 
Topics that remain open to future research include studying the indirect effects of 
political regimes on the probability of a financial crisis and explaining why the 
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duration of an autocracy reduces the probability of a crisis, whereas the tenure of a 
democracy increases the likelihood of a banking crisis. 
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Tables and Figures  
  Table 2.1 Countries that experienced transition from autocracy to democracy 
Country 
  
Political 
transition 
year 
Polity2 score Average crisis 
Before 
transition 
After 
transition 
Trans 
(5) 
Trans 
(10)  
Argentina 1973 1 16 NA NA 
Argentina 1983 2 18 2.00 2.18 
Bolivia 1982 3 18 2.00 1.63 
Brazil 1985 7 17 2.33 2.27 
Chile 1988 9 18 0.67 0.37 
Dominican Republic 1978 7 16 0.33 0.91 
Ecuador 1968 9 15 NA NA 
Ecuador 1979 5 19 1.17 1.55 
El Salvador 1982 10 12 0.00 0.18 
Ghana 1971 8 12 NA NA 
Ghana 1980 10 16 NA NA 
Ghana 1997 9 12 0.50 0.36 
Greece 1974 3 11 0.17 0.27 
Guatemala 1986 9 13 0.50 1.57 
Honduras 1980 9 11 0.83 1.00 
Hungary 1989 8 14 1.17 1.09 
Indonesia 1999 5 16 1.33 0.82 
Korea 1963 3 13 0.33 0.27 
Korea 1987 5 11 0.33 0.36 
Kenya 1999 8 18 0.83 0.64 
Mexico 1994 10 14 1.50 0.91 
Nicaragua 1990 9 16 2.50 2.00 
Nigeria 1978 10 17 NA NA 
Nigeria 1999 9 14 0.50 0.36 
Paraguay 1989 2 12 1.17 1.27 
Peru 1979 8 13 1.67 2.18 
Philippines 1986 4 11 1.50 1.10 
Poland 1989 4 15 2.50 1.82 
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Country 
  
Political 
transition 
year 
Polity2 score Average crisis 
Before 
transition 
After 
transition 
Trans 
(5) 
Trans 
(10)  
Portugal 1975 7 13 0.33 0.55 
Romania 
Spain 
1990 
1976 
8 
7 
15 
11 
2.00 
1.00 
1.91 
1.10 
Turkey 1973 8 19 NA NA 
Turkey 1983 5 17 1.50 1.36 
Uruguay 1989 3 19 1.50 1.36 
Note: Polity2 score before transition refers to the polity score a year before the political 
transition took place. Since the chapter considers banking, currency and debt crisis, crisis tally 
may range from 0 to 3. Average crisis tally under Trans (5) and Trans (10) refers to number of 
crisis experienced during the first 5 and 10 years of transition, respectively. NA represent the 
cases when democratic regime lasted less than 5 or 10 years, and hence it was impossible to 
calculate average crisis tally. Countries with polity2 score of 11 or higher are considered 
democracy, and vice versa. Some of the non-durable transitions are omitted, as they don’t 
represent valuable information for this paper. 
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Table 2.2 The countries that experienced transition from democracy to 
autocracy 
Note: Polity2 score before transition refers to the polity score a year before the political transition 
took place. Since the chapter considers banking, currency and debt crisis, crisis tally may range from 0 
to 3. Average crisis tally under Trans (5) and Trans (10) refers to number of crisis experienced during 
the first 5 and 10 years of transition, respectively. NA represent the cases when autocratic regime 
lasted less than 5 or 10 years, and hence it was impossible to calculate average crisis tally. Countries 
with polity2 score of 10 or higher are considered democracy, and vice versa. Some of the non-durable 
transitions are omitted, as they don’t represent valuable information for this paper.
Country 
Political 
transition 
year 
Polity2 score Average crisis tally  
Before 
transition 
After 
transition Trans (5) 
Trans 
(10) 
Argentina 1976 16 1 1.20 NA 
Brazil 1964 13 7 1.00 0.70 
Chile 1972 16 3 1.80 1.30 
Dominican Republic 1966 10 7 0.00 0.00 
Ecuador 1961 12 9 0.00 NA 
Ecuador 1972 10 5 0.00 NA 
El Salvador 1972 10 9 0.20 0.10 
Ghana 1973 13 3 0.20 NA 
Ghana 1982 16 3 0.60 0.50 
Greece 1967 14 3 0.00 NA 
Guatemala 1974 11 7 0.20 0.30 
Honduras 1972 10 9 0.00 NA 
Korea 1972 13 1 0.20 0.30 
Kenya 1966 10 3 0.00 0.00 
Nicaragua 1981 10 5 1.20 NA 
Nigeria 1966 17 3 0.00 0.10 
Nigeria 1984 17 3 1.80 1.80 
Peru 1968 15 3 0.40 0.50 
Philippines 1971 12 1 0.00 0.20 
Turkey 1971 18 8 NA NA 
Turkey 1980 19 5 NA NA 
Thailand 1971 12 3 NA NA 
Thailand 1976 13 3 NA NA 
Singapore 1965 10 8 0.00 0.00 
Uruguay 1972 13 7 0.80 1.00 
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Table 2.3 Marginal effects from logit specification with crisis dummy 
Note: The dependent variable is binary crisis dummy, defined in the data section. All explanatory variables are lagged by 1 period 
to account for reverse causality. Error terms are clustered by countries. ***, **, * stand for statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Explanatory variables                     
݌݋݈݅ݐݕ௧ିଵ - 1.9*** -1.0 0.9** 0.6* -0.5 -0.8** -0.8* -0.9* -1.0** -1.0** 
ܽݑݐ݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ -17.8 -5.8 
ܽݑݐ݋ܿݎܽܿݕ݀ݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊௧ିଵ -0.6** -0.9*** -0.6** -0.8*** -0.5 -0.5 -0.6** -0.6** 
݀݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ିଵ -12.8** -7.7 
݀݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ݀ݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊௧ିଵ -0.2 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 
ܽݑݐ݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ିଵ ՜ ݀݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ିଵ 12.5** 6.8 15.2*** 14.9*** 11.1** 11.0** 
݀݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ିଵ ՜ ܽݑݐ݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ିଵ -4.3 -2.3 
Control variables           
ܾ݀݁ݐȀܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ 0.2*** 0.2*** 0.2** 0.2** 
ݐݎܽ݀݁Ȁܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
݀݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿܿݎ݁݀݅ݐȀܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ -0.2** -0.002 -0.002 -0.2 
ܩܦܲ݃ݎ݋ݓݐ݄௧ିଵ -2.3*** -2.3*** -2.5*** -2.5*** 
݄ܿܽ݊݃݁݅݊ݎ݁ݏ݁ݎݒ݁ݏ௧ିଵ -1.3 -1.3 0.9 0.9 
݁ݔݐ݁ݎ݈݊ܽܾ݈ܽܽ݊ܿ݁Ȁܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ -0.7 -0.7 0.6* 0.5* 
݂݈݅݊ܽ݊ܿ݅ܽ݋݌݁݊݊݁ݏݏ௧ିଵ 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 
ݏܽݒ݅݊݃ݏȀܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 
Number of observations  2863 2763 2863 2763 2863 2763 2095 2095 2044 2044 
Country dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes 
Control variables No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.4 Marginal effects from ordered logit specification 
Note: The dependent variable is ordered tally variable that ranges between 0 and 3. Marginal 
effects of change in variables over probability of having crisis tally of 0, 1, 2 or 3. All variables are 
used in specification are lagged by one period to account for reverse casualty. ***, **, * stand for 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
  
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
tally=0 tally=1 tally=2 tally=3 
Explanatory variables      
݌݋݈݅ݐݕ௧ିଵ 0.7* -0.4* -0.3* 0.0*
   
ܽݑݐ݋ܿݎܽܿݕ݀ݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊௧ିଵ 0.4* -0.2* -0.14* -0.0 
   
݀݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ݀ݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊௧ିଵ -0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 
   
ܽݑݐ݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ିଵ ՜ ݀݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ିଵ -5.6 3.0 2.1 0.5 
݀݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ିଵ ՜ ܽݑݐ݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ିଵ 5.3 -2.9 -2.1 -0.5 
Number of observations  2018 2018 2018 2018 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 2.5 Results of logit, probit and instrumental variables for probit  
Note: The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is binary crisis dummy. The dependent variable in the first stage of 
the column (3) is Polity2 variable, whereas under the second stage of the column (3) the dependent variable is crisis
dummy. All variables are lagged to control for possible reverse causality. Average Polity score of the region during past 
5 years is used as an instrument for political regime in country. Wald test of exogeneity refers Standard errors are 
reported in the parenthesis. . ***, **, * stand for statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES logit probit IV probit 
2nd stage 1st stage 
Explanatory variables         
݌݋݈݅ݐݕ௧ିଵ -0.072*** -0.402*** -0.17*** 
(0.028) (0.015) (0.07) 
regional polity score 0.464*** 
(0.14) 
ܽݑݐ݋ܿݎܽܿݕ݀ݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊௧ିଵ -0.045** -0.024* -0.056** -0.240*** 
(0.023) (0.012) (0.022) (0.044) 
݀݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ݀ݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊௧ିଵ 0.013 0.007 -0.005 -0.074** 
(0.01) (0.005) (0.01) (0.036) 
ܽݑݐ݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ିଵ ՜ ݀݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ିଵ 0.783** 0.451* 0.571*** 1.173*** 
(0.383) (0.211) (0.205) (0.407) 
݀݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ିଵ ՜ ܽݑݐ݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ିଵ -0.168 -0.113 -0.889* -5.983*** 
(0.352) (0.208) (0.481) (0.854) 
Control variables 
ܾ݀݁ݐȀܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ 0.015** 0.008** 0.010*** 0.000 
(0.073) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) 
ݐݎܽ݀݁Ȁܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ -0.003 0 -0.001 -0.006 
(0.019) (0.01) (0.012) (0.024) 
݀݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿܿݎ݁݀݅ݐȀܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ -0.011 -0.007* -0.008** -0.010** 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
ܩܦܲ݃ݎ݋ݓݐ݄௧ିଵ -0.180*** -0.107*** -0.107*** -0.041 
(0.031) (0.017) (0.018) (0.031) 
݄ܿܽ݊݃݁݅݊ݎ݁ݏ݁ݎݒ݁ݏ௧ିଵ -0.061 -0.046 -0.069 -0.076 
(0.091) (0.055) (0.06) (0.132) 
݁ݔݐ݁ݎ݈݊ܽܾ݈ܽܽ݊ܿ݁Ȁܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ -0.039* -0.022* -0.021* -0.017 
-0.022 -0.013 -0.013 (0.031) 
݂݈݅݊ܽ݊ܿ݅ܽ݋݌݁݊݊݁ݏݏ௧ିଵ 0.013 0.006 0.008 0.008 
ݏܽݒ݅݊݃ݏȀܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ (0.018) (0.01) -0.012 (0.022) 
0.02 -0.011 -0.007 0.023 
-0.025 -0.014 -0.014 (0.049) 
Observations 2048 2048 2014 
Number of countries 56 56 56 
First stage F test 77.63 
First stage Prob.>F 0.00 
Wald Test of exogeneity   3.15 
Prob. . Ȥ2 0.08
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Table 2.6 Robustness check: results of OLS model 
Note: Dependent variable is long term government bond yield.  Standard errors are clustered in country levels 
and presented in parenthesis. ***, **, * stand for statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables 
݌݋݈݅ݐݕ௧ିଵ -0.382** -0.464** -0.411** -0.437** 
(0.18) (0.178) (0.183) (0.183) 
ܽݑݐ݋ܿݎܽܿݕ݀ݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊ ௧ିଵ -0.185** -0.218** -0.187** -0.201** 
(0.083) (0.084) (0.088) (0.092) 
݀݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ݀ݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊௧ିଵ -0.015 -0.014 -0.073*** -0.075*** 
(0.01) (0.009) (0.021) (0.02) 
ܽݑݐ݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ିଵ ՜ ݀݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ିଵ 1.971 1.708 1.08 1.01 
(1.271) (1.345) (0.896) (0.909) 
݀݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ିଵ ՜ ܽݑݐ݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ିଵ -5.996*** -1.078 
(2.208) (1.629) 
Control variables         
ܾ݀݁ݐȀܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ -0.017 -0.018 -0.017 -0.018 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
ݐݎܽ݀݁Ȁܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ 0.058 0.051 -0.019 -0.019 
(0.146) (0.140) (0.07) (0.070) 
݀݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿܿݎ݁݀݅ݐȀܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ -0.025 -0.024 -0.001 -0.000 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.01) (0.009) 
ܩܦܲ݃ݎ݋ݓݐ݄௧ିଵ -0.06 -0.046 -0.203*** -0.200*** 
(0.067) (0.068) (0.069) (0.069) 
݄ܿܽ݊݃݁݅݊ ݎ݁ݏ݁ݎݒ݁ݏ௧ିଵ 0.771** 0.835*** 0.428** 0.438** 
(0.291) (0.296) (0.202) (0.203) 
݁ݔݐ݁ݎ݈݊ܽܾ݈ܽܽ݊ܿ݁Ȁܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ -0.183 -0.182 -0.128 (0.127) 
(0.117) (0.115) (0.08) (0.079) 
݂݈݅݊ܽ݊ܿ݅ܽ݋݌݁݊݊݁ݏݏ௧ିଵ -0.057 -0.049 0.057 0.057 
(0.148) (0.142) (0.082) (0.082) 
ݏܽݒ݅݊݃ݏȀܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ -0.056 -0.062 0.187* 0.188* 
  (0.126) (0.125) (0.105) (0.105) 
Observations 1,042 1,042 1,042 1,042 
R-squared 0.179 0.186 0.642 0.642 
Country FE No No Yes Yes 
Time FE No No Yes Yes 
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Table 2.7 Robustness check: results of regression with application of Lewbel’s 
method 
Variable 
Standard 
IV 
Generated 
Instrument 
Generated Instrument 
and standard IV 
Explanatory variables     
݌݋݈݅ݐݕ௧ିଵ -0.275 -0.372** -0.296 
(0.417) (0.175) (0.191) 
ܽݑݐ݋ܿݎܽܿݕ݀ݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊௧ିଵ -0.233 -0.265*** -0.240*** 
(0.148) (0.071) (0.081) 
݀݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ݀ݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊௧ିଵ -0.083** -0.083*** -0.083*** 
(0.033) (0.030) (0.031) 
ܽݑݐ݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ିଵ ՜ ݀݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ିଵ 1.678 1.373 1.61 
(1.54) (1.32) (1.31) 
݀݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ିଵ ՜ ܽݑݐ݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ିଵ -2.19 -3.046** -2.381* 
  (3.43) (1.49) (1.32) 
Control variables 
ܾ݀݁ݐȀܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
(0.019) (0.015) (0.016) 
ݏܽݒ݅݊݃ݏȀܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ 0.171 0.147 0.166 
(0.171) (0.106) (0.123) 
ܩܦܲ݃ݎ݋ݓݐ݄௧ିଵ -0.157 -0.146* -0.154* 
(0.101) (0.082) (0.088) 
݂݈݅݊ܽ݊ܿ݅ܽ݋݌݁݊݊݁ݏݏ௧ିଵ 0.064 0.056 0.062 
(0.131) (0.110) (0.115) 
݁ݔݐ݁ݎ݈݊ܽܾ݈ܽܽ݊ܿ݁Ȁܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ -0.269** -0.256*** -0.266*** 
(0.112) (0.075) (0.084) 
ݐݎܽ݀݁Ȁܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ -0.078 -0.072 -0.077 
(0.115) (0.102) (0.105) 
݄ܿܽ݊݃݁݅݊ݎ݁ݏ݁ݎݒ݁ݏ௧ିଵ 0.359 0.386 0.365 
(0.382) (0.335) (0.35) 
݀݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿܿݎ݁݀݅ݐȀܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Observations 1037 1037 1037 
Hansen’s J statistics 7.03 9.13 
p value 0.796 0.692 
Notes: Dependent variable is yield on long-term government bond. Column (1) to (3) represents the results of 
estimation with standard IV, with generated instruments and with both respectively. Hansen’s J statistics is used to test 
null hypothesis of overidentification. p value is corresponding probability of null hypothesis. Standard errors are 
clustered in country levels and presented in parenthesis. ***, **, * stand for statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.8 Robustness check: marginal effects from logit specification by 
separating crisis dummy  
Note: Dependent variables are binary crisis dummies. If in a given year a country experiences at least 
one of these crises it equals 1 and 0 otherwise. Control variables are the same as in Table 3 
and are not presented here to save the space. Standard errors are clustered in country levels. 
***, **, * stand for statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) 
Banking 
Crisis 
Currency 
Crisis Debt Crisis 
 Explanatory variables       
   
݌݋݈݅ݐݕ௧ିଵ -0.94* -0.00 0.58 
ܽݑݐ݋ܿݎܽܿݕ݀ݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊௧ିଵ -0.11 -0.00 -1.2*** 
݀݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ݀ݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊௧ିଵ 0.98*** -0.2 0.00 
ܽݑݐ݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ିଵ ՜ ݀݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ିଵ 12.7** -0.7 1.6 
݀݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ିଵ ՜ ܽݑݐ݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ିଵ 5.7 4.4* -14.2*** 
Lagged crisis indicators
ܾ݀݁ݐܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௧ିଵ -4.2 9.1***  
ܾ݀݁ݐܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௧ିଶ -4.0 0.15  
ܿݑݎݎ݁݊ܿݕܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௧ିଵ 6.6***  4.3* 
ܿݑݎݎ݁݊ܿݕܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௧ିଶ 1.6  1.6 
ܾܽ݊݇݅݊݃ܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௧ିଵ  4.4* 8.0*** 
ܾܽ݊݇݅݊݃ܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௧ିଶ  -3.9 -0.9 
   
Observations 2067 1818 1054 
Number of countries 55 50 53 
Pseudo R-squared 0.20 0.33 0.54 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes 
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Figure 2.1 Time series plot of total number of crises in our dataset 
Figure 2.2 Average Polity Scores, 1960-2010
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Figure 2.3 Average crisis tally for different political regimes 
Figure 2.4 Crisis tallies by regime type 
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Figure 2.5 Comparison of average bond yield and average crisis tally 
Figure 2.6 Synthetic control method results for Portugal 
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Figure 2.7 Synthetic control method results for Spain 
Figure 2.8. Synthetic control method results for Korea
61 
Figure 2.9. Synthetic control method results for Thailand
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Appendix 1: Regression results for panel logit specification 
Note: Dependent variable is binary crisis dummy. If in a given year a country experiences at least one of the major financial crises (banking, sovereign debt and 
currency crisis) it equals 1 and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are clustered in country levels and presented in parenthesis with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Specifications (1), (5), (7) don’t include country specific and time specific fixed effects, while in the rest specifications we use them.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Explanatory variables           
݌݋݈݅ݐݕ௧ିଵ -0.094*** -0.066 0.042** 0.038* -0.026 -0.054** -0.043* -0.047* -0.068** -0.072*** 
 (0.036) (0.047) (0.018) (0.023) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (-0.027) (0.028) (0.028) 
ܽݑݐ݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ିଵ -0.854 -0.403         
 (0.554) (0.636)         
ܽݑݐ݋ܿݎܽܿݕ݀ݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊௧ିଵ -0.030** -0.060***   -0.028** -0.059*** -0.025 -0.026 -0.043** -0.045** 
 (0.014) (0.022)   (0.014) (0.022) (0.017) (0.018) (0.021) (0.023) 
݀݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ିଵ   -0.620** -0.528       
  (0.304) (0.395)       
݀݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ ݀ݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊௧ିଵ   -0.008 0.015 -0.006 0.008 -0.004 -0.004 0.013 0.013 
  (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.010) 
ܽݑݐ݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ିଵ ՜ ݀݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ିଵ     0.616** 0.475 0.760*** 0.758*** 0.793** 0.783**
݀݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ିଵ ՜ ܽݑݐ݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ିଵ
    (0.246) (0.318) (0.262) (0.260) 
-0.218 
(0.381) 
(0.382) (0.383) 
-0.168 
(0.352) 
Control variables           
ܾ݀݁ݐȀܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ       0.012*** 0.012*** 0.015** 0.015** 
      (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.073) 
ݐݎܽ݀݁Ȁܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ       -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 
      (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.019) 
݀݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿܿݎ݁݀݅ݐȀܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ       -0.011** -0.011** -0.011 -0.011 
      (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
ܩܦܲ݃ݎ݋ݓݐ݄௧ିଵ       -0.118*** -0.118*** -0.180*** -0.180*** 
      (0.021) (0.021) (0.031) (0.031) 
݄ܿܽ݊݃݁݅݊ݎ݁ݏ݁ݎݒ݁ݏ௧ିଵ       -0.067 -0.063 -0.064 -0.061 
      (0.076) (0.077) (0.091) (0.091) 
݁ݔݐ݁ݎ݈݊ܽܾ݈ܽܽ݊ܿ݁Ȁܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ       -0.034 -0.034 -0.04* -0.039* 
      (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) 
financial openness       -0.004 -0.004 0.013 0.013 
ݏܽݒ݅݊݃ݏȀܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ
      (0.014) 
0.010 
(0.021) 
(0.014) 
0.010 
(0.021) 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.026) 
(0.018) 
0.020 
(0.025) 
Observations 2,867 2,767 2,867 2,767 2,867  2,767 2,099 2,099 2,048 2048 
Number of countries 58 58 58 58 58 58 55 55 55 52 
R-squared 0.01 0.29 0.02 0.28 0.03 0.29 0.10 0.11 0.34 0.34 
Country FE 
Time FE 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
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Appendix 2. Results of logit specification with disentangled polity variable 
  (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES crisis crisis crisis crisis 
Explanatory variables         
xrreg 0.362 0.338 0.861** 0.847** 
(0.396) (0.405) (0.399) -0.395 
xrcomp -0.154 -0.139 -0.0439 -0.027 
(0.339) (0.347) (0.372) -0.374 
xropen 0.253 0.259 0.109 0.111 
(0.211) (0.209) (0.218) -0.214 
xconst -0.0440 -0.0389 -0.333* -0.334* 
(0.127) (0.128) (0.170) (0.170) 
parreg -0.154 -0.170 -0.267* -0.286* 
(0.105) (0.104) (0.138) (0.137) 
parcomp -0.268** -0.252** -0.321 -0.304 
(0.117) (0.113) (0.236) (0.231) 
autocracy duration -0.023 -0.020 -0.040* -0.040* 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.022) (0.022) 
democracy duration -0.001 -0.001 0.009 0.009 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.010) 
transit 0.707*** 0.726*** 0.809** 0.829** 
(0.263) (0.263) (0.332) (0.332) 
rtransit 0.374 0.331 
(0.350) (0.347) 
Control variables         
debt/gdp 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.015* 0.016* 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) 
trade/gdp 0.006 0.006 -0.005 -0.005 
(0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
domestic credit/gdp -0.009* -0.009* -0.010 -0.010 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
gdp growth -0.123*** -0.123*** -0.179*** -0.179*** 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.034) (0.034) 
¨ reserves -0.116 -0.127* -0.115 -0.124 
(0.072) (0.073) (0.093) (0.093) 
external balance/gdp -0.029 -0.030 -0.039* -0.040* 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021) 
financial openness -0.013 -0.013 0.016 0.016 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
savings  0.008 0.009 -0.016 -0.015 
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) 
Observations 2,034 2,034 1,983 1,983 
Country FE No No Yes Yes 
Time FE No No Yes Yes 
Note: The left hand side is binary crisis dummy. First six variables among explanatory 
variables are component variables of polity score. Xrreg stands for regulation of chief executive 
recruitment, which ranges from 0 (unregulated) to 3 (regulated). Xrcomp stands for 
competitiveness of executive recruitment ranging from 1 (selection) to 3 (election). Xropen is 
openness of executive recruitment ranging from 1 (close) to 4 (open). Xconst is executive 
constraints, where 1 is unlimited authority, while 7 is executive parity or subordination. Parreg 
stands for regulation of participation and ranges from 1 (unregulated) to 5 (regulated). Finally, 
parcomp stands for competitiveness of participation. It varies from 0 (not applicable) to 5 
(competitive). The rest variables and denotations are the same as in baseline regression
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Political and Institutional Dimensions of Chapter 3:
Banking Crises 
3.1 Introduction 
Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, there has been an increasing move 
towards financial liberalisation. In particular, during the past two decades, more 
countries have reformed their domestic financial sector, opened up their markets and 
introduced free capital inflows. As a result, more competition in financial markets 
has led to higher saving rates, which have increased the resources available for 
investment (Bumann et al. 2013). In addition, the availability of capital has reduced 
financing constraints and fostered economic growth via innovation and human 
capital accumulation (Ang 2014; Aghion et al. 2005). 
In contrast, several papers have taken a pessimistic view of financial liberalisation. 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), as well as Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiahe (1998) claim that liberalisation increases the fragility of 
financial markets and increases the likelihood of banking crises. Renciere et al. 
(2006) draw a similar conclusion, but they argue that crises are rare events and that 
the pro-growth effects of removing financial restrictions outweighs the negative 
effects of crises in the long run. Tornell et al. (2004) show that, despite fostering 
GDP growth, financial liberalisation has resulted in more financial crises. An 
important mechanism highlighted in this study is excessive risk-taking and the 
lending boom that follows financial liberalisation.
In light of these discussions, the research into the determinants of banking crises 
have emphasised the boom-bust cycles in the domestic credit market. For example, 
studying the theoretical and empirical determinants of banking crises, Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache (1998) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) identify domestic 
credit growth as one of the key determinants of banking crises. A number of recent 
studies have scrutinised this relationship for a larger group of countries and for a 
longer period. To study the effect of money and credit growth over macroeconomic 
stability, Schularik and Taylor (2012) use a dataset consisting of 14 Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries covering the period 
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1880–2010. They show that credit growth remains one of the key determinants of 
banking crises. Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) use a larger dataset and confirm this 
finding. Their study suggests that credit expansion and real currency appreciation 
have been the most robust and significant predictors of financial crises, regardless of 
whether a country is emerging or advanced. Aikman et al. (2014) conclude that large 
fluctuations in credit set necessary pre-conditions for subsequent banking crises. 
While the effects of domestic credit growth on the incidence of banking crises have 
been carefully documented in the literature, among other macroeconomic variables, 
institutional and political determinants of policy choices have received limited 
attention (Chang 2007). History has shown that politics and institutional quality play 
an important role in both the lead-up to financial crashes and their aftermath (Rajan 
2010). 
Taking a cue from the above discussion, this thesis studies the effects of credit 
booms on banking crises, emphasising the role of domestic political and institutional 
conditions. There are several reasons why banking crises merit specific attention. 
First, banking crises are regularly occurring events in relation to other crisis types, 
both for emerging and advanced economies. Reinhart and Rogoff (2013) study the 
frequency of banking crises in both types of economies from 1800 to 2010, 
concluding that there is no significant difference in terms of the number of crises 
experienced in advanced and emerging countries. Second, Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2011) analyse data covering 70 advanced and emerging market economies and 
conclude that banking crises help predict sovereign debt crises. Third, banking crises 
tend to have a pervasive effect on the real economy compared with other crisis types. 
It has a lingering negative effect on potential output and unemployment, which are 
two of the most important macroeconomic variables for policymakers. Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009) show that, in the aftermath of banking crises, output declines on 
average by 9 per cent, whereas unemployment increases by 7 per cent. 
The empirical literature has shown that, despite being one of the fundamental causes 
of banking crises, not all credit booms are unsustainable. For example, Dell’Ariccia 
et al. (2012) find that only about one-third of boom cases result in financial crises, 
while the rest are followed by extended periods of below-trend economic growth. 
Given this finding, the question arises: Why are some credit booms bad? To answer 
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this question, this thesis explores the institutional and political dimensions of 
banking crises, relying on the works of theoretical and empirical priors, which argue 
that institutional and political environments are important determinants of policy 
choice. Acemoglu et al. (2003) address institutional aspects of macroeconomic 
volatility and financial crises. They provide alternative explanations to the standard 
theory of financial crises, which suggest that countries with distortionary 
macroeconomic policies tend to be more vulnerable to macroeconomic volatility. 
The authors argue that the fundamental cause of post-war instability is institutional. 
After controlling for institutional aspects, the effect of the most macroeconomic 
variable fades away. Similarly, Pauly (2008) contends that stable and well-
functioning financial markets require clear operating rules, respect for private 
property, prudential supervision and a reliable lender of last resort. Pauly (2008) 
argues that national and regulatory systems in advanced economies helped them to 
mitigate the damage stemming from financial crises. Their failure to sustain and 
expand a cross-national regulatory body resulted in more volatility across financial 
markets and contagion. 
Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2013) analyse the presence of political credit cycles in 
the lead-up to the Eurozone crisis. The authors claim that the availability of easy 
credit in the peripheral economies reduced the incentive to reform the economy. As a 
result, institutional deterioration and delayed reforms prolonged the credit bubble and 
reduced prospects for economic growth. Herrera et al. (2014) argue that, in some 
cases, governments allow domestic credit to grow unsustainably. According to the 
authors, politicians derive political benefits from not regulating financial markets. As 
a result, the banking sector becomes vulnerable to any endogenous or exogenous 
shocks that bring about crises. However, the authors claim that this finding is valid 
mostly for emerging market economies. 
Using quarterly data from 22 OECD economies covering the first quarter of 1995 to 
the last quarter of 2013, this thesis investigates two related research questions. First, 
it reassesses the relationship between credit growth and banking crises. Second, it 
analyses possible constraints on the part of governments in curbing unsustainable 
credit growth. 
67 
To investigate the effects of credit growth on the banking sector, we first examine the 
aggregate credit growth measure. After establishing the relationship between credit 
growth and banking crises, we then use various measures of credit—that is, 
enterprise credit and household credit—to explore which measure of credit growth 
has the most significant effect on banking crises. Buyukkarabacak and Valev (2010) 
made a similar differentiation using a dataset on household and enterprise credit from 
37 advanced and developing countries. They conclude that household credit has a 
more significant effect on the likelihood of banking crises. 
To analyse the political economy channel, we build on the reputation mechanism 
proposed and empirically tested by Herrera et al. (2014). The authors claim that 
governments tend to receive political dividends from not regulating unsustainable 
credit because they are concerned about their reputation. However, they conclude 
that this relationship only holds in emerging market economies. In contrast, this 
study tests the presence of the possible reputation mechanism in 22 OECD countries. 
We posit that in the absence of independent central banks domestic popularity 
concern even in advanced economies may set pre-conditions for banking crises by 
triggering unsustainable credit growth. 
This thesis contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, it employs a 
unique approach to tackle the potential endogeneity problem arising from reverse 
causality or omitted variables. The results of earlier studies need to be considered 
carefully due to their limited ability to disentangle the causal effect. More 
specifically, the relationship between banking crises and credit growth runs in a 
reverse direction. For instance, after the recent subprime crisis affected countries 
around the world, most governments decided to ease monetary policy and pump 
liquidity into the banking system. In this particular case, credit growth may not be 
treated as exogenous because it is directly affected by a government’s decision to 
boost the economy. 
To reduce the potential bias from possible omitted variables or reverse causality, this 
chapter employs the recursive bivariate probit method. This strategy helps to 
generate an exogenous variation in domestic credit growth and estimate its effect on 
the likelihood of banking crises in a system of two equations. The bivariate probit 
model tackles endogeneity by excluding a number of determinants of domestic credit 
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growth from the second stage of the equation, where we model the banking crisis. 
For this purpose, we exclude credit-to-GDP, short-term interest rates, log of private 
consumption expenditure, government stability and central bank independence from 
the banking crisis equation. 
The study’s second contribution relates to investigating the institutional dimensions 
of banking crises. We use data on time-to-elections and central bank independence to 
explain poor policy choices in the countries under scrutiny. The rationale for 
incorporating the time-to-elections variable is to test the presence of political 
business cycles. The political business cycle theory argues that governments tend to 
ease policies in the lead-up to an election to increase their chance of re-election. 
However, there is mixed empirical support for the political business cycle. For 
example, Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997) study how the timing of elections 
affects various real economy indicators and monetary and fiscal policy tools in 
OECD economies. The authors find evidence in favour of election effects on 
macroeconomic policies and outcomes. However, Brender and Drazen (2005) find 
that economic outcomes have an insignificant effect on the probability of being 
elected in a democracy. 
In authoritarian regimes where, by definition, institutions enjoy less autonomy 
compared to democracies, the technocrats in central banks and finance ministries are 
usually given direction in the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy. For instance, in 
cases where governments have power over their central bank, they tend to allow for 
more credit just before an election. Given that the presence of an independent central 
bank reduces the incumbent government’s opportunistic behaviour, we also control 
for central bank independence in our model. 
The dependent variable throughout the analysis is the banking crisis dummy, which 
is used as a binary variable. It takes the value of 1 if a country experiences a banking 
crisis in a given quarter, and 0 otherwise. The choice of empirical methodology is 
dictated by the binary nature of the dependent variable. Thus, to explore the effect of 
the credit boom on the probability of a banking crisis, we employ the univariate 
probit method. Moreover, to account for potential endogeneity, this study also 
employs the bivariate probit model, as mentioned earlier. Lastly, we use different 
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specifications—a model with lagged explanatory variables and a bivariate probit 
model with alternative specifications—to test our results for robustness. 
The results reveal that there is a robust relationship between banking crises and 
growth in total domestic credit. This finding is in line with the findings of previous 
studies (Aikman et al. 2012; Schularik and Taylor 2012). Replacing an aggregate 
credit measure with household credit and enterprise credit reveals that the former 
poses significantly higher risks to the banking sector. An increase in enterprise credit 
increases the probability of a banking crisis by 1.7–2.8 per cent, whereas a 1 per cent 
increase in household credit increases the likelihood of a banking crisis by 6–8.2 per 
cent depending on the value of the government stability variable. However, the 
results for enterprise credit do not hold up when we test for robustness. 
In contrast, the estimation results suggest that a high government stability score, 
which is used as a proxy for domestic popularity, reduces the likelihood of financial 
distress; that is, the higher the government’s domestic approval rating, the lower the 
likelihood of a banking crisis. Another interesting finding of the probit model is that 
time-to-elections enters the regression with a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient. This result suggests that the probability of a banking crisis decreases 
closer to an election. Given the political costs of a banking crisis at the onset of an 
election, this result makes sense. 
The results of the bivariate probit model, which addresses potential endogeneity 
issues, confirm that unsustainable credit booms cause banking crises. The results are 
driven by growth in household credit. Interestingly, the analysis reveals that the 
government popularity variable affects the provision of total credit, exhibiting an 
insignificant coefficient for enterprise and household credit equations. This finding 
indicates that, when governments are concerned about domestic popularity, they do 
not target specific groups of borrowers; rather, they are interested in the total credit 
measure. Further, estimation results indicate that central bank independence has a 
negative effect on the probability of banking crises when we use the total credit 
measure. Conversely, the time-to-elections variable enters the credit boom equation 
with a negative sign and the banking crisis equation with a positive sign. This result 
suggests that, as elections approach, there is a high likelihood that the incumbent 
government will allow a credit boom. Moreover, given the high political costs of 
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banking crises, the estimations reveal that governments tend to avoid banking crises 
at any cost in the lead-up to elections. 
Overall, this chapter finds significant evidence in favour of the presence of political 
business cycles. We show that the reputation concern mechanism (Herrera et al.
2014) of the incumbent government is valid in OECD countries as well. However, 
the results suggest that the presence of an independent central bank reduces the 
negative effect stemming from a government’s opportunistic behaviour. Based on 
these findings, this thesis highlights the importance of a well-functioning central 
bank in reducing vulnerability to banking crises. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the 
findings of the related papers. Section 3.3 contains the data and descriptive statistics. 
Section 3.4 presents the econometric methodology. Section 3.5 presents all of the 
results and discussions. Section 3.6 concludes the chapter. 
3.2 Literature Review 
Earlier studies on banking crises have concentrated on macroeconomic indicators 
and highlighted their importance in the lead-up to the crises. In their seminal paper, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) study the determinants of banking crises in 
developing and developed countries. The authors discuss important theoretical 
channels (credit risk, exchange rate risk, speculation) through which banking crises 
hit. Furthermore, empirical analysis focusing on 53 countries from 1980 to 1995, 
reveals that banking crises tend to hit at times when the macroeconomic environment 
is weak. High inflation rates and high real interest rates tend to increase the 
likelihood of banking crises. Financial liberalization and the presence of appropriate 
deposit insurance schemes are the other important factors influencing this likelihood. 
In another seminal paper Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) study the causes of banking 
and currency crises. The authors find that after the 1980s- when financial 
liberalization took place in most parts of the world, these two types of crises became 
intertwined. The results also show that in most of the cases banking crises precede 
balance-of-payments crises. Both types of financial crises typically follow 
deteriorating macroeconomic fundamentals. The authors show that for banking crises 
the volatility of real variables, including asset prices, output and house prices seem to 
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be influential variables. In particular, the bursting of asset-price bubbles and 
increased bankruptcies associated with economic downturn appear to have an 
adverse effect on domestic financial sector.  
Goldstein and Turner (1996) summarize the findings of the research on origins of 
banking crises in developing countries. The authors identify several factors17 that lay 
foundations for problems in the banking sector. Most of the leading determinants 
identified relate to economic or financial indicators.  
While the findings of different authors vary quite significantly, domestic credit 
growth is the variable that has been central to most of the studies on banking crises. 
Subsequently, first subsection describes papers that are mostly related to the 
relationship between credit boom and banking crises. The second subsection 
summarizes the findings of research on institutional and political aspects of credit 
booms.  
3.2.1 Credit boom and banking crisis 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) argue that financial liberalisation and/or increased 
capital inflows provide easy access to financing. Consequently, this fuels the boom 
phase of the domestic credit cycle and increases the financial vulnerability of the 
economy. The event study analysis conducted in Kaminsky et al (1999) indicates that 
on the eve of a banking crisis, the domestic credit-to-GDP ratio exceeds the growth 
levels observed during tranquil periods. Interestingly, it even remains above normal 
levels during the first phase of the banking crisis. This tendency may reflect the 
support provided by central banks in the form of pumping money to the banks to 
prevent the crisis from worsening. 
Schularik and Taylor (2012) use a historical dataset for 13 countries18  covering 
1880–2008 to study the effect of money and credit growth on macroeconomic 
                                               
17  The variables identified are grouped under following categories: (i) macroeconomic volatility: 
external and domestic; (ii) lending booms, asset price collapses and surges in capital inflows; (iii) 
increasing bank liabilities with large maturity/currency mismatches; (iv) inadequate preparation for 
financial liberalisation; (v) heavy government involvement and loose controls on connected lending; 
(vi) weakness in the accounting, disclosure and legal framework; (vii) distorted incentives; and (viii) 
exchange rate regimes.  
18 The countries under scrutiny are the US, Canada, Australia, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the UK. 
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stability. One of the key research questions of the paper relates to testing the 
presence of the boom–bust cycle in the credit markets of advanced economies. All 
regression estimates suggest that a credit boom occurring in the previous five years is 
a powerful predictor of a financial crisis. The authors conclude that the data on credit 
aggregates contain valuable information about the probability of future banking 
crises. 
Using a dataset covering 1973–2010, Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) come to a 
similar conclusion, suggesting that credit expansions and real currency appreciation 
are the most robust and significant predictors of financial crises, regardless of 
whether a country is emerging or advanced. 
Mendoza and Terrones (2012) study 61 emerging and industrial countries over the 
1960-2010 period. Credit boom is defined as an episode in which credit to the private 
sector rises significantly above its long-run trend.19 The authors identify 70 credit 
boom events, half of them in each group of countries. Event analysis shows a 
systematic relationship between credit booms and a boom-bust cycle in production 
and absorption, asset prices, real exchange rates, capital inflows, and external deficits. 
The major finding of the paper is that while not all credit booms end in crisis, the 
peaks of credit booms are often followed by banking crises, currency crises or 
sudden stops. The authors also conclude that while credit booms are often associated 
by periods of economic expansion, including rising asset prices, growing output and 
real appreciation, post-boom periods usually bring about the opposite dynamics. 
Aikman et al. (2014) examine the behaviour of credit cycles. The authors argue that 
the major lessons to be learnt from previous financial crashes is that credit booms 
sow the seeds of subsequent credit crunches. In other words, the large fluctuations in 
credit set necessary preconditions for subsequent banking crisis.  Interestingly, Jorda 
et al. (2013) find that the magnitude of the credit boom also matters: more credit-
intensive booms are generally followed by deeper recessions and slower growth 
(Aikman et al, 2014). 
                                               
19 More information on credit boom definition by Mendoza and Terrones (2012) and other authors are 
provided in data section.  
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Buyukkarabacak and Valev (2010) study the impact of different credit measures on 
the likelihood of banking crisis. The authors find that both credit measures are 
associated with higher probability of crisis. However, the estimations reveal that 
household credit has a larger impact in comparison with enterprise credit. 
Theoretical literature identifies several channels via which credit boom may lead to 
banking crisis. Consumption channel, for example, may lead to overstimulated 
aggregate demand which overheats the economy. This may put upward pressure on 
prices (especially asset prices) and appreciate the real exchange rate. The result is 
reduced exports and increased imports, creating trade deficit. Study conducted by 
IMF (Bakker and Gulde, 2010) shows that by 2008 countries with highest credit 
growth had highest inflation and biggest loss of competitiveness measured as unit 
labour cost-manufacturing based real exchange rate.  
Moreover, during benign economic environment the lenders have over-optimistic 
expectations about borrowers’ ability to pay back and many borrowers suddenly 
become more creditworthy. This leads to excessive credit growth with many risky 
borrowers. Consequently, expectations channel increases the number of bad loans 
during upward phases of credit cycle (Gersl and Seidler, 2012). When the credit 
bubble bursts, there is a sudden increase in non-performing loans, which causes 
problems for the banking sector.  
In addition, loss of accountability at times of credit bubble may also inflate the 
problems in the banking sector. The reason is that it is hard to obtain good signals of 
performance during bubbly period. Hence, managers and politicians may extract 
benefits without fear of punishment (Fernandez-Villarde et al., 2013). As a result, 
during bubble the governance deteriorates and institutions weaken. 
While the relationship between aggregate credit measures and the likelihood of 
banking crisis has been documented in the literature carefully, the differential impact 
of the boom in enterprise and household credit markets has received scant attention.  
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To the best of our knowledge, most of the papers making the similar distinction 
between credit measures focus exclusively on economic growth. For instance, Beck 
et al. (2012) find that enterprise credit positively affects economic growth and 
reduces inequality. Sassi and Gasmi (2014) study panel of 27 European countries 
from 1995 to 2012 and confirm this finding. According to the authors, the positive 
effect of enterprise credit on economic growth is driven by allocation of credit to 
more productive sectors.  
3.2.2 Institutions and credit booms 
The previous section summarised several papers that established the relationship 
between credit booms and banking crises. However, it would be naïve to conclude 
that all credit booms are dangerous. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012) claim that about one-
third of boom cases result in financial crises, while the rest are followed by extended 
periods of below-trend economic growth. Hence, this section discusses a strand of 
the literature that attempts to explain the policy choices leading to unsustainable 
credit growth. 
One explanation for why governments tend to delay reforms in the presence of a 
bubble may relate to sources of government revenue. The war-of-attrition model 
developed by Alesina and Drazen (1991) implies that governments tend to delay 
reforms when they have access to borrowing from overseas. They prefer ‘riding’ 
easy revenue to finance high levels of spending instead of reforming the economy. 
Vamvakidis (2008) extends the war-of-attrition model to allow for private sector 
borrowing. Both the theoretical and empirical results show that easily available 
foreign financing can result in a delay in economic reform. Even if the source of 
financing is different (e.g., foreign aid, capital inflow or windfall from natural 
resources), the end result is the same; there is a negative correlation between 
economic reforms and the availability of external financing. 
Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2014) confirm this relationship in their analysis of 
Eurozone economies. The authors study the mechanisms through which the adoption 
of the euro delayed, rather than advanced, economic reforms in the Eurozone 
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periphery and led to the deterioration of important institutions in these countries. 
They find that large inflows of capital to peripheral economies led to a gradual end 
to, and abandonment of, reforms. According to the authors, despite the fact that the 
source of capital inflow was not natural resources, some Eurozone countries 
(especially Ireland and Spain) experienced problems that typically appear as a result 
of Dutch disease. This was particularly reflected in the movement of human and 
physical capital away from the export-oriented sector towards real estate and the 
government sector. Further, some Eurozone countries wasted significant resources on 
the implementation of grandiose infrastructure projects. 
The results of the studies mentioned above suggest that, given the availability of 
‘easy’ money, the incumbent government faces a trade-off—to manage its windfalls 
effectively or derive political dividends from short-term improvements in social 
welfare and macroeconomic conditions. If there are not enough checks and balances, 
it is possible that the government will opt for the latter to increase its chances of re-
election. 
Herrera et al. (2014) consider easing monetary policy as a tool for increasing 
domestic popularity. Therefore, the authors focus on political boom together with 
credit boom. The paper shows that governments have more information about the 
nature of the credit boom. In other words, they are aware whether the credit boom is 
based on fundamentals or it is bubbly credit20. Having this information, governments 
may choose to regulate credit market or “ride” the credit boom. Central question of 
the paper is why the authorities do not take necessary actions if they see banking 
crisis coming? According to theory proposed, government popularity responds to 
credit growth. In other words, conditional on observing regulation, government 
reputation declines and conditional on observing no regulation, the reputation 
increases. This in its turn reduces government’s incentive in emerging market 
economies (EME), who is concerned about declining approval rate among 
constituency. The authors refer to this phenomenon as political boom. Having 
conducted empirical analysis of 60 countries, the paper concludes that unlike credit 
boom, political boom takes place only in EME. The key difference that drives this 
                                               
20 Martin and Ventura (2014) define sustainable credit as credit backed by expectations of future 
profits, and bubbly credit as credit backed by expectations about future credit.  
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difference is that generally EME have lower and more volatile popularity. This 
translates into more concern about reputation, discourages regulation before crisis. 
Paper shows there is negative correlation between regulation and government 
popularity in EME.  Finally, it shows that in most of the EME, crises happen not due 
to tightened regulation, but lack of action by government.  
Evolution of the literature shows that effective macroeconomic research cannot be 
conducted in isolation, i.e., ignoring politics and the quality of institutions will 
generate incomplete story. The literature on banking crises is no exception. Over the 
years, more authors started adding political variables to their analysis of banking 
crises.  
3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
This Chapter assesses the relationship between credit measures and the probability of 
banking crisis. In addition, the Chapter studies political and economic determinants 
of poor policy choices in countries under scrutiny. In accordance with the prediction 
of political business cycle theory described above, we assume the conduct of 
economic policy may change several quarters before and after elections. Hence, the 
empirical analysis is based on the quarterly dataset. The dataset consisting of 1672 
quarterly observations for 22 countries21 and covers the period of the first quarter of 
1995 to the last quarter of 2013. More information about the definition, sources and 
measurement of the variables are provided below. 
3.3.1 Dependent variable 
The main dependent variable in this study is the quarterly banking crisis dummy. The 
data for this variable are taken from the dataset constructed by Babecky et al. (2013), 
who aggregate information about the occurrence of crises from several influential 
                                               
21  Countries included in the analysis are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US.   
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papers, including Laeven and Valencia (2012) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). 
According to this aggregation approach, the crisis dummy equals 1 if at least one of 
the sources claims that a crisis occurred. Based on this dataset, we identify 298 
episodes when the banking crisis dummy equals 1. It is worth noting that this does 
not necessarily mean there were 298 banking crisis episodes, as in most cases the 
persistence of the crises increases the tally by up to 14.6 per cent of the total 
observations. 
3.3.2 Explanatory variables 
Explanatory variables are measures of credit, including change in total credit, 
household credit and enterprise credit. These variables are collected from the Bank 
for International Settlements’ (BIS) database. All of the credit measures are 
normalised by domestic GDP. Considering credit as a share of GDP instead of in 
level terms has both drawbacks and advantages. It is difficult to gauge whether 
movements in the credit-to-GDP ratio are driven by changes in credit or GDP. For 
instance, an increase in the ratio may be due to credit growth or a decline in GDP. 
Conversely, this method relates credit growth to the size of the economy. As a result, 
the reader receives a better picture, and it becomes easier to compare different 
countries. Given the large number of countries and different-sized credit markets, we 
use the ratio of domestic credit-to-GDP rather than credit levels. 
We also use the credit boom variable in the robustness check. This variable is 
generated from the total credit data. In the simplest form, a credit boom is an episode 
when credit growth significantly deviates from its long-term trend. We employ the 
Hodrick–Prescott (HP) filter to calculate long-term trends following Borio and Lowe 
(2002), Hilbers et al. (2005) and Mendoza and Terrones (2008). 
Despite using the HP filter to generate long-term trends, there are varying thresholds 
for identifying an episode as a credit boom. Mendoza and Terrones (2008) identify 
credit boom episodes based on cyclical patterns in both macro and micro data. The 
authors first split the real per capita credit in each country into cyclical and trend 
components. Whenever credit growth exceeds the country-specific long-run trend by 
a boom threshold, the episode is regarded as a credit boom. The key defining feature 
of this method is that the thresholds are proportional to each country’s standard 
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deviation of credit over the business cycle. Hilbers et al. (2005) consider an episode a 
credit boom if the credit-to-GDP ratio is at least 5 per cent higher than its HP trend. 
Although the HP filter has been extensively applied in the literature, it has several 
drawbacks. First, the calculation of the series is sensitive to a smoothing parameter22
(lambda). Additionally, this method is sensitive to the choice of endpoint, thereby 
generating unreliable estimates at the end of the date period. In the absence of 
enough data points, credit itself may be used to generate smoothed series. 
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014) estimate a backwards-looking rolling cubic trend and 
define a boom if: (i) the deviation from the trend is greater than 1.5 times its standard 
deviation and the annual growth rate of the credit-to-GDP ratio exceeds 10 per cent, 
or (ii) the annual growth rate of the credit-to-GDP ratio exceeds 20 per cent. The 
authors identify the end of the boom when growth of the credit-to-GDP ratio is: (i) 
negative or (ii) falls within three-quarters of one standard deviation from its trend 
and its annual growth is below 20 per cent. Crowe et al. (2014) define a credit boom 
as an episode when credit growth is one standard deviation above its backwards-
looking trend or the growth exceeds an arbitrary cut-off of 20 per cent. 
Although methodologies and thresholds vary, there is a significant correlation 
between different credit boom measures. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014) argue that the 
methodology used to identify credit boom episodes has little effect on the major 
empirical results. The authors compare different measures and conclude that there is 
a very high correlation between boom dummies identified by different authors. This 
thesis follows the methodology of Dell’Ariccia (2014) to construct the credit boom 
data used in the subsequent analysis.  
The other explanatory variable—government stability (govstab)—is used as a proxy 
for the domestic popularity of the incumbent government. Herrera et al. (2014) argue 
that the govstab variable from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) is highly 
correlated with domestic approval rates (for available data). It ranges from 1 to 12, 
with 1 being extremely instable (unpopular) government and 12 being perfect 
stability. 
                                               
22 The BIS recommends using a smoothing parameter at 400,000 for quarterly data. 
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In addition to direct effects, we also examine the indirect effects of credit booms at 
different levels of government popularity. For this purpose, credit measures are 
interacted with the government stability variable. 
In the specification where we control for election dates, the data are derived from the 
Polity IV dataset. Note that due to the large number of parliamentary republics in our 
dataset, we concentrate on parliamentary elections only. 
3.3.3 Control variables 
We use the following variables as controls: (i) change in short-term interest rates, (ii) 
log of private consumption expenditure, (iii) real GDP growth, (iv) inflation rate and 
(v) central bank independence. The data for macroeconomic variables (i–iv) are 
mostly derived from Eurostat and the OECD statistics portal. 
The choice of control variables is guided by theoretical considerations, availability of 
quarterly data and the findings of previous authors. For example, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998) show that high short-term real interest rates adversely affect bank 
balance sheets if banks cannot increase their lending rates quickly. Hardy and 
Pazarbasioglu (1999) find that private consumption booms can be a leading indicator 
of banking crises. The authors also conclude that banking crises are associated with 
large declines in real GDP. English (1996) argues that chronic high inflation tends to 
be associated with an overblown financial sector, as financial intermediaries profit 
from the float on payments. When inflation is drastically reduced, banks see one of 
their main sources of revenue disappear, and generalised banking problems may 
follow. 
In addition to economic channels, we also include central bank independence as a 
control variable. Our a priori expectation is that banks that are more independent 
have more tools at their disposal to tackle crises. Klomp and de Haan (2009) find that 
there is a robust negative relationship between central bank independence and 
financial instability. According to the authors, greater independence from external 
pressures implies that central banks are less politically constrained in acting to 
prevent financial distress, while also allowing them to act earlier and more decisively 
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when a crisis begins. Further, in the presence of a well-functioning central bank, the 
incumbent government has no power over monetary policy. 
Data for central bank independence are derived from Dincer and Eichengreen (2014). 
The authors augment the index proposed by Cukierman et al. (1992). The latter 
methodology uses 16 criteria reflecting the independence of chief executive officers 
(CEOs) of central banks, their independence in policy formulation, their mandate or 
objective, and stringency of limits on their lending to the public sector. Dincer and 
Eichengreen (2014) add the following measures to capture other aspects of 
independence: (i) limits on the reappointment of CEOs, (ii) measures of provisions 
affecting the (re)appointment of other board members, similar to those affecting 
CEOs, (iii) restrictions on government representation on the board, and (iv) 
government intervention in exchange rate policy formulation. Overall, the index is 
bound between 0 and 1, where 1 represents completely independent central banks, 
and 0 represents non-independent central banks. The authors compare central bank 
independence and transparency in 1998 and 2010 and conclude that there is a trend 
towards greater independence and transparency. 
3.3.4 Descriptive statistics 
Figure 3.1 depicts the behaviour of certain variables before and after a banking crisis 
starts. As shown, there is an increase in the total credit to the private sector during 
the lead-up to the banking crisis. However, the growth of household credit-to-GDP 
seems to be higher compared to enterprise credit. Moreover, the level of household 
credit remains below its pre-crisis level for the next four quarters after the banking 
crisis, whereas enterprise credit recovers quickly and indeed exceeds its pre-crisis 
level. 
The top-right panel of Figure 3.1 depicts the behaviour of the government stability 
variable, which stays almost constant before the crisis. However, once the banking 
crisis starts, the domestic approval rate falls in the following two quarters. It starts to 
increase during the third and the fourth quarters after the crisis, but it remains lower 
than its pre-crisis level. 
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Further, given our initial hypothesis about the motivation of governments to loosen 
credit conditions at the onset of elections, we present the behaviour of the same 
variables during the four quarters leading up to an election and four quarters after the 
election (see Table 3.1). 
The data in the table present evidence of the presence of political business cycles. 
Although the change is very small, all credit measures see a slight increase within 
four quarters before an election. Conversely, total credit and enterprise credit 
measures see a small decline after an election. 
Table 3.1 suggests that governments may be involved in policies to boost their 
domestic approval rating in the lead-up to an election. Herrera et al. (2014) refer to 
this phenomenon as a ‘political boom’ and conclude that there is a significant 
difference between emerging market economies and developed countries in terms of 
governments’ opportunistic behaviour. They point to the low average government 
stability score and its high volatility in developing countries as a potential 
explanation for this difference. 
Given that our dataset only contains developed economies, it would be interesting to 
observe the average score for government stability in the countries under scrutiny. 
Figure 3.2 shows the average government stability score for the countries used in our 
analysis. As shown, Luxembourg has the highest score. Interestingly, the highest 
volatility is observed for the UK. Overall, despite these differences, there is little 
variation in the government stability scores across the countries.
In contrast, the frequency of banking crises significantly varies from country to 
country. Figure 3.3 indicates that, among the countries under scrutiny, Australia and 
Norway have never experienced a banking crisis during the entire sample period. 
Conversely, the Czech Republic and Greece have spent the highest number of 
quarters in banking crises (24 quarters each). 
Overall, there are 298 banking crisis episodes in the dataset. This represents 14.6 per 
cent of the total number of observations. Credit booms, as identified in the previous 
section, took place during only 5 per cent of observations. Table 3.2 presents 
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descriptive statistics for both the dependent and independent variables, while Table 
3.3 shows how central bank independence variable varies across countries. 
3.4 Econometric Methodology 
The previous section documented the behaviour of economic and political variables 
before, during and after banking crises. We now turn to econometric analysis to test 
the link between political booms and banking crises in a more formal way. 
From a review of the literature and some descriptive statistics provided above, one 
can argue that governments tend to improve their popularity by allowing for credit 
booms. The assumption is that governments have information about the nature of the 
boom. A credit boom that is not based on fundamentals makes a country vulnerable 
to a banking crisis, which again alters the popularity of the government. Hence, there 
seems to be a continuous interaction between these two variables. In this section, we 
will test whether government stability and its interaction with domestic credit affects 
the probability of banking crises. The first subsection of the analysis uses the probit 
model; however, given that there is a potential endogeneity problem, we employ the 
bivariate probit model in the second subsection. 
3.4.1 Univariate probit model 
The dependent variable is the banking crisis (BC) dummy. Hence, we will use the 
univariate probit model for the analysis. Consider the binary variable BC, which is 
determined by the latent variable BC*: 
ܤܥכ ൌ ܺߚଵ ൅ ߝଵ(1)
where X is a vector of explanatory and control variables for banking crises: 
ܤܥ௧ ൌ ൜ ͳǡ݂݅ݐ݄݁ݎ݁݅ݏܽܾܽ݊݇݅݊݃ܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏܽݐݐ݅݉݁ݐሺܤܥ
כ ൐ Ͳሻ
Ͳǡ݂݅ݐ݄݁ݎ݁݅ݏ݊݋ܾܽ݊݇݅݊݃ܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏܽݐݐ݅݉݁ݐሺܤܥכ ൑ Ͳሻ (2)
Conditional on information set ȳ௧ିଵ , the banking crisis dummy has a Bernoulli 
distribution with a parameter probability ݌௧ . The probit model estimates the 
conditional probability of future banking crises. The parameters of the model may be 
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estimated directly using maximum likelihood estimation. We estimate the following 
equation using the univariate probit model: 
ሺݕ ൌ ͳȁȳ௧ିଵሻ ൌ ߜ௜ ൅ ߚଵοܿݎ݁݀݅ݐ݃݀݌௜௧ ൅ ߚଶ݃݋ݒݏݐܽ ௜ܾ௧ ൅ ߚଷοܿݎ݁݀݅ݐ݃݀݌௜௧ כ ݃݋ݒݏݐܽ ௜ܾ௧
                                                                                                                        ൅ߚࢄ ൅ ߝ௜௧ (3)
In Equation (3), οcreditgdp is the change in domestic credit-to-GDP and govstab is 
the proxy for government popularity, as described in the data section. Apart from the 
direct effect of credit and government stability, we also include their interaction in 
the baseline model to capture any indirect effects. X is a vector of control variables 
that includes change in GDP, inflation, central bank independence, log of reserves 
and time to parliamentary elections. The latter is added to reflect the government’s 
time constraint. ߜ௜ represents country dummies. 
One methodological difficulty of using country and time dummies in binary 
regression models relates to the issue of incidental parameters. In the presence of 
small N and large T (which is the case in this paper), the structural parameters cannot 
be consistently estimated. Hence, following Schularick and Taylor (2012), we use a 
model with country dummies only. Error terms are clustered by countries to allow 
for possible cross-section correlation. 
Following Equation (3), we extend our analysis to differentiate between domestic 
credit to households and enterprises. This type of division has been popular in the 
literature in the context of economic growth. For example, Galor and Zeira (1993) 
argue that household credit can increase economic growth if it increases human 
capital accumulation. In general, most theoretical and empirical papers relate 
household credit to economic growth via the human capital accumulation channel. In 
contrast, Japelli and Pagano (1994) argue that household credit decreases growth, 
while Beck et al. (2012) show that bank lending to enterprise not only increases GDP 
per capita growth, but is also significantly associated with faster reductions in 
income inequality. The effects of enterprise and household credit on real economic 
variables suggest that these variables may have different effects on the probability of 
banking crises. Therefore, we estimate Equations (4) and (5):  
ሺݕ ൌ ͳȁȳ௧ିଵሻ ൌ ߜ௜ ൅ ߚଵο݁݊ݐܿݎ௜௧ ൅ ߚଶ݃݋ݒݏݐܽ ௜ܾ௧ ൅ ߚଷο݁݊ݐܿݎ݁௜௧ כ ݃݋ݒݏݐܽ ௜ܾ௧ ൅ ߚࢄ൅ߝ௜௧ (4)
ሺݕ ൌ ͳȁȳ௧ିଵሻ ൌ ߜ௜ ൅ ߚଵο݄݋ݑݏ݁ܿݎ௜௧ ൅ ߚଶ݃݋ݒݏݐܽ ௜ܾ௧ ൅ ߚଷο݄݋ݑݏ݁ܿݎ௜௧ כ ݃݋ݒݏݐܽ ௜ܾ௧ ൅ ߚࢄ൅ߝ௜௧ (5)
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Despite contrasting views in the literature regarding the effect of enterprise and 
household credit on economies, our a priori expectation is that enterprise credit has 
fewer effects than household credit in exposing economies to banking crises. The 
theoretical literature predicts that enterprise credit raises capital accumulation and 
productivity and increases economic growth, whereas household credit has no long-
term effects on growth (Buyukkarabacak and Valev 2010). 
The structure of credit to the private sector has recently changed dramatically. 
Household debt was a small portion of total credit until the 1990s. The past two 
decades has seen a sustainable rise in household debt in many economies. For 
example, Crotty (2009) shows that the household debt-to-GDP ratio was 48 per cent 
in 1985 compared to around 100 per cent in 2008. 
In addition to credit card debt and non-bank debt, the rise in household indebtedness 
has largely reflected the growing tendency of households to extract equity from the 
value of their houses to finance consumption (Barba and Pivetti 2009). 
Further, higher mortgage debt servicing costs have also contributed to household 
debt. These developments have exposed households to negative shocks. A collapse in 
house prices, a decline in interest rates and other external shocks may also affect 
households’ ability to pay back debt (Dynan et al. 2012). 
3.4.2 Bivariate probit model 
An issue with estimating Equation (1), as well as with Equations (2) and (3), is that 
credit growth may be endogenous. The probability a credit boom occurring may be 
determined by other unobservable characteristics that are correlated with other 
explanatory variables. Potential reverse causality may also result in biased estimates. 
For instance, credit growth may stem from the easing of monetary policy after a 
banking crisis starts. In this case, the causality in the relationship runs from the crisis 
to the credit boom. 
One way of addressing endogeneity in models with binary outcomes is to employ the 
recursive bivariate probit model. Morris (2007) uses this method to establish the 
relationship between obesity and employment. Minetti and Zhu (2011) employ the 
bivariate probit model to estimate the effect of credit rationing on firms’ exports. The 
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basic logit behind the bivariate probit model is outlined below, as well as how this 
model can be employed in the context of this thesis. 
The bivariate probit model is a joint model of two binary outcomes. In the context of 
the present study, the dependent variables of the equations are BC (defined the same 
as in the data section) and credit boom (CB) dummies (discussed in the previous 
section). The latter equals 1 if there is a credit boom, and 0 otherwise. Note that we 
use the CB dummy as a proxy for excessive credit growth used in the univariate 
probit regressions. These two dichotomous variables are determined by two latent 
variables BC* and CB*, which are governed according to: 
ܥܤכ ൌ ݔߚଷ ൅ ߝଶ (6)
ܤܥכ ൌ ݔߚଵ ൅ ߚଶܥܤכ ൅ ߝଵ (7)
     ቀߝଵߝଶቁ̱ܰ ൤ቀ
Ͳ
Ͳቁǡ ൬
ͳߩ
ߩͳ൰൨
where vectors ݔଵ and ݔଶ include explanatory and control variables for banking crises 
and credit booms respectively.23 Error terms are distributed as standard bivariate 
normal variables with a correlation coefficient ߩ . The bivariate probit model is 
recursive in that the banking crisis outcome depends on both exogenous variables 
and the outcome of the boom regression, whereas the boom equation depends on 
exogenous variables only. Hence, in this section, the crisis equation is structural and 
the credit boom equation is a reduced-form equation. However, to check for 
robustness, we also use the bivariate probit model with both of the lagged dependent 
variables in further sections. 
As in the univariate probit model, the values of BC and CB are not observed directly. 
The bivariate probit model specifies the outcomes as follows: 
ܤܥ ൌ ൜ͳ݂݅ܤܥ
כ ൐ Ͳ
Ͳ݂݅ܤܥכ ൑ Ͳ  (8)
ܥܤ ൌ ൜ͳ݂݅ܥܤ
כ ൐ Ͳ
Ͳ݂݅ܥܤכ ൑ Ͳ (9)
                                               
23 Note that subscript i, which denotes cross-sections, is ignored for convenience. 
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We obtain the estimates of our parameters from maximising the log likelihood 
function with respect to ȕ = (ߚଵǡ ߚଶǡ ߚଷሻ and the correlation coefficient between error 
termsߝଵand ߝଶ. 
Estimating two binary probit models in one equation system may yield more 
consistent estimates compared to estimating each probit model separately. If the error 
terms are not independent (cov(ߝଵǡ ߝଶሻ ് Ͳሻ, the findings of the univariate probit 
model are affected by the endogeneity problem; thus, using two separate probit 
models will generate inconsistent estimates of the parameters. To control for 
endogeneity, we therefore proceed with employing the bivariate probit method. 
One practical difficulty in attempting to estimate a bivariate probit is finding a set of 
identifying restrictions that are significant determinants of the endogenous variable, 
but that are also orthogonal to the residuals of the main equation. In this study, 
identification is achieved by excluding some credit boom equation variables from the 
banking crisis equation (Minetti and Zhu 2011). As a result, we obtain exogenous 
variation in the probability of experiencing a credit boom. 
Based on the above discussion, we estimate the following system of equations: 
݌ݎ݋ܾሺܥܤ௜௧ ൌ ͳሻ ൌ ݌ݎ݋ܾሺߙଵ ൅ ܼߙଶ ൅ ܺߙଷ ൅ ߝଶ ൐ Ͳሻ  (10)
݌ݎ݋ܾሺܤܥ௜௧ ൌ ͳሻ ൌ ݌ݎ݋ܾሺߚଵ ൅ ߚଶܥܤ௜௧൅ܺԢߚଷ ൅ ߝଵ ൐ Ͳሻ (11)
where X’ is the vector of control variables and Z is the vector of variables that create 
exogenous variation in the credit boom equation. We exclude credit-to-GDP, short-
term interest rates, log of private consumption expenditure, government stability and 
central bank independence from the banking crisis equation. The choice of 
explanatory variables are dictated by the review of the literature and discussed in 
more detail in section 3.3.3. The decision to include above mentioned variables only 
in Equation (10) is driven by the expectation that these variables affect the 
probability of banking crisis via affecting credit boom variable. In other words, the 
recursive bivariate probit model predicts the probability of experiencing a credit 
boom (from Equation (10)) conditional on values of explanatory variables and uses 
predicted probability in Equation (11) instead of actual CB values. 
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The main difference between the baseline probit model and the bivariate probit 
model is the absence of an interaction term in the latter. This is because the 
interaction term in the probit model consists of the product of credit growth and 
government stability. In the bivariate probit model, we estimate the credit boom and 
banking crisis equations in the system. Hence, credit boom, which is the proxy for 
credit growth, cannot be interacted with government stability. Therefore, in this 
setup, we only gauge the direct effect of the credit boom on the banking crisis. 
3.4.3 Robustness checks 
In this section, we use two methods to check the robustness of the previous 
estimations. First, we add a lagged banking crisis dummy to the credit boom equation 
of the bivariate probit model. In doing so, we aim to capture potential feedback 
running from the preceding banking crisis to the credit boom. That is, we 
acknowledge that the incidence of banking crises in the previous year may trigger a 
credit boom in the current year. 
The second method consists of running the bivariate probit model with lags. Using 
lagged independent variables may help to reduce the bias caused by potential reverse 
causality. 
3.4.3.1 Model with banking crisis dummy 
This strategy is used to capture the links between credit booms and banking crises. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) argue that the behaviour of some 
explanatory variables is likely to be affected after the onset of a banking crisis. 
Credit-to-GDP is one such variable, as the ratio is likely to fall after a banking crisis. 
In contrast, after the banking crisis, the central bank may inject money into the 
financial system to restore lending activity. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) find that, 
as the crisis unfolds, the central bank pumps money to banks to alleviate their 
financial situation. 
Taking the interlinkages into consideration, we estimate the following equations: 
݌ݎ݋ܾሺܥܤ௜௧ ൌ ͳሻ ൌ ݌ݎ݋ܾሺߙଵ ൅ ߙଶܤܥ ൅ ܼߙଷ ൅ ܺߙସ ൅ ߝଶ ൐ Ͳሻሺͳʹሻ
݌ݎ݋ܾሺܤܥ௜௧ ൌ ͳሻ ൌ ݌ݎ݋ܾሺߚଵ ൅ ߚଶܥܤ௜௧൅ܺߚଷ ൅ ߝଵ ൐ Ͳሻሺͳ͵ሻ
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3.4.3.2 Model with lags 
Both in the baseline specification and the bivariate probit model, the right-hand-side 
variables are used in contemporaneous form. However, all explanatory variables—
particularly the credit boom—may have a delayed effect on the banking crisis. 
Hence, by lagging the variables24 for four quarters, we account for the delayed effect 
of explanatory variables on the banking crisis and control for potential reverse 
causality. Using lagged independent variables to reduce endogeneity bias has been a 
popular approach in empirical literature. Baccini and Urpelainen (2014) study the 
impact of preferential trade agreement on domestic economic reforms. The authors 
use the political variables lagged by one year to avoid endogeneity. Similarly, 
Steinberg and Malhotra (2014) employ similar strategy to gauge the impact of 
authoritarian regime type on exchange rate policy. 
3.5 Results and Discussion 
This section highlights the major findings from the econometric estimations and 
discusses the implications of these results. 
3.5.1 Results of univariate probit specification 
Table 3.3 presents the main empirical results based on the univariate probit model. 
We start with the probit regression with no country dummies and no control 
variables. These estimates are presented in column (1). From columns (2) to (5), we 
gradually add country dummies and control variables to the regression. The first 
three variables in Table 3.3 are of primary interest, so we will start by discussing 
them. 
Several findings from Table 3.3 are worth highlighting. The change in total credit-to-
GDP enters regressions with positive but statistically insignificant coefficients in 
specifications with no interaction term (columns (1) and (2)). However, when we add 
the interaction term and control variables in columns (3) and (4), it becomes 
significant at the 1 per cent confidence level. More specifically, the results indicate 
that credit growth increases the likelihood of a banking crisis. This finding is in line 
                                               
24 The reason is that time to election shows the quarters remaining till elections and hence, it has only 
contemporaneous effect over the dependent variable.
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with those of previous studies (Demirguc-Kunt et al. 1999; Schularik and Taylor 
2012). As discussed earlier, credit expansions are considered a pre-condition for 
banking crises in both the theoretical and empirical literature. Interestingly, the 
magnitude of the effect increases as we control for other variables. This suggests 
that, once other economic and political factors are taken into account, the effect of 
credit growth becomes more pronounced. Hence, the first important finding that 
emerges from Table 3.3 is a positive relationship between credit expansion and the 
probability of a banking crisis. 
Second, Table 3.4 reveals that the government stability variable enters the regression 
with a negative coefficient, and it is statistically significant in three out of four 
specifications. That is, an increase in a government’s popularity score is associated 
with the lower likelihood of a banking crisis. This suggests that countries with low 
government stability are more likely to experience a banking crisis. In the previous 
section, we argued that governments may allow an unnecessary credit boom if they 
are concerned about their domestic approval rating. Hence, the result could be 
interpreted as governments’ willingness to allow unsustainable credit in order to 
boost their domestic approval rating. A strand of the literature claims that credit 
growth in an economy is affected by its political system. For instance, Calomiris and 
Haber (2014) argue that politics are ‘baked into’ the property rights systems that 
underpin banks. Consequently, the banking system is heavily dependent on the 
political system. That is, political institutions limit countries’ banking systems. The 
authors argue that countries that have abundant credit yet manage to stay crisis-free 
are those that are either small islands or democracies with anti-populist constitutions. 
Third, from Table 3.4, the coefficient of the interaction term suggests that domestic 
credit growth has a differential effect on different government stability levels. To 
understand this differential effect, consider Figure 3.4, which depicts the marginal 
effects of domestic credit growth on the probability of a banking crisis at different 
levels of government stability. The slope of the curve is negative, meaning that the 
lower the government’s stability, the higher the marginal effect of domestic credit 
growth. For example, when the government stability score is 4, a 1 per cent growth 
in domestic credit-to-GDP will increase the probability of a banking crisis by almost 
4 per cent. In contrast, in countries where the government is popular, the marginal 
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effect of credit growth is more than 2.3 per cent. These results confirm that growth in 
domestic credit increases the likelihood of a banking crisis. However, when the 
popularity of the incumbent government is high, it has less incentive to engage in 
unnecessary expansionary monetary policy whereas unpopular governments that are 
concerned with their chance of re-election may use unsustainable credit expansion as 
a political tool and hence create pre-conditions for a banking crisis. 
Herrera et al. (2014) reach a similar conclusion for emerging market economies. The 
authors show that, due to a lower level and higher volatility of domestic approval 
rates in emerging economies, governments prefer to delay or avoid corrective 
policies during booms. The reputation concerns in these economies are translated 
into a higher likelihood of financial crises. However, the authors do not find similar 
results for advanced economies. In this respect, our results are different, thus 
suggesting that the reputation mechanism could also be in place in developed 
countries. 
The signs of control variables are in line with expectations, excluding one for central 
bank independence. One would expect that central banks with more independence 
would implement corrective measures to curb credit growth and reduce the 
probability of a banking crisis. However, in our model, the sign of the coefficient 
indicates otherwise, although it is not statistically significant. 
One more important variable that needs to be discussed is the time-to-elections 
variable. This is the measure of time remaining until the next parliamentary election. 
From Table 3.4, we can conclude that the less time left until the election, the lower 
the probability of a crisis. This important finding can be interpreted in the following 
ways. 
First, it may reflect the attitude of governments at the onset of an election. Even if 
the economy is in trouble, governments will do whatever it takes to tackle the 
problem. Otherwise, the political cost would be extremely costly. Second, this 
finding may reveal the reckless behaviour of some governments after being elected. 
More specifically, incumbent governments use growth and employment-inducing 
policies in the lead-up to an election, which tend to have negative long-term 
consequences. In the context of the present study, an example of such a populist 
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policy would be ‘riding’ an unsustainable credit boom. For example, Cole (2009) 
analyses the credit from government-owned banks in different districts in India 
during election years and concludes that credit extended to the agriculture sector 
grows by 5–10 per cent in these years. As a result, the incumbent government’s 
chance of being re-elected increases, as the problems associated with delayed 
reforms have not yet been realised. As soon as the incumbent takes over, the 
problems that date back to the pre-election period are revealed and a banking crisis 
occurs. 
It is clear that banking crises tend to occur further from elections. In Figure 3.6, the 
vertical axis shows the number of banking crises in the dataset, while the horizontal 
axis presents the number of quarters since the last election. As shown, 160 out of 219 
banking crises occur during the first two years after the election. This constitutes 
more than 73 per cent of banking crisis observations. 
As a next step, the total credit figure is separated into credit to households and 
enterprise credit. The coefficient estimates of the equation are presented in the 
Appendix. Instead, we will focus on the marginal effects of household and enterprise 
credit growth on the probability of banking crises. This will help us determine the 
driver of the positive relationship that we established earlier between the total credit 
measure and banking crises. 
Table 3.5 shows the marginal effects of total credit growth (column 2), enterprise 
credit (column 3) and household credit (column 4) at different values of the 
government stability variable (column 1). It suggests that growth in total credit-to-
GDP increases the probability of a banking crisis by 3.9 per cent at the lowest level 
of the government approval rate. Column (3) indicates that this probability increases 
by only 2.8 per cent when the growth is in enterprise credit. For household credit, the 
marginal effect is 8.2 per cent (column 4). Interestingly, even in countries with the 
most popular government, a 1 per cent increase in household credit increases the 
likelihood of a banking crisis by 6 per cent. This result suggests that the positive 
relationship established between credit growth and banking crises is mostly driven by 
growth in household credit. 
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3.5.2 Results from the bivariate probit specification 
Table 3.6 presents the estimations of Equations (10) and (11) for total, enterprise and 
household credit (Models 1, 2 and 3, respectively). Overall, the estimates are 
satisfying in the sense that most of the variables entered into the equations have the 
expected signs and significance. Further, the likelihood test suggests that, for the 
total credit and household credit models, the bivariate probit model yields more 
consistent estimates than estimating two separate probit models. 
The model consists of two equations. It first estimates the credit boom equation and 
then proceeds with plugging in estimated values of the credit boom into the banking 
crisis equation. 
In the credit boom equation of the total credit model, several results stand out. First, 
the government stability variable is still negative and statistically significant. Second, 
the change in total credit-to-GDP retains its positive and significant coefficient. 
These two findings have also been established in the univariate probit model. Third, 
unlike in the univariate probit model, central bank independency enters the equation 
with a negative coefficient. The interpretation of the latter is simple: countries with 
independent central banks tend to have a lower likelihood of a credit boom. 
Similarly, more stable and popular governments tend to avoid credit booms, whereas 
less popular governments tend to use credit booms as a tool. Finally, an increase in 
total credit-to-GDP increases the probability of a credit boom. This is not surprising, 
as the credit boom dummy is derived from credit growth.25
The results also reveal that central bank independence helps to curb domestic credit 
booms when the aggregate credit measure is used. In contrast, for enterprise credit 
booms, the sign of the coefficient is still negative, despite being statistically 
insignificant. 
The banking crisis equation results also confirm the importance of the time-to-
elections variable, which is positive and statistically significant, at least at the 5 per 
cent confidence level. This result again confirms the presence of political business 
cycles before and after elections and is in line with the findings of previous empirical 
                                               
25 Note that growth in total credit does not necessarily mean that the country enters a credit boom. 
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research. For instance, Drazen (2001) finds that governments tend to prefer an 
economic boom just before an election and an economic recession afterwards. 
Table 3.6 also suggests that financial openness has a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient in all models. This result implies that more open economies 
tend to be less vulnerable to banking crises. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) 
argue that banks may hedge some of their risks by lending from overseas. Hence, the 
expansion of cross-border lending increases banks’ strength, especially in small open 
economies. Our finding confirms this argument. 
The results of both the probit and bivariate probit models imply that there is a 
relationship between credit growth and banking crises. Moreover, this relationship is 
affected by institutional factors such as government popularity, central bank 
independence and elections. In the next section, we perform robustness checks to 
confirm these findings. 
3.5.3 Robustness check results 
3.5.3.1 Results of model with banking crisis 
Table 3.7 presents the results of the bivariate probit model where the banking crisis 
dummy is included in the credit boom equation. Models 1 and 3, which correspond 
to total credit and household credit respectively, reveal that the likelihood of a boom 
in aggregate credit and credit to households increases after a banking crisis. In effect, 
this result reflects the aggressive monetary policy implemented by central banks 
around the world to mitigate the damage from the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 
2007–2009. This is in line with the findings of Mishkin (2010), who shows that the 
shock emanating from the GFC was considerably stronger than the shock produced 
by the Great Depression. Nevertheless, the economic downturn was significantly 
lower due to aggressive and effective monetary policy. This policy included liquidity 
provisions in which central banks expanded credit to the private sector. 
Interestingly, the coefficient of enterprise credit growth is negative, suggesting that 
enterprise credit declines in the aftermath of banking crises. However, the likelihood 
test of Model 2 shows that we fail to reject the null hypothesis; therefore, the results 
of the bivariate probit model are not superior to those of the two separate probit 
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models. This means that the univariate probit model for enterprise credit is not 
affected by endogeneity and we can therefore rely on its findings. 
In particular, the positive relationship established between credit and banking crises, 
governments’ tendency to avoid banking crises before an election, and the negative 
and statistically significant sign of the government stability variable are robust to 
different econometric specifications. 
3.5.3.2 Results of the model with lags 
We also run the model where independent variables are lagged by four quarters (see 
Table 3.8).26 We separate the model into two stages. In the first stage, we expect that 
all explanatory variables will have a lagged effect on credit booms, except for time-
to-elections. As explained above, the time-to-elections variable is expected to have a 
direct effect on credit booms, as policymakers may increase/decrease domestic credit 
based on the time until the next election, and there is no reason why this variable 
would have a lagged effect. In the second stage, the credit boom and other 
explanatory and control variables have a lagged effect on the probability of a banking 
crisis. Again, we use the contemporaneous value of the time-to-election variable. 
The results that stand out are as follows. There is a positive relationship between 
banking crises and credit booms. When the credit boom is separated into household 
and enterprise credit, only the effect of household credit is statistically significant. 
Further, government stability retains its negative sign and significance in Models 1 
and 3. The time-to-elections variable is only significant for Model 1, suggesting that 
governments tend to avoid a banking crisis closer to an election. 
3.6 Conclusions 
The relationship between domestic credit and banking crises has always been a 
central topic in macroeconomics. Given the emergence of longer and more 
comprehensive datasets, several papers (Aikman 2014; Schularik and Taylor 2012) 
have revisited the topic. Conversely, a strand of the literature has focused on the 
                                               
26 The results with up to eight lags are consistent with current estimates and are available upon 
request. 
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determinants of policy choices in an attempt to explain why domestic credit growth 
results in banking crises in some cases. 
This thesis brings together the two strands of the empirical and theoretical research 
on banking crises. The dataset consists of 1672 quarterly observations for 22 OECD 
countries from the first quarter of 1995 to the last quarter of 2013. The first part of 
the chapter investigates the effects of aggregate credit growth on the probability of a 
banking crisis. We then proceed with explaining the driver of the hitherto established 
relationship between credit growth and the likelihood of a banking crisis, focusing on 
institutional and political factors. 
To establish the differential effects of enterprise and household credit, this study uses 
data on these credit measures and total credit. Econometric estimations reveal that 
household credit growth has a larger effect on the likelihood of a banking crisis 
compared to enterprise credit growth. Further, the analysis finds that all credit 
measures have both direct and indirect effects on the likelihood of a banking crisis. 
More specifically, credit growth seems to have a differential effect on the propensity 
of a banking crisis, depending on the level of government popularity. 
This thesis also finds evidence in favour of the presence of political business cycles. 
Descriptive statistics reveal that all credit measures increase or stay stable in the 
lead-up to an election, and they show a slight decline after an election. These results 
are confirmed by econometric estimations. In particular, we find that countries with a 
higher government stability score tend to have a lower probability of a banking 
crisis. Herrera et al. (2014) reach a similar conclusion for emerging market 
economies. 
Moreover, this study uses time-to-elections and central bank independence variables 
to control for institutional aspects of banking crises. According to estimations, 
central bank independence tends to reduce the likelihood of a credit boom and 
banking crisis, which stems from the incumbent government’s opportunistic 
behaviour. In this regard, it plays the role of a pacifier variable in our model. 
Another interesting finding in the present study is that there is less likelihood of a 
banking crisis in the lead-up to an election. This can be interpreted as the 
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incumbent’s attempt to avoid a crisis in order to increase their chance of re-election. 
However, expansionary policies in the lead-up to an election may set the foundation 
for unsustainable credit growth. Consequently, the likelihood of a banking crisis 
increases after an election. Indeed, the descriptive statistics reveal that 73 per cent of 
banking crises occur during the first eight quarters after an election. 
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, it uses a 
unique approach to address the potential endogeneity problem arising from omitted 
variable bias and reverse causality. For this purpose, we use the bivariate probit 
model, which generates exogenous variation in the credit boom and assesses the 
relationship between the latter and banking crises.
Second, we incorporate central bank independence in our model, which has been 
largely ignored in previous empirical literature. The rationale behind this is that, in 
the presence of independent central banks, incumbent governments tend to have 
limited ability to alter the conduct of monetary policy. 
Third, this study attempts to capture the presence of political business cycles by 
including a time-to-elections variable in the empirical estimations. Our a priori 
expectation is that elections—particularly in countries with weak central bank 
independence—are among the determinants of policy choices. The empirical analysis 
confirms our expectations. 
Overall, the findings of this chapter are robust to different model specifications. Due 
to a lack of data, the analysis could not be subsampled. One possible extension in 
future would be to investigate why household credit has a larger effect on the 
likelihood of banking crises. In particular, exploring the transmission channel 
between household credit and banking crises would help to better understand 
unsustainable credit growth, which may in turn help to develop better macro-
prudential regulation and reduce the likelihood of banking crises. 
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Tables and Figures  
Table 3.1 Behaviour of variables before and after parliamentary elections 
Variables t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
Government stability 8.46 8.5 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.3 8.44 8.34 8.4 
Total credit, % of GDP 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.56
Enterprise credit, % of GDP 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.34
Household credit, % of GDP 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.25 
Note: The numbers show the evolution of credit measures and government stability variable at 
the onset of parliamentary elections. Data for credit is derived from OECD and BIS statistics. 
Government stability data is derived from ICRG.  
Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics of some variables 
Variable                                 Mean   Std. deviation       Min      Max 
Banking crisis 0.146 0.353 0 1 
Credit boom 0.049 0.217 0 1 
Government stability 8.383 1.661 4 12 
Inflation 0.009 0.020 -0.051 0.220 
Real GDP growth 0.023 0.029 -0.131 0.134 
Household credit, % of GDP 0.227 0.128 0.002 0.584 
Enterprise credit, % of GDP 0.350 0.199 0.028 1.598
Total credit, % of GDP 0.557 0.280 0.047 1.819 
Short-term interest rates 0.042 0.043 0.000 0.369 
Long-term interest rate 0.049 0.022 0.006 0.254 
Log of private consumption 12.259 2.211 7.667 19.035 
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Table 3.3 The determinants of banking crisis in univariate probit specification  
Country Mean Minimum Maximum 
Australia 0.18 0.17 0.21 
Austria 0.81 0.81 0.81 
Belgium 0.81 0.81 0.81 
Denmark 0.81 0.81 0.81 
Finland 0.81 0.81 0.81 
France 0.81 0.81 0.81 
Germany 0.81 0.81 0.81 
Greece 0.81 0.81 0.81 
Hungary 0.72 0.47 0.77 
Ireland 0.81 0.81 0.81 
Italy 0.81 0.81 0.81 
Luxembourg 0.81 0.81 0.81 
Mexico 0.63 0.63 0.63 
Netherlands 0.81 0.81 0.81 
Norway 0.36 0.11 0.47 
Poland 0.33 0.32 0.37 
Portugal 0.81 0.81 0.81 
Spain 0.81 0.81 0.81 
Sweden 0.77 0.77 0.77 
Switzerland 0.71 0.70 0.72 
UK 0.21 0.20 0.23 
US 0.18 0.18 0.18 
Note: the index is bound between 0 and 1, where 1 
represents completely independent central banks, and 
0 represents non-independent central banks. 
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Table 3.4 The determinants of banking crisis in univariate probit specification  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Probit Probit Probit Probit 
¨ in total credit-to-GDP 4.193 2.723 29.09*** 28.46*** 
(0.324) (0.499) (0.001) (0.000) 
Government stability -0.210** -0.264*** -0.257*** -0.102 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.110) 
¨ in credit x government 
stability   -3.000*** -3.30*** 
      (0.001) (0.000) 
Central Bank Independence  0.696 
(0.833) 
Log of reserves -0.537* 
(0.084) 
¨ in real GDP -20.16*** 
(0.000) 
Inflation 4.617 
(0.291) 
Time-to-elections 0.03* 
(0.044) 
Control variables No No No Yes 
Country dummies No Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies No No No No 
Observations 1587 1374 1374 876 
Number of countries 22 19 19 16 
Pseudo R-squared 0.058 0.12 0.13 0.21 
Note: Dependent variable is binary banking crisis dummy. Columns (1) to (4) contain 
the results of univariate probit specification. Error terms are clustered at the country 
level. P-values are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 3.5 Marginal effects of total, enterprise and household credit growth over 
the probability of banking crises 
Government 
stability Total credit Enterprise credit Household credit 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
Marginal 
effect 
P-
value 
Marginal 
effect P-value 
Marginal 
effect 
P-
value 
4 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.00 
4.5 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.00 
5.0 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.00 
5.5 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.00 
6.0 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.00 
6.5 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.00 
7.0 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.00 
7.5 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.00 
8.0 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.00 
8.5 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.00 
9.0 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.00 
9.5 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.00 
10.0 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.00 
10.5 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.00 
11.0 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.00 
11.5 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.00 
12.0 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.00 
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Table 3.6 The results of bivariate probit model  
Total credit Enterprise credit Household credit 
Variables Credit Boom 
Banking 
Crisis 
Credit 
Boom 
Banking 
Crisis 
Credit 
Boom 
Banking 
Crisis 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Credit boom  2.150*** 1.403*** 1.807*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log of official reserves -0.152 -0.130 -0.108 
(0.113) (0.181) (0.163) 
¨ in financial openness -70.4*** -110.6*** -72.91*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
¨ in real GDP -6.376 -14.7*** -23.36*** -14.07*** -12.49* -14.21*** 
(0.177) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) 
CPI Inflation 10.45 -4.102 14.05** -2.130 2.375 -2.786 
(0.348) (0.413) (0.038) (0.575) (0.799) (0.514) 
Time to election -0.0237 0.035*** -0.0155 0.036** 0.01 0.032** 
(0.390) (0.009) (0.453) (0.021) (0.713) (0.025) 
Government stability  -0.177* 0.140* -0.120* 
(0.022) (0.074) (0.075) 
Central Bank independence  -1.077* -0.061 0.468 
(0.095) (0.946) (0.594) 
¨ in Credit-to-GDP  29.08*** 28.69*** 61.51*** 
(0.000) (0.007) (0.000) 
Log of private consumption  0.0288 -0.124 -0.153 
(0.708) (0.267) (0.395) 
¨ in short-term interest rate  11.72** 11.93*** 11.36* 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.081) 
Observations 982 979 979 
Likelilood test, chi-square 3.03 0.03 3.55 
Prob. 0.08 0.86 0.06 
Note: ***,**,* represent statistical significance at 1,5 and 10 per cent confidence levels respectively. Error 
terms are cluster by countries. Underlying null hypothesis of the likelihood test suggests two independent 
univariate probit models. Probability of greater than 0.1 suggests significant correlation estimator, hence 
bivariate probit model is preferred.  
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Table 3.7 The results of bivariate probit model with banking crisis dummy 
Note: ***,**,* represent statistical significance at 1,5 and 10 per cent confidence levels respectively. Error terms 
are cluster by countries. Underlying null hypothesis of the likelihood test suggests two independent univariate 
probit models. Probability of greater than 0.1 suggests significant correlation estimator, hence bivariate probit 
model is preferred.  
  Total credit Enterprise credit Household credit 
Variables Credit Boom 
Banking 
Crisis 
Credit 
Boom 
Banking 
Crisis 
Credit 
Boom 
Banking 
Crisis 
  (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Credit boom  2.37*** -1.43*** 2.64*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log of official reserves -0.132 -0.15 -0.077 
  (0.156) (0.15) (0.268) 
¨ in financial openness -95.71*** -69.7*** -104.7*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
¨ in real GDP 4.79 -14.52*** -22.66*** -18.85*** 3.47 -12.4*** 
  (0.43) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.54) (0.00) 
CPI Inflation 8.43 -3.38 5.69 0.77 8.94 -2.52 
  (0.56) (0.49) (6.72) (0.86) (0.28) (0.56) 
Time to election -0.03 0.035*** 0.01 0.02* -0.015 0.03** 
  (0.22) (0.01) (0.44) (0.09) (0.32) (0.02) 
  
Banking crisis 2.5*** -1.73*** 2.82*** 
  0.00 (0.00) (0.00) 
Government stability  -0.14* 0.007 -0.055 
  (0.09) (0.65) (0.39) 
Central Bank 
independence  -0.89**  0.23 -0.306 
  (0.048) (0.32) (0.74) 
¨ Credit-to-GDP  11.81** 10.42 36.3*** 
  (0.042) (0.15) (0.06) 
Log of private 
consumption  0.05  -0.12 -0.06 
  (0.47) (0.13) (0.61) 
¨ in short-term interest 
rate  7.70*  5.48 2.87 
  (0.06) (0.18) (0.32) 
Observations 982 979 979 
Likelilood test, chi-square 15.9 1.39 71.08 
Prob. 0.01 0.24 0 
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Table 3.8 Results of bivariate probit model with lagged explanatory variables
Note: ***,**,* represent statistical significance at 1,5 and 10 per cent confidence levels respectively. Error terms 
are cluster by countries. Underlying null hypothesis of the likelihood test suggests two independent univariate probit models. 
Probability of greater than 0.1 suggests significant correlation estimator, hence bivariate probit model is preferred.  
  Total credit Enterprise credit Household credit 
Variables Credit Boom 
Banking 
Crisis 
Credit 
Boom 
Banking 
Crisis Credit Boom 
Banking 
Crisis 
  (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Credit boom , lagged 4 quarters 0.67* 0.24 0.80* 
  (0.06) (0.52) (0.06) 
Log of official reserves, lagged 4 quarters -0.23*** -0.235*** -0.176*** 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.012) 
¨ in financial openness, lagged 4 quarters -81.6*** -76.31*** -78.48*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) 5.23 
¨ in real GDP, lagged 4 quarters 15.69*** -10.88*** 19.18*** -10.74*** 9.72** -9.51*** 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) 
CPI Inflation, lagged 4 quarters 16.9*** 3.28 -3.91 5.00 5.96 4.708 
  (0.00) (0.51) (0.73) (0.30) (0.46) (0.30) 
Time to election -0.04 0.03* -0.05** 0.03 -0.02 0.03 
  (0.13) (0.08) (0.01) (0.11) (0.18) (0.13) 
  
Government stability , lagged 4 quarters -0.191*** -0.097 -0.184*** 
  (0.00) (0.43) (0.00) 
Central Bank independence , lagged 4 quarters -0.494 0.90 1.00 
  (0.45) (0.26) (0.13) 
¨ Credit-to-GDP , lagged 4 quarters 11.65 35.98*** 80.67*** 
  (0.18) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log of private consumption , lagged 4 quarters 0.08 -0.101 -0.12 
  (0.48) (0.22) (0.37) 
¨ in short-term interest rate , lagged 4 quarters 3.02 13.54*** 9.22* 
  (0.44) (0.00) (0.054) 
Observations 974 964 964 
Likelilood test, chi-square 8.78 3.23 10.51 
Prob. 0.00 0.07 0.00 
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   Figure 3.1 Behaviour of explanatory variables at the onset of banking crises 
Note: The dotted lines show the behaviour of government stability, total credit-to-GDP, 
household-credit-GDP and enterprise-credit-to-GDP variables at the onset of banking crises. t 
in the horizontal axis stands for the quarter when the crisis erupts. t-4 to t-1 show 4 quarters 
and a quarter before the crisis, respectively. Similarly, t+1 to t+4 stand for a quarter and 4 
quarters after the banking crises, respectively. 
Figure 3.2 Average government stability scores with ±1 standard deviation 
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Figure 3.3 The frequency of banking crises in the sample. 
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Figure 3.4 Marginal effects of growth in domestic credit at different levels of 
government stability variable  
Note: Dotted lines show 95% confidence intervals 
Figure 3.5 The number of banking crises after elections 
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Figure 3.6. Marginal effects of enterprise (left panel) and household (right panel) 
credit growth at different levels of government stability. 
Note: Dotted lines show 95% confidence intervals 
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On the Effectiveness of Fiscal Stimulus During Chapter 4:
Recessions and Financial Crises 
4.1 Introduction 
The subprime crisis in the US and the subsequent debt crisis in the Eurozone 
triggered a debate between two strands of literature: the advocates of austerity and 
fiscal stimulus. Despite the emergence of influential papers, the macroeconomic 
effects of fiscal expansion remain uncertain (Cogan 2010). While a strand of the 
literature makes a case for expansionary fiscal policy (see Blanchard and Perotti 
2002; Romer and Romer 2010, inter alia), a large amount of research in academia 
has provided evidence in favour of austerity measures (Giavazzi and Pagano 1990; 
Alesina and Perotti 1997). 
The debate between these opposing bodies of ideas has provided invaluable input for 
the policymaking process. Inspired by the policy recommendations of the proponents 
of austerity, a number of governments have chosen fiscal consolidation as a response 
to financial crises. This has particularly been the case for Eurozone countries, where 
authorities including the IMF, European Union and European Central Bank have 
called upon the governments of distressed economies to slash public spending. The 
deficit reduction process was targeted at the bond market’s reaction to large debts 
and deficits (Alesina et al. 2015a). The proponents of this program believe that it will 
enhance confidence and foster economic growth. However, sceptics of expansionary 
fiscal policy worry about the crowding effect and costs associated with prolonged 
fiscal stimulus (Aizenman and Jinjarak 2010). 
The opponents of fiscal consolidation have accused its advocates of ignoring the 
lessons of the past. Krugman (2013) argues that one reason why the subprime crisis 
caused less damage than the Great Depression was the incorrect economic measures 
taken in response to the Great Depression. The onset of the Great Depression was 
accompanied by a reduction in government spending and an increase in interest rates. 
Conversely, the response to the subprime crisis included several expansionary 
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measures, including tax cuts and spending increases. For example, in response to the 
crisis, the US government passed the Economic Stimulus Act with a size of $100 
billion to increase private consumption. Broda and Parker (2014) examine the effects 
of this program and conclude that it helped to increase private consumption by 1.3 
per cent in the second quarter of 2008 and 0.6 per cent in the third quarter. 
These types of programs have been implemented around the world. Governments 
have spent large amounts of money to support their domestic economy and restore 
confidence in the banking and financial sector (Tagkalakis 2013). According to 
estimations, support packages were around 74 per cent of the GDP in UK, 73 per 
cent in the US and 18 per cent in the Eurozone. Most of these funds were part of 
bailout transfers to the banking system (Aizenman and Jinjarak 2010). However, 
even these programs were considered too small by some economists. Alesina (2014) 
argues that several economies shifted to deficit reduction policies when their 
recessions were not quite over. 
There is significant evidence in favour of both austerity and stimulus programs. Most 
studies to date have concentrated on the effects of fiscal policy on output. Despite the 
large number of papers in this field, the literature has been relatively silent about the 
effectiveness of expansionary fiscal policy on exiting the recessionary phase of the 
business cycle. Even fewer papers have assessed the effects of fiscal stimulus on 
exiting financial crises. Recessions and financial crises accompany each other in 
most cases. However, not all recessions are followed by financial crises, and vice 
versa. 
Therefore, the goal of this chapter is to examine the role of fiscal stimulus in exiting 
recessions and financial crises. Three types of financial crises are considered in the 
present study: banking, currency and sovereign debt crisis. The empirical study is 
based on data from 65 developing and developed countries from 1980 to 2014. 
According to IMF data, only Germany and the US have returned to their pre-GFC 
per capita GDP levels. Using these data, Reinhart and Rogoff (2014) argue that some 
advanced economies will not exit the recessionary phase until 2022. Given the 
ongoing debate in academic and political circles, as well as the fact that many 
advanced economies are still in recession, there has been a call to reassess the effects 
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of countercyclical fiscal policy. Hence, this paper will contribute to the literature by 
filling identified gaps, as well as having important policy implications.  Moreover, 
we explain why some countries engage in expansionary fiscal policy and others do 
not. Using data on political constraints and macroeconomic variables, we model the 
probability of implementing fiscal stimulus measures. 
Most of the existing theoretical and empirical research has focused on the reaction of 
output to fiscal shocks. The proponents of austerity measures generally agree that 
austerity measures through government spending cuts may have an expansionary 
effect (Giavazzi and Pagano 1990; Alesina et al. 1997; Alesina and Ardagna 2010). 
Conversely, Blanchard and Perrotti (2002) argue that positive shocks to government 
spending have an expansionary effect on output, whereas tax increases negatively 
affect output. The latter occurs mostly via discouraging private investment. Ramey 
(2011) claims that the relationship between expansionary fiscal policy and output is 
primarily driven by the shift in equilibrium hours worked. Auerbach and 
Gorodnichenko (2012) assess the effectiveness of countercyclical fiscal policy in 
different phases of the business cycle and find that government spending is 
significantly higher compared to the expansionary phase during times of recession. 
Chari and Henry (2014) compare fiscal policy responses to the Eurozone crisis and 
the Southeast Asian crisis. They argue that a gradual approach to fiscal consolidation 
(i.e., providing stimulus to the economy at times of crisis and tightening fiscal policy 
after recovery) results in faster recovery of output and employment in the latter 
episode. The failure to take a gradual approach has been a major obstacle for 
recovery in Eurozone countries. 
Based on the above discussions, we identify several shortcomings in the literature. 
First, there is a limited amount of research on the effectiveness of fiscal policy in 
terms of exiting recessions or financial crises. Baldacci et al. (2014) examine the 
effectiveness of fiscal policy in restoring growth after banking crises. They find that 
fiscal expansion helps to reduce the duration of banking crises. Moreover, fiscal 
stimulus not only reduces the duration, but also creates necessary conditions for 
restoring pre-crisis output. Aizenman and Jinjarek (2011) summarise policy 
responses to the subprime crisis in advanced and emerging economies, while Manase 
and Roubini (2009) and Hong and Tornell (2005) focus on currency crises. Given the 
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limited amount of research on exiting financial crises, this chapter will consider the 
whole gamut of financial crises, viz., the sovereign debt crisis, the banking crisis and 
the currency crisis. Hence, the first stage of the empirical analysis estimates the 
effects of fiscal expansion on the probability of exiting crises and recessions. 
The second contribution of this study is to investigate how the percentage change in 
the structural fiscal balance affects the likelihood of exiting recessions and financial 
crises. For this purpose, this chapter employs the probit model with a Heckman 
selection, which has not previously been used in similar studies. By applying this 
methodology, we include only substantial changes in fiscal balance as an explanatory 
variable. More specifically, consisting of a system of two equations, the first stage of 
the probit model with a Heckman selection models the likelihood of implementing 
fiscal stimulus, whereas the second stage assesses the effect of the change in 
structural balance on the probability of exiting a recession or crisis. As a result, 
observations corresponding to 0 in the first stage of the equation (episodes of non-
stimulus) are excluded from the second stage. That is, changes in the structural 
balance that are not regarded as fiscal stimulus do not enter the second stage of the 
equation. Including small changes in the fiscal balance would have biased the 
coefficient (Claessens 2012). In contrast, the probit model with a Heckman selection 
helps to explain the decision to implement expansionary fiscal policy by emphasising 
the role of political constraints. 
The third contribution of this chapter is to address the potential endogeneity problem 
arising from reverse causality. It is likely that the direction of the causality runs from 
financial crises to fiscal expansion. For example, the subprime crisis showed that a 
government’s fiscal balance may deteriorate as the result of a financial crisis. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) show that the real value of government debt following a 
financial crisis rises an average of 86 per cent during post-World War II episodes. 
Hence, reverse causality remains a significant threat to the robustness of our results. 
To overcome this issue, this chapter employs the panel vector autoregression 
(PVAR) model. It is worth mentioning that the problem of endogeneity has largely 
been ignored by prior literature. 
The baseline specification in this paper consists of estimating two similar equations 
with exit from recession and exit from crisis dummies as dependent variables. The 
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methodology for constructing the former is based on Reinhart and Rogoff’s approach 
(2014). We extend their methodology to 65 countries and generate a binary exit from 
recession variable for the period 1980–2014. Exit from recession variable is 
constructed using and, where possible, extending the dataset of Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009). Given the binary nature of the dependent variables, we estimate the 
coefficients of both equations using the probit model. 
To identify episodes of fiscal expansion, we use the government structural balance to 
GDP ratio. We treat this variable as a discretionary change to fiscal balance, as it 
removes the effects of cyclical components and asset and commodity prices. That is, 
by removing the effects of automatic stabilisers, structural balance reflects the 
discretionary changes to fiscal balance only (Borhorst et al. 2011). Hence, we use the 
change in structural fiscal balance to identify episodes of fiscal stimulus. Following 
Baldacci et al. (2014) and Alesina and Ardagna (2010), we accept 1.5 per cent as a 
threshold. Thus, episodes when the change in structural balance equals or exceeds 
1.5 per cent are treated as fiscal expansion episodes. This variable enters the baseline 
specification as a stimulus dummy and is coded 1 when a country engages in 
expansionary fiscal policy in a given year, and 0 otherwise. The results of the 
baseline specification remain robust to different proxies for fiscal stimulus 
mentioned above. 
We then proceed with assessing the magnitude of the relationship established in the 
probit model. In this specification, instead of using the stimulus dummy as an 
explanatory variable, we use absolute values of an increase in structural deficit as a 
proxy for fiscal stimulus.27 For this purpose, this chapter employs the probit model 
with a Heckman selection. This methodology has been employed in different micro 
and macro studies. For example, Claessens et al. (2012) use this model to study the 
effect of the subprime crisis on firm-level performance and the level of global 
interconnectedness on the transmission of the crisis. Picazo-Tadeo (2012) applies the 
probit selection model to investigate the influence of political ideology on public 
choice of local services management. 
                                               
27 Note that there are episodes in the dataset when a country’s structural deficit increases for several 
years in a row. However, as these changes in the balance are smaller than 1.5 per cent, none of these 
episodes are treated as fiscal expansions. 
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Modelling the effectiveness of fiscal policy via a two-stage probit model has not 
previously been addressed in the empirical literature. Despite running two different 
probit equations, these equations are intertwined. The sample in the second stage is 
not random; it is selected from the first stage of the equation. 
We find that fiscal stimulus is effective during economic downturns, as it helps 
economies to exit both recessions and financial crises. Interestingly, empirical 
estimations show that it takes two years for fiscal expansion to take an economy out 
of recession, whereas the effect is more immediate during financial crises. As a 
result, fiscal stimulus can help a country to exit a financial crisis after just one year. 
More specifically, we find that if a country implements fiscal expansion at time t, the 
probability of exiting the financial crisis at time t+1 increases by 18–42 per cent 
depending on the specification. Similarly, the probability of exiting a recession 
increases by 23–32 per cent if the fiscal stimulus is implemented at time t. 
The other important difference between the exit from recession and exit from crisis 
equations relates to the political aspect of fiscal expansions. We find that the higher 
the political constraints, the lower the probability of exiting a recession. Further, 
when a different specification is employed, we find that higher political constraints 
reduce the probability of engaging in expansionary fiscal policy. This increases the 
likelihood of staying in a recession. Interestingly, the political constraint variable has 
a statistically insignificant coefficient when the dependent variable is exit from crisis. 
This result is consistent with the fact that fiscal expansion has an immediate effect 
during times of crisis, as the response to a financial crisis is not delayed by political 
checks and balances. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 4.2, we discuss the most 
relevant literature. Section 4.3 discusses the data sources used and provides basic 
descriptive statistics. Section 4.4 describes the econometric approach used. Section 
4.5 presents the results and discussions, and Section 4.6 concludes the chapter. 
4.2 Literature Review 
This paper brings several strands of the literature together. First, we look at the inter-
relationship between financial crises and domestic macroeconomic conditions, 
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including fiscal balance. Second, the paper discusses the ongoing debate in the 
literature between proponents of fiscal stimulus and austerity. Third, the paper 
highlights the role of institutional variables in conduct of fiscal policy. We will start 
discussing the most relevant literature in above mentioned order. 
4.2.1 Relationship between financial crises and macroeconomic conditions 
The effects of financial crises on domestic macroeconomic conditions have been 
widely discussed in the literature. Blanchard et al. (2009) consider five case studies28
and argue that severe financial episodes are accompanied or followed by severe 
economic recessions. Reinhart and Rogoff (2014) examine the evolution of real per 
capita GDP in 100 systemic banking crises. They find that economic activity peaks 
within a cycle either the year before a banking crisis or the year of the financial 
crisis. After the onset of a banking crisis, the recessionary phase of the cycle starts 
and, on average, it takes 8.5 years for economic output to reach its pre-recession 
level. Interestingly, only the US and Germany have recovered since the onset of the 
GFC. Another influential paper by Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) concludes that, in 
most cases, banking crises precede or accompany a build-up in sovereign debt and 
may trigger a debt crisis. Claessens, Mendoza and Terrones (2009) conclude that 
recessions associated with credit crunches and busts in the housing sector tend to be 
deeper and last longer. 
On public finance side, Tagkalakis (2013) examines the impact of financial crises on 
stock of debt in 20 OECD countries. The author finds that the stock of debt is 
increased by 2.7 to 4 per cent as a result of severe financial crisis. Baldacci et al.
(2014) show that banking crisis increases fiscal deficits by two percent of GDP per 
year. These papers shed light on the impact of financial crises on fiscal balances. 
With this regards, there is broadly established consensus in the literature. However, 
the same is not true about the impact of fiscal policy on output. Both theoretical and 
empirical priors concluding that fiscal stimulus is expansionary have been echoing 
                                               
28 Great Depression, banking crisis of Japan (1997), economic crisis of Korea (1997), savings and 
loans crisis of the US (1980s and 1990s), and Nordic banking and economic crisis. 
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Keynesian arguments that increased government spending is likely to affect 
employment and consumption.  
4.2.2 Austerity versus stimulus debate 
Fatas and Mihov (2001) examine the effects of government spending on key 
macroeconomic variables. The authors employ a vector autoregression model and 
find that the government spending multiplier is above 1. Moreover, economic growth 
is always accompanied by increased consumption. In their seminal paper, Blanchard 
and Perrotti (2002) present a case for fiscal stimulus. Combining the structural VAR 
method with an event study, the authors estimate the effects of positive shocks to 
taxes and government spending on output. The results suggest that an increase in 
government spending has a positive bearing on output, whereas a positive shock to 
taxes has a negative effect on GDP. Moreover, the authors find that an increase in 
taxes deteriorates output by discouraging investment. The persistence and size of 
these effects depend on the econometric specification. 
Using a dataset of around 60,000 individual loans, mainly from multilateral 
development banks and aid agencies, Kraay (2014) builds an instrument for 
government spending to isolate an effect of discretionary fiscal policy. The evidence 
from 102 countries suggests that one dollar of additional government spending raises 
GDP by 40 cents. The magnitude of the government spending multiplier is robust to 
different specifications and varies between 0.3 and 0.5. Aghion et al. (2014) analyse 
the effect of fiscal policy on industry growth. The key finding of the paper is that 
financially constrained industries that are heavily dependent on external financing 
grow much faster in the presence of countercyclical fiscal policy. Further, this effect 
becomes stronger during downturns compared to economic booms. Ilzetski et al. 
(2013) contribute to the austerity versus stimulus debate by addressing several 
shortcomings in the literature. Among different findings, the authors find that the 
effect of fiscal policy is asymmetric across different country groups. In particular, the 
fiscal multiplier is not statistically different from zero for developing countries, 
whereas it is positive both in effect and over time for advanced economies. 
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Despite conventional wisdom suggesting that fiscal expansion has a positive effect 
on economic output, an influential group of academics believe otherwise. Proponents 
of austerity measures argue that a reduction in the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance through spending cuts helps economic development (Chari and Henry 2014). 
Further, academics and policymakers who champion austerity argue that these 
measures help to restore confidence in the domestic financial system. 
By examining data on OECD countries, Alesina (1997) considers the effects of fiscal 
consolidation on output. The author identifies two types of fiscal adjustment: cutting 
expenditure and increasing broad-based taxes. Empirical estimations suggest that 
even if the size of both types is the same in terms of a positive change in the primary 
balance, the effect of the former lasts longer and it is expansionary. In contrast, tax 
increase effects reverse quickly and have an overall negative effect on output. 
Alesina et al. (2015b) reassess the effects of deficit reduction policies in 16 OECD 
countries post-GFC. They suggest that a tax-based fiscal adjustment program with a 
size of 1 per cent of GDP reduces output by 2 per cent over the next three years. In 
contrast, fiscal consolidation based on spending cuts generates a minor recession. 
These results confirm the findings of Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), who pioneered the 
idea that spending-based adjustments have small or no output costs. 
Interestingly, comparing the effects of post-GFC austerity measures to past 
measures, Alesina et al. (2015a) find no significant difference in terms of the cost of 
these programs. This finding is contrary to the findings of Blanchard and Leigh 
(2013), who argue that the size of fiscal multipliers was above 1 during the post-GFC 
period, which is higher than before the crisis. More importantly, the paper concludes 
that the size of the multipliers can be higher or lower across countries and across 
time. 
Guajardo et al. (2014) argue that the standard methodology used by Alesina and 
Ardagna (2010) to identify fiscal consolidation may be inappropriate. As a result, it 
may create bias in favour of the positive effects of fiscal consolidation. Using a wide 
range of contemporary policy documents, the authors identify episodes of fiscal 
contraction based on the desire to reduce a budget deficit. As these actions represent 
responses to past decisions, it is unlikely that they will be correlated with short-term 
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output growth (Romer and Romer 2010). The results suggest that fiscal consolidation 
with a size of 1 per cent of GDP reduces private consumption by 0.75 per cent over 
the next two years, and GDP by 0.62 per cent. Further, the authors employ a 
falsification exercise and replace the abovementioned fiscal consolidation data with a 
change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance. As a result, there is some evidence 
in favour of the ‘expansionary austerity’. 
Romer and Romer (2010) employ a similar methodology to identify fiscal policy 
shocks. By examining executive actions and speeches over the period 1945–2007, 
the authors attempt to identify all of the significant legislated tax changes. 
Estimations suggest that a tax increase of 1 per cent of GDP reduces real GDP by 
2.5–3 per cent. More importantly, the authors conclude that using different measures 
of tax changes may bias their effects. 
Despite ongoing debate on the importance of austerity, fiscal stimulus has been 
widely used in practice both at times of economic downturns. Strand of literature 
evaluates the effectiveness of these programs in exiting recessions and financial 
crises. Ha and Kang (2014) study the effect of financial crises on the stance of 
monetary and fiscal policy in Least Developed Countries (LDC). The authors take 
regression-based approach to strip out the effects of automatic stabilizers and 
estimate the cyclical component of the fiscal adjustment. Empirical results suggest 
that both fiscal and monetary policies have been tightened in the response to 
financial crises.  
Chari and Henry (2014) compare the response of South-East Asian countries during 
1997-98 crisis with those of Eurozone countries after the GFC. The authors argue 
that the formers tightened their fiscal policies early and provided fiscal stimulus in 
latter stages. Whereas, in the case of Eurozone, the governments provided fiscal 
stimulus and reversed the policy before the economies recovered. Econometric 
estimations conclude that shifting policy from expansion to austerity has had a 
significant negative impact on output growth. Overall, the authors find that the size 
of fiscal multiplier depends on the state of the economy, with larger multipliers 
during recessions.     
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Ramey (2011) argues that the before Global Financial Crisis happened, monetary 
policy was the major tool used by governments as a response to recessions. Main 
reason for prevalence of monetary policy was its immediate effect, compared to 
lagged effect of fiscal policy. With revived interest in the effect of fiscal expansion at 
times of downturn, the author attempts to calculate aggregate multiplier of temporary 
increase in government purchases. Using long-term US data the author concludes 
that it is between 0.8 and 1.5. However, the paper does not discuss the mechanism by 
which government spending raises GDP. 
Several authors putting a case for austerity measures during crises have suggested 
that tight fiscal policy would benefit the country at times of sovereign debt and 
currency crisis (Manase and Roubini, 2009). Ha and Kang (2014) bring an example 
from IMF recommendations for LDC. The authors argue that in most of the cases, to 
stop capital outflow, the Organization has requested tight fiscal policy at times of 
currency crisis. However, these policy recommendations have varied across time and 
countries.  
Despite significant evidence in favour of both austerity and stimulus measures, it 
would be naïve to conclude that these policies would have the same impact in all 
countries at all times. The design and effectiveness of fiscal policy may depend not 
only on domestic economic and political conditions, but also on whether the 
economy is in recession or in expansion. Tagkalais (2008) examines the relationship 
between fiscal policy and consumption during different phases of business cycle. The 
author claims that due to liquidity constraints, fiscal policy may have an asymmetric 
effect at different times. Both theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that 
government spending and tax shocks are more successful tools to mitigating slumps 
than muting booms. Particularly, the author finds an evidence in favour of Keynesian 
theory and conclude that spending shock has a positive effect, whereas tax shock has 
a negative effect on consumption. 
Similarly, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) study the effectiveness of fiscal 
policy at different phases of business cycle. The authors use regime switching panel 
vector autoregression model and find that fiscal multipliers are significantly larger 
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during recessions. Even after controlling for future expectations about economic 
condition and disaggregating the components of government spending, estimated 
multiplier is 0 to 0.5 during expansions and 1 to 1.5 during recessions.          
To sum it up, existing literature’s focus has mainly been on the output response to 
fiscal shocks. However, none of the previous studies has investigated the impact of 
expansionary fiscal policy on restoring output to its pre-recession level. Moreover, 
limited authors have considered the role of fiscal stimulus on ending financial crisis 
(see Baldacci et al., 2014).  
4.2.3 Role of political factors 
Studying the effects of fiscal policy without considering political factors may result 
in disregarding an important part of the question, namely the political determinants 
of the decision to engage in expansionary policy. Despite theory dictating different 
policy choices, incumbent governments may choose policies that will improve their 
domestic approval rating. A strand of literature has discussed the relationship 
between fiscal policy and political outcomes, with a general belief that incumbent 
governments can use fiscal policy as a tool to increase their re-election prospects. For 
example, Brender (2003) studies the effects of fiscal performance on local 
government election results in Israel, finding that fiscal austerity increases the chance 
of being re-elected. Brender and Drazen (2008) consider this relationship for a 
broader cross-section of countries. By analysing 350 election campaigns in 74 
democracies, the authors find no relationship between government deficit and 
political outcomes. Further, these results are robust for different groupings of the 
countries, including developing/developed countries, presidential and parliamentary 
governments, proportional/majoritarian electoral systems, and countries with 
different democracy levels. However, the study also finds that voters are generally 
fiscal conservatives, and this pattern is stronger in an election year. Hence, it is 
expected that voters will punish incumbent governments for recent fiscal deficits. 
Furthermore, Frankel and Vegh (2013) argue that because of access to credit and 
political distortions, emerging economies may end up conducting procyclical fiscal 
policy. Lack of credit leaves the incumbent government with no option but to cut 
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spending or raise taxes. Apart from this, in the presence of political distortions it is 
hard to resist to additional spending. The experience of past decades show that some 
of the countries under scrutiny were able to shift to counter-cyclical fiscal policy. 
The authors refer to this shift as “fiscal graduation” and conclude that as the quality 
of institutions improve, the level of pro-cyclicality decreases. 
Despite the use of fiscal and monetary policy as a tool to recover from financial 
crises, Ha and Kang (2014) argue that their effect is lower in the presence of political 
gridlock. The authors use data on political veto and conclude that constraints 
imposed by domestic political conditions may delay the adaptation of necessary 
policy measures and impede recovery from crises. They find that even though 
financial crisis affect the fiscal and monetary stance, the effect is heavily dependent 
on the power of veto players, orientation of incumbent government and electoral 
cycles.  All in all, fiscal policies are more constrained by political conditions in the 
presence of domestic veto players. 
These findings are in line with those of Shi and Svensson (2006). The authors use 
information from 85 countries over the period of 1975-1995 and find an evidence of 
political business cycles. In other words, fiscal deficit increases in the lead up to 
elections. Given the size of political distortions, it is not surprising that political 
budget cycles is more pronounced in the developing countries.  Theoretical model 
underpinning the empirical estimations suggest that incumbent has an ability to 
manipulate the policy to increase the likelihood of re-election. The estimations show 
that institutional variables play an important role in explaining the different levels of 
political budget cycles in developed and developing countries.  
For reasons mentioned above, importance of political veto players is to ensure the 
government is not engaged in opportunistic expansionary fiscal policy. Despite 
extensive research on this field, the literature has not adequately modelled the 
effectiveness of fiscal stimulus and failed to acknowledge that this process consists 
of two separate, albeit intertwined processes: decision to implement fiscal stimulus 
and the effect stimulus on exiting recession and financial crisis.  
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4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The dataset covers 65 advanced and developing countries. We look at the annual data 
that spans from 1980 to 2014. Most of the macroeconomic variables are derived from 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics database, World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators and OECD’s statistics portal.  
4.3.1 Dependent variable 
This paper examines the effects of expansionary fiscal policy on exiting from 
recessions and financial crises. Both of the variables are binary in nature. Data from 
Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2010) influential paper are used to construct the latter 
variable. The authors identify episodes of banking, currency, external and domestic 
debt crises, and stock market crashes29 for 70 countries from 1800 to 2010,30 and we 
have expanded the original data using other sources to cover the period 2010–2014. 
Building on this dataset, we generate the exit from crisis variable. If a country 
experiences no crises in a given year, the latter variable is left blank. Episodes when 
at least one crisis takes place are coded as 0, as a country experiences a crisis and 
fails to exit. Finally, the first year that a country exits a financial crisis—that is, a 
country experiences a crisis at time t and the crisis ends at time t+1—we code the 
exit from crisis variable as 1. This methodology helps us to differentiate between not 
experiencing a crisis and failing to exit a crisis, and between a new crisis and the 
continuation of the previous crisis. 
Data for the exit from recession dummy are constructed in a similar manner. 
However, this time we follow Reinhart and Rogoff (2014) to construct a recession 
dummy. The authors define a downturn in the economic cycle as a fall in real GDP 
                                               
29 Stock market crashes are dated only for the subset of countries where time series for stock prices are 
available. 
30 The original dataset by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) includes data up to 2010. An episode of banking 
crisis is identified as when: (a) a bank run leads to closure, a merger or a takeover by the public sector 
of one or more financial institutions; and (b) in the absence of a bank run, closure, merging, a takeover 
or large-scale government assistance of an important financial institution takes place, marking the start 
of a string of similar outcomes for other financial institutions. An external debt crisis is defined as an 
episode when a sovereign fails to pay the principle or interest on the due date, or when credit 
conditions are changed to less favourable conditions than the original obligation. A currency crisis is 
defined as an annual depreciation versus the US dollar of 15 per cent or more. 
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per capita. We collect data on real per capita GDP and construct a recession dummy. 
This variable equals 1 if a country’s real per capita GDP at time t+1 is less than at 
time t in a given year. If it fails to recover to the pre-recessionary level (time t level) 
in the following year (t+2), the recession dummy still equals 1. This process 
continues until the country’s real per capita GDP exceeds its pre-recession level. 
Further, we construct the exit from recession dummy. The value of this variable is 
determined in a similar manner to the exit from crisis dummy. 
For example, Figure 4.1 shows the evolution of per capita real GDP in Argentina 
during the Latin American debt crisis. As shown, Argentina was in recession from 
1981 to 1996. The country’s real per capita GDP started dropping in 1981 and did 
not get back to its previous level for 15 years. Hence, in our dataset for this period, 
the recession dummy for Argentina is coded as 1, and the exit from recession 
variable equals 0. The reason for this is that the country is still in recession, but fails 
to exit it. Accordingly, the latter variable is coded as 1 because Argentina exited the 
recession in 1996. Observations for 1997 and 1998 are left blank for the exit from 
recession dummy because the country was in an expansionary phase of the business 
cycle in the given years. 
The methodologies discussed above are applied across all countries to construct two 
dependent variables: exit from recession and exit from crisis. As a result, the dataset 
consists of 249 exit from crisis and 176 exit from recession episodes. In 19 of these 
cases, exit from recession and exit from crisis occurred in the same year. 
4.3.2 Explanatory variables 
To assess the effectiveness of expansionary fiscal policy, we first need to create 
indicators. The natural starting point for the definition of stimulus episodes would be 
a significant increase in the budget balance. However, this would bias our results. A 
budget balance reflects not only the discretionary actions of a government, but also 
the effects of automatic stabilisers. For example, during a financial crisis, 
government expenditure increases due to the effect of automatic stabilisers; as a 
result, the government budget balance worsens. In this case, an increase in the budget 
deficit would mistakenly be treated as a fiscal stimulus program. One way of 
overcoming this issue would be to employ a cyclically adjusted fiscal balance 
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(CAFB)—that is, the fiscal position net of cycles. Despite stripping out the business 
cycle effect, this measure does not capture the effects of transitionary factors, 
including asset and commodity prices and output composition effects (Bornhorst et 
al. 2011). For this purpose, structural balance is considered a more accurate measure 
of fiscal stance. As the IMF’s World Economic Outlook suggests, structural balance 
refers to the cyclically adjusted balance adjusted for non-structural components 
beyond the economic cycle. That is, it can be viewed as an augmentation of the 
CAFB; hence, it is a more useful proxy in terms of assessing the effects of 
discretionary fiscal policy. 
Previous studies have used different proxies and thresholds to define episodes of 
stimulus. Baldaci et al. (2014) define fiscal expansion as a 1.5 per cent worsening of 
the budget balance. Conversely, Alesina and Ardagna (2010) use a cyclically 
adjusted primary balance as a proxy and define fiscal stimulus as an episode in which 
the deficit in the latter variable exceeds 1.5 per cent. In the light of discussions about 
measures of fiscal stance, our benchmark definition of fiscal stimulus relies on the 
structural balance to GDP ratio. Episodes when the latter worsens by more than 1.5 
per cent are treated as fiscal expansion. Constructing a fiscal stimulus dummy based 
on the abovementioned procedure produces 166 episodes of fiscal consolidation 
(13.8 per cent of total observations). 
The benchmark methodology helps to identify sharp movements in fiscal stance. 
Nevertheless, some countries may choose a smaller stimulus over the course of 
several years. For example, Argentina’s structural budget deficit deteriorated by 0.5 
per cent and 1 per cent for two consecutive years (1998 and 1999). However, neither 
of these episodes is treated as a stimulus. In our dataset, only 166 out of 393 negative 
changes in the structural balance qualify as expansionary fiscal policy due to a high 
threshold. To address this problem, we construct a negative change in the structural 
balance variable. The definition is straightforward: we first find the changes in the 
structural balance. Episodes when the change is positive are coded as 0 because we 
are interested in the effect of negative changes. Respectively, when the structural 
deficit grows, we use the absolute value of the change in balance. Using absolute 
values of negative changes help us to avoid difficulties with interpretation. As a 
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result, a constructed negative change in the structural balance is a continuous 
variable that is larger than or equal to 0. 
Expansionary fiscal policy is not easy to implement. The lagged effects of fiscal 
policy make it less effective during economic downturns. In addition, providing a 
significant stimulus to the economy requires approval from different political actors 
in most cases. Thus, the feasibility of implementing stimulus measures is an 
important component of fiscal policy. For this purpose, we obtain the political 
constraints index from the Quality of Government dataset. The index measures the 
feasibility of policy change; that is, it is a proxy for the incumbent government’s 
power. Political constraints theoretically range between 0 and 1. Lower scores 
indicate that there is a small political constraint, and a change in the preferences of 
any political actor may lead to a change in government policy. Respectively, a higher 
score means that political checks and balances are in place, and thus the feasibility of 
the policy change is lower. Figure 4.3 depicts the values of political constraints 
globally. 
4.3.3 Control variables 
In addition to the explanatory variables described above, we also control for 
domestic macroeconomic conditions. In the exit from crisis equation, we control for 
the recession dummy. Similarly, we use the crisis dummy as a control variable in the 
exit from recession equation. Data sources and definitions of both variables are 
discussed above. Other macroeconomic control variables are added to regressions 
based on the works of theoretical empirical priors and descriptive statistics. These 
variables are debt-to-GDP ratio, unemployment rate, inflation, change in export to 
GDP, investment to GDP ratio and current account balance. 
4.4 Empirical Methodology 
This section describes the methodologies used for the empirical estimations. 
4.4.1 Probit model 
The goal of this thesis is to assess the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus during 
economic downturns. In this chapter, we estimate the effects of fiscal expansion on 
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the probability of exiting recessions and financial crises. In both cases, the dependent 
variables are binary. The literature on limited dependent variable models provides a 
natural starting point for our own empirical investigation. Following Berg and Patillo 
(1999), Bordo et al. (2010) and Frankel and Sarvelos (2012), we employ the 
univariate probit model as our benchmark specification. 
4.4.1.1 Exiting recession 
First, we model the probability of exiting a recession. For simplicity, we denote the 
dependent variable as ER. The observed value of the dependent variable is 
conditional on the value of the latent variable ܧܴ௜௧כ , which is defined as follows: 
ܧܴ௜௧כ ൌ ࢄ࢏࢚ࢾ ൅ ߦ௜௧ (1) 
where X is a vector of explanatory variables and ߦ௜௧ is the error term. The observed 
values of the exit from recession dummy are defined as follows: 
ܧܴ௜௧ ൌ ൜ͳǡ݂݅ܧܴ௜௧
כ ൐ Ͳሻ
Ͳǡ݂݅ܧܴ௜௧כ ൑ Ͳ  (2) 
The coefficient estimates are calculated using the maximum likelihood method. 
Given the research question, we estimate the following equation: 
ܧܴ௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶ௜௧ିଶ ൅ ߚଷܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௜௧ିଵ ൅
ߚଷ݌݋݈ܿ݋݊௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚࢄ ൅൅Ɂ௜ ൅ ߤ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ (3) 
The dependent variable is the exit from recession dummy, which equals 1 if a 
country exits the recessionary phase of the business cycle in a given year, and 0 
otherwise. The main variable of interest in this equation is the fiscal stimulus 
dummy, which equals 1 if a country engages in expansionary fiscal policy in a given 
year, and 0 otherwise. The construction of this variable is discussed in the data 
section. However, to allow for the alternative definition of fiscal stimulus discussed 
above, we also run the same regression after replacing the stimulus dummies with the 
absolute value of fiscal expansion as a percentage of GDP. This variable is also 
discussed in more detail in the data section. 
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As the literature review suggests, the effects of fiscal policy are not immediate, and 
output does not respond to fiscal shocks for several quarters. Hence, we use the 
explanatory variable in one- and two-year lagged forms. To control for domestic 
political constraints, we use the political constraint variable derived from Teorell et 
al. (2015). We also use a wide range of macroeconomic variables to control for 
domestic economic conditions, including controlling for the incidence of financial 
crises at time t-1. Note that all explanatory variables are lagged by one year to 
partially address the reverse causality problem. Finally, į and ȝ are country and time 
dummies. 
4.4.1.2 Exiting crisis 
To determine whether expansionary fiscal policy has different effects during crises, 
we replace the dependent variable with the exit from crisis dummy. The definition of 
the latent variable and the observed value of the dependent variable are the same as 
in the exit from recession equations. For simplicity, the dependent variable is 
denoted as EC. The estimated equation is as follows: 
ܧܥ௜௧ ൌ
ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶ௜௧ିଶ ൅ ߚଷݎ݁ܿ݁ݏݏ݅݋݊௜௧ିଵ ൅
ߚଷ݌݋݈ܿ݋݊௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚࢄ ൅ Ɂ௜ ൅ ߤ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ (4) 
Note that the only difference on the right-hand-side of Equations (1) and (2) is the 
replacement of the crisis dummy with the recession dummy, as we are trying to 
capture the probability of exiting a crisis by controlling for the business cycle. We 
check the robustness of the estimation procedure by replacing the stimulus dummy 
with an alternative proxy for fiscal expansion. Moreover, as in the previous 
specification, both proxies of expansionary fiscal policy enter the regression with 
one- and two-year lags, while the rest of the control variables are lagged by just one 
year. Note that Equation (2) also includes time and country dummies. 
4.4.2 Probit model with a Heckman selection 
Following the benchmark specification, we estimate the probit model with the 
Heckman selection to assess how a percentage change in the structural fiscal balance 
affects the likelihood of exiting a recession or financial crisis. One way to estimate 
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the magnitude effect would be to replace the fiscal stimulus dummy with the change 
in the structural fiscal balance in Equation (1). However, the change could be small 
or large. Hence, this estimation process would include observations where the change 
is very small. That is, even a 0.1 per cent increase in the structural fiscal balance 
would enter the estimation as an episode of fiscal expansion. The goal of this section 
is to estimate the magnitude of the relationship between fiscal stimulus and exiting a 
recession or crisis, as established in the probit specification. Including any increase 
in structural deficit as a dependent variable would bias the coefficient and not 
correspond to what we are trying to capture (Claessens 2012). 
To exclude immaterial changes in the structural fiscal balance from analysis, we 
employ the Heckman selection method, which consists of estimating the system of 
two equations. The first stage of the equation models the likelihood of implementing 
a fiscal stimulus. The second stage estimates the effects of change in structural 
balance on the probability of exiting a recession or crisis. That is, observations 
corresponding to 0 in the first stage (episodes of non-stimulus) are excluded from the 
second stage. This means that the effect of fiscal expansion will be calculated 
conditional on the results of the first stage. Formally, we can represent the first stage 
of the Heckman selection model as follows. Consider the binary variable stimulus, 
which is determined by the latent variable stimulus*: 
ݏݐ݅݉ݑ݈ݑݏ௜௧כ ൌ ࢆ࢏࢚ࢽ ൅ ߦ௜௧ (5) 
where ݖ௜௧  is the vector of explanatory variables, ߛ  is the vector of coefficient 
estimates and ߦ௜௧ is the error term. Then the observed values of the stimulus dummy 
are defined as follows: 
ݏݐ݅݉ݑ݈ݑݏ௜௧ ൌ ൜ͳǡ݂݅ݏݐ݅݉ݑ݈ݑݏ௜௧
כ ൐ Ͳሻ
Ͳǡ݂݅ݏݐ݅݉ݑ݈ݑݏ௜௧כ ൑ Ͳ  (6) 
Similarly, the dependent variable in the second stage of the equation is the exit from 
recession and exit from crisis dummies, as determined by the latent variables ER* 
and EC*. These variables are modelled as follows: 
ܧܴ௜௧כ ൌ ࢄ࢏࢚ࢾ ൅ ߦ௜௧ (7) 
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ܧܥ௜௧כ ൌ ࢆ࢏࢚ࢻ ൅ ߟ௜௧ (8) 
where ܺ௜௧ and ܼ௜௧ correspond to the vector of explanatory variables and ߜ and Į are 
vectors of their respective coefficient estimates. Finally, ߦ௜௧  and ߟ௜௧  are the error 
terms from the second stage of the equation. Both the first and second stages are 
estimated using the probit model. 
The Heckman selection model helps us to distinguish clearly between the 
determinants of implementing a stimulus and those of exiting a recession or financial 
crisis. However, we should take into account that these two stages are intertwined 
(Plumper et al. 2006). That is, the sample in the second stage is not random, but is 
the result of earlier self-selection. 
We first discuss the determinants of the fiscal stimulus dummy. The literature has 
shown that engaging in expansionary fiscal policy is politically costly. In particular, 
the decision to run a high fiscal deficit is difficult to implement in the presence of a 
large number of domestic veto players. Thus, domestic political constraint is a 
determinant of running a fiscal deficit. Conversely, experiencing a financial crisis 
during a recession and a recession during a financial crisis may enhance the 
government’s inclination to support the economy. We also include real GDP growth 
lagged by one year as another determinant of fiscal stimulus. As a result, the first 
stage of the Heckman selection model for exiting from a recession consists of 
estimating the following regression: 
ݏݐ݅݉ݑ݈ݑݏ௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶ݃݀݌݃௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷ݌݋݈ܿ݋݊௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௜௧ (9) 
The second stage of the Heckman selection model involves estimating a similar 
regression to Equations (1) and (2). The second stage of exiting from a recession 
model is as follows: 
ܧܴ௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵȟݏݐܾ݈ܽ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶȟݏݐܾ݈ܽ௜௧ିଶ ൅ ߚଷܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚࢄ ൅ ߝ௜௧ (10) 
where ܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௜௧ିଵ equals 1 if a country at time t-1 experiences at least one banking, 
currency or sovereign debt crisis. X is a vector of control variables and ߝ௜௧ is the error 
term. Note that Equation (11) includes one- and two-year lags of negative change in 
structural balance, denoted as ȟݏݐܾ݈ܽ. It denotes the absolute value of an increase in 
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the fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP.31 In the years when a country runs a fiscal 
surplus, the variable equals 0. The construction of this variable is detailed in the data 
section. 
Similarly, the second stage of the exit from the crisis model is as follows: 
ܧܥ௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵȟݏݐܾ݈ܽ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶȟݏݐܾ݈ܽ௜௧ିଶ ൅ ߚଷݎ݁ܿ݁ݏݏ݅݋݊௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚࢄ ൅ ߝ௜௧ (11) 
In summary, the first stage of the Heckman selection model involves a selection 
process based on the determinants of fiscal stimulus. The second stage of the model 
evaluates the magnitude of the effect of change in the structural balance on the 
probability of exiting a recession. If the correlation coefficients between the errors of 
two equations are statistically significant, we cannot reject the hypothesis that both 
equations are independent (Picazo-Tadeo et al. 2012). That is, a statistically 
significant correlation coefficient between errors suggests that running separate 
probit equations would have yielded unbiased and more efficient estimates. In 
contrast, if the correlation coefficient is insignificant, running the probit model with 
selection yields unbiased estimates. 
Further, this methodology may help to reduce potential reverse causality. One 
concern related to our research question is that the causality could be running from 
exiting a recession and providing further stimulus to the economy. For instance, the 
subprime crisis negatively affected the balance sheet of many governments around 
the world. Hence, without taking care of endogeneity, the relationship established 
between crises and fiscal balances could run either way. However, in the current 
setup, the effect of a fiscal expansion on an economic downturn is first estimated 
based on running the selection equation. 
4.4.3 Panel vector autoregression 
By using lagged independent variables and employing the Heckman selection model, 
we attempt to reduce potential reverse causality. Next, we employ a PVAR to 
establish the relationship between fiscal shock and the probability of leaving a 
                                               
31 All values of the ȟݏݐܾ݈ܽ variable in the second stage are greater than or equal to 1.5 per cent of 
GDP, as fiscal stimulus is defined as the change in structural budget deficit with the size of at least 1.5 
per cent of GDP. 
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recession. Empirical literature has used VAR and PVAR to estimate the effects of 
fiscal expansion on output and trace the effects through the economy based on 
impulse-response analysis (Beetsma et al. 2008). Some of these papers are discussed 
in Section 4.2 (Blanchard and Perotti 2002; Fatas and Mihov 2001; Ramey 2011). 
This methodology has the same structure as traditional VAR models, with a cross-
sectional dimension added to the representation (Canova 2013). Hence, all of the 
variables in the system are treated as endogenous. The advantage of the PVAR is that 
it does not require any a priori assumptions on the direction of feedback between the 
variables in the model (Klein 2010). However, we orthogonalise the shocks in the 
PVAR using the Cholesky decomposition. This implies that the variable that appears 
earlier in the ordering is the most exogenous one and has a contemporaneous effect 
on the latter variable (Love and Zicchino 2006). 
Caldara and Kamps (2012) argues despite using similar data, studies using structural 
VAR have provided different measures of fiscal multipliers. The author concludes 
that existing identification scheme imply different restrictions on the output elasticity 
of tax revenue and government spending. In other words, small changes in assumed 
elasticities of taxes and government expenditure in structural VAR results in large 
differences in estimated multipliers.  
Given the variables of interest are completely invariant with the assumed changes in 
the taxes and government spending, despite the limitation highlighted by Caldara and 
Kamps (2012), PVAR  is the most appropriate way of addressing endogeneity 
problem in this chapter.  
Based on the above discussions, we estimate the following structural model: 
ܼ௜௧ ൌ ܣሺܮሻܼ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௜௧ (12) 
where ܼ௜௧ is the vector of endogenous variables, L is the lag operator, A is the 
polynomial in the lag operator and ߝ௜௧ is the error term. The lag structure is set to 2. 
Based on theoretical assumptions, the literature review and the research question, we 
use the following ordering of variables: ܼ௜௧ ൌ ሾܧܴǡ ݏݐ݅݉ݑ݈ݑݏǡ ݃݀݌݃ሿ . One 
identification restriction is obtained following Beetsma et al. (2008), who argue that 
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cyclically adjusted government spending is not contemporaneously affected by 
output because spending plans are usually presented a year before the new fiscal year 
starts. Hence, we leave real GDP growth in last place in the ordering. 
Following Love and Zicchino (2006), we apply the Helmert transformation to the 
raw data to control for individual heterogeneity. This forward-demeaning procedure 
is very important in the sense that in presence of lagged dependent variables in the 
structural model as explanatory variables, these variables may be correlated with 
country fixed effects. Forward demeaning helps to overcome this problem. 
After estimating the coefficients from the structural model, we will generate impulse-
response functions. The plot of impulse-response functions describes the reaction of 
one variable in the system to innovations in another variable in the system while 
holding all other shocks at zero. 
This will help us to establish the relationship between expansionary fiscal policy and 
economic outcomes, and to define the direction of the relationship. 
4.4.4 Falsification exercise 
To conclude the empirical analysis, we conduct a falsification exercise by replacing 
the negative change in structural fiscal balance, which was one of the proxies for 
fiscal expansion, with a positive change in structural fiscal balance. If the results 
from the baseline specifications are in opposition to the results from this section, this 
will add robustness to our main results. We estimate Equation (1) to gauge the effect 
of austerity measures on exiting recessions and financial crises: 
ܧܴ௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵο௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶο௜௧ିଶ ൅ ߚଷܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷ݌݋݈ܿ݋݊௜௧ିଵ ൅
൅ߚࢄ ൅ Ɂ௜ ൅ ߤ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ (13) 
ܧܥ௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߙଵο௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଶο௜௧ିଶ ൅ ߙଷݎ݁ܿ݁ݏݏ݅݋݊௜௧ିଵ ൅
൅ߙଷ݌݋݈ܿ݋݊௜௧ିଵ ൅ ࢆ߀ ൅ Ɂ௜ ൅ ߤ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ (14) 
4.5 Results and Discussion 
This section presents the main findings from the empirical estimations. 
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4.5.1 Exiting a recession 
The results of the baseline probit model are presented in Table 4.1. Column (1) 
contains the coefficient estimates of Equation (1) with explanatory variables only. 
Columns (2) to (4) are modifications of the baseline model. In column (2), we add 
country and time dummies, whereas in column (3), we augment the baseline equation 
with control variables. Finally, column (4) presents the results from the full model, 
where both country and time dummies and control variables are added to the first 
specification. 
As shown in Table 4.1, the stimulus dummy lagged by two years is statistically 
significant at the 1 per cent level. Note that this table contains the estimated 
coefficients from the probit model, which are not directly interpretable. To interpret 
the magnitude of the relationship, we need to examine the marginal effects. The 
upper panel of Table 4.3 shows the marginal effects of the major variables of 
interest. 
According to Table 4.3, countries that have implemented fiscal expansion at time t
are 25 per cent more likely to exit the recessionary phase of the business cycle 
compared to those that have not implemented this policy. However, this effect is 
lagged by two years. The marginal effect of the stimulus program varies between 24 
and 28 per cent, depending on the specification. This is not a surprising result. Lags 
in the design and implementation of fiscal stimulus, together with the short length of 
recessions, implies that their effect on output would likely occur too late (IMF 
2013).32 Hence, the focus of macroeconomic policy in many economies has often 
been on monetary policy. Ramey (2011) argues that one reason for the lack of 
interest in using fiscal stimulus during economic downturns is the belief that the lags 
in implementation are too lengthy. Taylor (2000) highlights the lagged effect of 
stimulus as one of the major drawbacks of fiscal policy compared to monetary 
policy. The author mentions that even after identifying what program or tax change 
will be implemented, several quarters or even years are needed for the positive effect 
of the proposal to become apparent on the economy. Studying the effect of changes 
on taxes and government spending on US real GDP, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) 
                                               
32 In our dataset, the average duration of a recession is 1.5 years. Eighty-five per cent of all recessions 
last just three years. 
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find that shifting aggregate demand via fiscal policy requires several quarters and 
lasts for several years. Our results suggest that fiscal expansion has no immediate 
effect on restoring pre-recession output. On average, there are two years until there is 
a positive effect. The sign of the one-year lagged stimulus dummy is negative in 
most of the specifications. However, none of the coefficients are statistically 
significant. Overall, the results of the probit model confirm that there is a link 
between fiscal expansion and exit from a recession.
The sign of the crisis dummy in Table 4.1 is negative, suggesting that if a country 
experiences at least one banking, currency or sovereign debt crisis in the previous 
year, it is less likely that it will exit a recession at time t. Marginal effects on the 
probability of exiting a recession varies between 23 and 32 per cent, depending on 
the econometric specifications. 
The other interesting finding from the probit model is that the higher the political 
constraints, the lower the chance of exiting a recession. As mentioned above, the 
design and implementation of fiscal expansion takes time. In most cases, it is subject 
to approval from a legislative body. Hence, increasing government spending or 
reducing taxes requires a substantial timespan (Taylor 2000). In the presence of 
political checks and balances, it becomes more difficult for incumbent governments 
to provide the economy with stimulus. Ha and Kang (2014) show that there seems to 
be a shift in the stance of fiscal and monetary policy during downturns. However, 
they conclude that, as the number of political veto players increases, this shift 
becomes minor. That is, in the presence of high political constraints, implementing 
fiscal or monetary stimulus becomes difficult. Our results are in line with this 
finding, as the political constraint variable enters the exit from recession equation 
with a negative sign. 
The signs of most control variables are in line with the predictions of theoretical and 
empirical priors. However, the only variable to enter the full model with a 
statistically significant coefficient is the debt-to-GDP ratio. The estimations reveal 
that an increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio reduces the chance of recovery. 
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4.5.2 Exiting a crisis 
As discussed in the previous section, although most financial crises are associated 
with a significant drop in living conditions and other economic indicators, this is not 
always the case. The structural strength of the economy, timely intervention of the 
government and other factors may result in relatively small economic damage 
followed by no, or a short, recession. Hence, to gauge the effects of fiscal stimulus 
on the probability of exiting a crisis, we replace the dependent variable with the exit 
from crisis dummy and run the probit regression with the same control variables. 
Note that, unlike in the previous section, we do not include a crisis dummy in this 
model because of the collinearity problem. Instead, this variable is replaced by the 
recession dummy. 
The coefficient estimates from Equation (2) are presented in Table 4.2. The lower 
panel of Table 4.3 shows the marginal effects of a 1 per cent change in the major 
explanatory variables on the probability of exiting a financial crisis. 
The major findings from these estimations can be summarised as follows. Unlike in 
the exit from recession equation, the first lag of the stimulus dummy enters the model 
with a positive sign. Further, it is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. 
According to our estimations, if fiscal stimulus is provided at time t to the economy 
experiencing the crisis, the odds of exiting the crisis will be increased by 18–42 per 
cent. Interestingly, fiscal expansion lagged by two years seems to have no effect on 
exiting a financial crisis. This finding suggests that the effect of fiscal stimulus 
during financial crises seems to be more immediate. Increasing government spending 
and reducing taxes was heavily practiced by both developed and emerging 
economies during the GFC. Jha et al. (2014) conclude that extraordinary policy 
measures taken by emerging Asian countries played a significant role in helping 
them to bounce back quickly from the crisis. 
We also find that the political constraints variable has no effect on exiting a financial 
crisis. In column (3), the sign is negative, and in the full model, it switches to a 
positive sign. Nevertheless, the variable is not significant in any of the specifications. 
This result could be explained by panics following financial crises. Experience has 
shown that consumers, financial markets and governments become extremely 
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nervous during crises (Kindleberger and Aliber 2011). As the result of a political 
need to act during times of crisis, governments may conduct an immediate 
intervention in the economy. Hence, the results indicate that the need for action 
arising from a crisis removes the frictions created by the presence of political checks 
and balances. In contrast, recessions can be seen as the result of longer-term 
structural problems in the economy. Thus, any change made to fiscal policy can be 
scrutinised at different level of governance. Consequently, the political constraint 
variable is negatively correlated with the exit from recession variable, but it has no 
relationship with the exit from crisis variable. 
4.5.3 Alternative measures of fiscal expansion 
To check the robustness of the results, we run Equations (1) and (2) with an 
alternative fiscal stimulus variable. That is, instead of a dummy variable, we use the 
absolute value of the negative changes in the structural balance to GDP ratio. Table 
4.6 presents the marginal effects of the major explanatory variables. 
The results of the estimations confirm the findings of the models with the stimulus 
dummy. In particular, the two-year lagged fiscal expansion has a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient when the dependent variable is removed from the 
recession. Further, this variable has a positive effect on exiting a financial crisis 
when the dependent variable is the exit from recession dummy. However, as in the 
previous section, the proxy for fiscal expansion has a more immediate effect on the 
duration of financial crises. The model with both control variables and time and 
country dummies suggests that a 1 per cent increase in the structural deficit to GDP 
ratio increases the probability of exiting a recession by 20 per cent. 
Moreover, experiencing a financial crisis at time t reduces the likelihood of exiting a 
recession, whereas experiencing a drop in the per capita real GDP at time t reduces 
the odds of exiting a financial crisis. 
4.5.4 Results from the Heckman selection model 
Next, we present the results from the Heckman selection model. The model consists 
of two equations. The lower panel of the table contains the dependent variables from 
the first stage of the equation, whereas the upper panel includes the explanatory and 
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control variables from the main equation. First, we discuss the results of the model 
where the explanatory variable is exit from recession. 
Column (2) contains the coefficient estimates of the first stage. These results suggest 
that experiencing a financial crisis in the previous year increases the likelihood of 
providing the economy with fiscal stimulus. In contrast, real GDP growth enters the 
equation with a negative sign, suggesting that the higher the GDP growth, the lower 
the probability of fiscal stimulus. The coefficient estimate of political constraints is 
also in line with a priori expectations. However, in the previous section, we include 
this variable in the exit from recession equation and conclude that high political 
constraints reduce the probability of exiting a recession. 
The estimation of the selection equation in the Heckman probit model shows the 
channel that this relationship works through. We find that political compulsion 
reduces the probability of fiscal expansion, which in turn lowers the odds of exiting a 
recession. In this regard, our finding is consistent with the findings of Ha and Kang 
(2014), who study the effects of political gridlock on government policy responses 
during financial crises and show that fiscal policies are considerably constrained by 
political conditions. This argument is shared by Cox and McCubbins (2001), who 
contend that, in the presence of veto players, responses to economic shocks or crises 
may be delayed. 
In addition to the effect mentioned above, political constraints may affect the pursuit 
of other economic policies. Figure 4.4 plots the marginal effects of fiscal expansion 
at different political constraint levels. As shown, the marginal effects plot the slope 
downwards at higher levels of political constraints. This suggests that the effect of 
fiscal expansion is relatively small when there are a large number of political veto 
players. 
Returning to the main equation, we find that the major findings from previous 
models also survive in the Heckman selection model. The sign of fiscal stimulus 
dummy is negative and significant at the 1 per cent confidence level. Conversely, 
experiencing a financial crisis during a recession is likely to prolong the duration of 
the recession. The sign of most control variables is in line with expectations, despite 
most of them being statistically insignificant. Overall, the Heckman model performs 
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better than running two separate probit regressions. The chi square test for 
independence is 17.06; thus, we can reject the null hypothesis of preferring running 
two separate probit models. 
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4.7 contain the coefficient estimates from the Heckman 
selection model, where the main dependent variable is the binary exit from crisis 
variable. As in the exit from recession equation, the dependent variable of the first 
stage is the stimulus dummy. An important finding from the first stage is that the 
political constraint variable has no effect on the probability of providing fiscal 
stimulus. This result is also in line with the finding of the baseline probit model. That 
is, there seems to be less political friction during times of financial crisis compared to 
the recessionary phase of the business cycle. The other interesting finding is that, 
despite keeping the sign, negative changes in the structural balance are only 
statistically significant at 11 per cent. The Wald test also suggests that the null 
hypothesis of independent errors can be rejected. Consequently, the Heckman 
selection model yields unbiased estimates compared to running two separate probit 
models. Overall, we find significant support for our findings in the previous section. 
4.5.5 Results from PVAR 
The findings from the probit model and the Heckman selection model should be 
treated as a robust correlation. However, the effects of fiscal stimulus on the 
probability of exiting both financial crises and recessions are subject to potential 
endogeneity. This problem may occur as the result of reverse causation or omitted 
variable bias. We employ the PVAR approach to overcome this problem. In the 
upper panel of Table 4.8, we report the coefficient estimates from Equation (4) using 
the following variable ordering: {Real GDP growth, Stimulus, Recession}. The 
lower panel of Table 4.8 contains the coefficient estimates from Equation (5) using 
the following ordering: {Real GDP growth, Stimulus, Exit from recession}. 
To present these results graphically, we provide impulse-response functions (IRFs), 
which describe how innovations in one variable of the system affect the other 
variable, keeping the innovation to the rest of the variables at 0. We only present and 
discuss four crucial IRFs. Figure 4.5 presents the response of the recession dummy to 
the shock to two different measures of fiscal stimulus. 
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Unlike the baseline models, in PVAR setup fiscal stimulus tends to increase the 
probability of a recession in the first year. However, this effect becomes negative in 
the second year; that is, the probability of exiting a recession increases. Figure 4.6 
shows how the exit from crisis dummy reacts to the innovation to fiscal stimulus. 
From the IRF above, we can conclude that the response is immediate. Fiscal 
expansion increases the probability of exiting a financial crisis. 
Tables 4.8 and 4.9 show that there is no significant feedback from fiscal stimulus to 
innovations to the recession or exit from crisis dummies. 
4.5.6 Falsification exercise 
Finally, Table 4.10 presents the results from Equation (6), where we perform a 
falsification exercise. The explanatory variable is a positive change in structural 
balance to GDP. Note that this variable equals 0 if structural balance has expanded in 
a given year. That is, we are trying to capture the effect of fiscal expansion on the 
probability of exiting recessions and crises. Columns (1) and (2) are coefficient 
estimates from the equation where the dependent variable is exit from recession. 
Columns (3) and (4) represent the coefficient estimates from the exit from crisis 
equation. We only present the results of the equations containing control variables 
only (columns (1) and (3)) and control variables and time/country dummies (columns 
(2) and (4)). 
The most important finding is that fiscal expansion has no bearing on exiting from a 
recession. Conversely, this variable has a negative effect on the exit from crisis 
equation. The latter result suggests that, during a financial crisis, austerity increases 
the duration of the crisis. As in previous models, the fiscal variable has an immediate 
effect on the dependent variable. This result confirms the arguments put forward by 
Krugman (2013) in favour of expansionary fiscal policy. Krugman argues that 
austerity has never been a useful tool during crises. Several cases where crisis 
recovery occurred following austerity measures may have been the result of different 
macroeconomic developments that overcame the negative effects of austerity. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter focuses on the effectiveness of fiscal policy during financial crises and 
recessions. The existing literature has mostly concentrated on the effect of fiscal 
policy on output. Few papers discussing this question in the context of financial 
crises have focused on particular crisis types. To address this shortcoming, we 
attempt to quantify the effect of stimulus on the probability of exiting financial crises 
and recessions. 
Despite a high correlation between crises and recessions, they do not always 
accompany each other. Therefore, we use two separate binary dependent variables to 
acknowledge the differential effect of expansionary fiscal policy during financial 
crises and economic recessions. This chapter contributes to the existing literature in 
several ways. 
First, it evaluates the effect of fiscal policy on exiting three major crisis types: 
banking, currency and sovereign debt. Moreover, it investigates the differential effect 
of fiscal stimulus during crises and recessions. Despite estimating a similar 
econometric specification, we find significantly different results for crisis and 
recession equations. The results show that fiscal stimulus has a positive effect in both 
equations. Interestingly, it appears that it has a more immediate effect during 
financial crises. Only the first lag of fiscal stimulus has a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient in the exit from crisis equation. For the exit from recession 
equation, the two-year lagged fiscal stimulus has a statistically significant 
coefficient. 
Second, this chapter employs a unique methodology to quantify the relationship 
established between structural fiscal balance and exit from recessions and crises. We 
apply the probit model with the Heckman selection. This method was first used by 
Van de Ven and van Praag (1981) and later employed in different micro and macro 
setups (e.g., Claessens et al. 2012; Picazo-Tadeo et al. 2012). Consisting of two 
stages, the first stage of the estimation models the probability of implementing fiscal 
stimulus, where one of the explanatory variables is political constraints. In the model 
for exit from recession, the probability of implementing stimulus is negatively 
affected by political constraints. That is, in the presence of political checks and 
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balances, it is more difficult to implement expansionary fiscal policy, which in turn 
delays the effect of fiscal stimulus. Conversely, we find that the political constraints 
variable enters the first stage of the exit from crisis equation with a statistically 
insignificant sign. This suggests that, during financial crises, the role of political 
constraints decreases, and therefore the effect of expansionary fiscal policy is visible 
one year after the stimulus is implemented. 
Finally, this study employs PVAR analysis to tackle the endogeneity problem. This 
methodology has been very popular in assessing the effect of fiscal and monetary 
shocks on output (Blanchard and Perotti 2002; Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012). 
However, no prior studies have applied this methodology to assess the effectiveness 
of expansionary fiscal policy in ending recessions and financial crises. 
This chapter should not be considered as advocating for fiscal stimulus during all 
recessions or crises. Nor does it argue that fiscal consolidation always harms 
economic growth. The effect of fiscal stimulus or consolidation programs may well 
depend on their composition, persistence and indirect effects (Alesina et al. 2015b; 
Blanchard and Leigh 2013). Moreover, the prevailing macroeconomic conditions at 
the time of the fiscal program are also considered important (Chari and Henry 2014). 
The findings in this paper suggest that, if designed wisely and timely, fiscal stimulus 
helps to exit recessions and financial crises. 
There are several avenues for future research. In this paper, we concentrate on 
sovereign debt, banking and currency crises. It would be interesting to assess the 
effectiveness of fiscal policy during each type of crisis. As a result of data 
limitations, we had to combine all of the observations. However, conducting similar 
analysis by separating fiscal stimulus into different components would yield 
important policy implications. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 4.1 Results of exit from recession equation with benchmark definition of 
fiscal stimulus 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Stimulus, lagged 1 year -0.0864 -0.305 -0.225 0.00609 
(0.666) (0.479) (0.394) (0.991) 
Stimulus, lagged 2 years 0.804*** 1.001*** 0.874*** 1.306** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) 
Crisis, lagged 1 year -0.738*** -1.356** -0.798** -1.679* 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.036) 
Debt to GDP ratio, lagged 1 year -0.269 -2.669* 
(0.110) (0.039) 
Unemployment, lagged 1 year -2.166 -1.527 
(0.143) (0.853) 
Inflation, lagged 1 year 0.672 -7.504 
(0.453) (0.144) 
Change in export to GDP ratio, lagged 1 year 0.251 1.891 
(0.700) (0.476) 
Investment to GDP ratio, lagged 1 year 1.477 -0.0356 
(0.240) (0.991) 
Current account to GDP ratio, lagged 1 year 1.006 -2.019 
(0.569) (0.824) 
Political constraints -1.163** -4.594* 
      (0.001) (0.040) 
Observations 319 234 263 172 
Countries 60 41 54 34 
Time dummies No Yes No Yes 
Country dummies No Yes No Yes 
Pseudo R square 0.09 0.32 0.16 0.42 
Notes: Dependent variable is binary Exit from recession dummy. The variable equals 1 if in a given 
year country exits recession, and 0 if in a given year the country is still in recession or in a growth 
phase. More information about the variable is provided in the data section. Explanatory variables are 
fiscal stimulus dummy lagged by 1 and 2 years, and crisis dummy. Fiscal stimulus dummy equals 1 if 
at time t-1 the change in structural government balance exceeds -1.5 per cent of the GDP, and 0 
otherwise. Crisis dummy equals 1 if in a given year country experiences at least one of the banking, 
currency or sovereign debt crises. Control variables are discussed in data section. The numbers 
provided correspond to the coefficient estimates from baseline probit model for exiting recession 
(Equation 1). Standard errors are clustered by countries to allow for autocorrelation. P-values in 
parenthesis. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table 4.2 Results of exit from crisis equation with benchmark definition of fiscal 
stimulus 
Dependent variable: Exit from 
crisis (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Stimulus, t-1 0.795*** 1.94*** 0.74*** 1.22*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Stimulus,  t-2 0.052 -0.66 -0.04 0.20 
  (0.31) (0.27) (0.82) (0.47) 
Recession,  t-1 -0.34*** 1.04 -0.53*** -1.00*** 
  (0.05) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) 
Political constraints, t-1 -0.21 0.24 
  (0.54) (0.88) 
Debt to GDP ratio,  t-1 0.31 -0.41 
  (0.28) (0.64) 
Unemployment,  t-1 -1.14 2.25 
  (0.57) (0.70) 
Inflation,  t-1 1.48 0.37 
  (0.39) (0.89) 
Change in export to GDP ratio,  t-1 -1.17** -1.47* 
  (0.05) (0.08) 
Investment to GDP ratio,  t-1 -0.10 1.27 
  (0.92) (0.45) 
Current account to GDP ratio,  t-1 1.51 4.01 
  (0.35) (0.10) 
Observations 535 84 408 262 
Countries 65 18 59 15 
Time dummies No Yes No Yes 
Country dummies No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Dependent variable is binary Exit from crisis dummy. The variable equals 1 if at time t-1 
country exits at least one of the banking, currency or sovereign debt crises. More information about 
the variable is provided in the data section. Explanatory variables are fiscal stimulus dummy lagged 
by 1 and 2 years, and recession dummy. Fiscal stimulus dummy equals 1 if at time t-1 the change in 
structural government balance exceeds -1.5 per cent of the GDP, and 0 otherwise. Recession dummy 
equals 1 if in a given year country experiences recession. Control variables are discussed in data 
section. The numbers provided correspond to the coefficient estimates from baseline probit model for 
exiting crisis (Equation 2). Standard errors are clustered by countries to allow for autocorrelation. P-
values in parenthesis. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table 4.3 Marginal effects from Equation (1) and (2) 
Dependent variable: 
exit from recession (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Stimulus, t-1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
Stimulus, t-2 0.3*** 0.2*** 0.3*** 0.3*** 
Crisis, t-1 -0.2*** -0.3** -0.2** -0.3* 
Dependent variable: 
exit from crisis 
Stimulus, t-1 0.2*** 0.4*** 0.2*** 0.3*** 
Stimulus, t-2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1 
Recession t-1 -0.1** 0.2* -0.1*** -0.3*** 
Time dummies No Yes No Yes 
Country dummies No Yes No Yes 
Note: Marginal effects of the explanatory variables from Table 1, each column 
corresponding to the subsequent column of Table 1. Each marginal effect is calculated 
when the rest of the explanatory and control variables are at their mean. ***, ** and * 
represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table 4.4 Results of exit from recession equation with alternative definition of 
fiscal stimulus  
Dependent variable: Exit from 
recession (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Negative changes in fiscal balance, 
t-1 2.582 13.01 1.876 11.19 
  (0.625) (0.114) (0.798) (0.252) 
Negative changes in structural 
balance-to-GDP, t-2 18.02*** 29.32*** 21.43*** 35.31*** 
  (0.001) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) 
Crisis, t-1 -0.78*** -1.565*** -0.83*** -1.168*** 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) 
Political constraints     -1.101*** -3.868*** 
      (0.003) (0.004) 
Debt-to-GDP, t-1     -0.303* -2.544*** 
      (0.068) (0.006) 
Unemployment, t-1     -1.692 4.758 
      (0.238) (0.520) 
Inflation, t-1     0.635 0.691 
      (0.426) (0.596) 
Change in export to GDP ratio, t-1     0.643 2.663** 
      (0.317) (0.024) 
Investment to GDP ratio, t-1     1.100 0.477 
      (0.352) (0.819) 
Current account to GDP ratio, t-1     0.770 0.795 
      (0.661) (0.886) 
Observations 318 234 263 213 
Countries 60 41 54 34 
Time dummies No Yes No Yes 
Country dummies No Yes No Yes 
Pseudo R square 0.07 0.31 0.14 0.28 
Notes: Dependent variable is binary Exit from recession dummy. The variable equals 1 if in a given 
year country exits recession, and 0 if in a given year the country is still in recession or in a growth 
phase. More information about the variable is provided in the data section. Explanatory variables are 
negative changes in structural balance lagged by 1 and 2 years, and crisis dummy. The former is 
continuous variable and it equals to absolute value of the negative changes in structural balance to 
GDP ratio. When the change in structural balance is positive, this variable equals 0. Crisis dummy 
equals 1 if in a given year country experiences at least one of the banking, currency or sovereign debt 
crises. Control variables are discussed in data section. The numbers provided correspond to the 
coefficient estimates from baseline probit model for exiting recession (Equation 1). Standard errors 
are clustered by countries to allow for autocorrelation. P-values in parenthesis. ***, ** and * represent 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table 4.5 Results of exit from crisis equation with alternative definition of fiscal 
stimulus 
Dependent variable: Exit from recession (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Negative changes in fiscal balance, t-1 18.11*** 20.84* 17.39*** 21.23** 
(0.000) (0.093) (0.003) (0.029)
Negative changes in fiscal balance, t-2 -1.496 -26.24** -4.309 -0.309
  (0.755) (0.026) (0.397) (0.967) 
Recession, t-1 -0.331* 0.747 -0.529*** -0.887*** 
  (0.056) (0.138) (0.003) (0.000) 
Political constraints     -0.227 0.127 
      (0.502) (0.926) 
Debt-to-GDP, t-1     0.349 -0.381 
(0.231) (0.669)
Unemployment, t-1 -0.576 2.825
      (0.787) (0.628) 
Inflation, t-1     1.942 1.020 
      (0.249) (0.609) 
Change in export to GDP ratio, t-1     -1.039* -1.286* 
      (0.052) (0.078) 
Investment to GDP ratio, t-1     -0.127 0.742 
(0.899) (0.625)
Current account to GDP ratio, t-1 1.709 4.588
      (0.285) (0.175) 
Observations 530 79 408 262 
Countries 65 18 59 15 
Time dummies No Yes No Yes 
Country dummies No Yes No Yes 
Pseudo R square 0.04 0.38 0.07 0.61 
Notes: Dependent variable is binary Exit from crisis dummy. The variable equals 1 if at time t-1 
country exits at least one of the banking, currency or sovereign debt crises. More information about 
the variable is provided in the data section.  Explanatory variables are negative change in structural 
balance to GDP lagged by 1 and 2 years, and crisis dummy. The former is continuous variable and it 
equals to absolute value of the negative changes in structural balance to GDP ratio. When the change 
in structural balance is positive, this variable equals 0. Crisis dummy equals 1 if in a given year 
country experiences at least one of the banking, currency or sovereign debt crises. Control variables 
are discussed in data section. The numbers provided correspond to the coefficient estimates from 
baseline probit model for exiting recession (Equation 1). Standard errors are clustered by countries to 
allow for autocorrelation. P-values in parenthesis. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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Table 4.6 Marginal effects from Equation (1) and (2) with alternative definition 
of fiscal stimulus 
Dependent variable: 
exit from recession (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Stimulus, t-1 0.0 0.2* 0.0 0.2 
Stimulus, t-2 0.2*** 0.3*** 0.2*** 0.4*** 
Crisis, t-1 -0.3*** -0.4*** 0.2*** -0.3*** 
Dependent variable: 
exit from crisis 
Stimulus, t-1 0.2*** 0.3** 0.2*** 0.2*** 
Stimulus, t-2 -0.0 -0.3* -0.1 -0.0 
Recession t-1 -0.1** 0.2 -0.1*** -0.3*** 
Time dummies No Yes No Yes 
Country dummies No Yes No Yes 
Note: Marginal effects of the explanatory variables from Table A3, each column 
corresponding to the subsequent column of Table A3. Each marginal effect is calculated 
when the rest of the explanatory and control variables are at their mean. ***, ** and * 
represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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Table 4.7 Probit model with Heckman selection  
Dependent variables Exit from recession Exit from crisis 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables from the 
second stage         
          
Stimulus, t-1 -24.05   10.49   
(0.114)   (0.105)   
Stimulus, t-2 21.39**   6.242   
(0.006)   (0.427)   
Crisis, t-1 -1.192**       
(0.001)       
Debt to GDP ratio, t-1 -0.242   0.0527   
(0.117)   (0.793)   
Unemployment, t-1 -5.788***   -0.482   
(0.000)   (0.877)   
Inflation, t-1 0.928   1.647   
(0.785)   (0.215)   
Change in export to GDP, t-1 0.311   -1.483   
(0.815)   (0.146)   
Investment to GDP, t-1 2.733   0.382   
(0.272)   (0.670)   
Current account to GDP, t-1 -0.599   1.922   
(0.742)   (0.269)   
Explanatory variables from the 
first stage         
Recession, t-1       0.132 
        (0.336) 
Crisis, t-1   0.684***   0.824*** 
    (0.000)   (0.000) 
GDP growth, t-1   -10.07***     
    (0.000)     
Political constraints, t-1   -0.751*   0.0724 
    (0.011)   (0.763) 
Observations 877 909 
Countries 62 62 
Wald test of independence, chi 
square 17.06 14.81 
Prob. 0.00 0.00 
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) are results from two-stage Heckman selection model, where dependent 
variable for selection equation is fiscal stimulus dummy, and for main equation is exit from recession. 
Exit from recession variable equals 1 if in a given year country exits recession, and 0 otherwise. Fiscal 
stimulus dummy equals 1 if in a given year the change in structural government balance exceeds -1.5 
per cent of the GDP, and 0 otherwise. Columns (3) and (4) contain the results for two-stage Heckman 
selection model, where dependent variable for selection equation is fiscal stimulus dummy and for 
main equation is exit from crisis dummy. 
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Table 4.8 Results from three variable Panel VAR with benchmark proxy for 
fiscal stimulus 
GDP Stimulus Recession 
Dependent 
variable Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 1 Lag 2 
Exit from 
recession 
Stimulus 1.299 2.785** 0.143*** -0.018 0.204 0.067 
Recession -3.87*** -0.844 0.084 -0.086** 0.197** 0.03 
Real GDP growth 0.48*** 0.065 0.003 0.002 0.02 0.003 
  
Exit from crisis 
Stimulus 0.401 1.338 0.096* 0.003* 0.0529 0.141 
Exit from crisis 0.902* 0.189 0.147** 0.028 0.055 0.043 
Real GDP growth 0.414*** -0.045 0.004 0.001 0.015*** -0.001 
Notes: Stimulus variable is the dummy variable and equals 1 if in a given year country expands its 
structural budget deficit at least by 1.5 per cent of the GDP. Recession dummy equals 1 if in a 
given year a country is in the recession. Definition of recession is discussed in data section. VAR 
model is estimated using GMM. Country and time fixed effects have been eliminated using 
Helmert transformation. Row variables are regressed on column variables. ***, **, * corresponds 
to 10%, 5% and 1% significance level.  
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Table 4.9 Results from three variable Panel VAR with alternative proxy for 
fiscal stimulus 
Notes: Proxy for fiscal stimulus is continuous variable and it equals to absolute value of the 
negative changes in structural balance to GDP ratio. When the change in structural balance is 
positive, this variable equals 0. Recession dummy equals 1 if in a given year a country is in the 
recession. Definition of recession is discussed in data section. VAR model is estimated using 
GMM. Country and time fixed effects have been eliminated using Helmert transformation. Row 
variables are regressed on column variables. ***, **, * corresponds to 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance level.  
Dependent
variable Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 1 Lag 2
Exit from recession
Negative changes to structural balance 1.116 2.84*** 0.100** -0.023 0.302 0.03
Recession -2.97*** -0.966 0.084 -0.049** 0.203** 0.06
Real GDP growth 0.33*** 0.032 0.046 0.002 0.048 0.021
Exit from crisis
Negative changes to structural balance 0.480 1.202 -0.102* 0.06* 0.102 0.213
Exit from crisis 0.866* 0.076 0.216** 0.08 0.006 0.036
Real GDP growth 0.316*** -0.068 0.03 0.098 0.008 -0.003
GDP Stimulus Recession
Shocks to
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Table 4.10 Results of falsification exercise 
  
Exit from 
recession Exit from crisis 
Dependent variable: Exit from 
recession (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Negative changes in fiscal balance, 
t-1 -2.906 10.22 -14.20* -19.99* 
  (0.701) (0.288) (0.016) (0.017) 
Negative changes in fiscal balance, 
t-2 -9.957 -15.37 -4.734 -8.274 
  (0.197) (0.134) (0.467) (0.440) 
Crisis, t-1 -0.662** -0.85*     
  (0.003) (0.029)     
Recession, t-1 -0.447** -0.86***
      (0.008) (0.000) 
Political constraints -1.230*** -2.96* -0.235 0.133 
  (0.000) (0.031) (0.506) (0.919) 
Debt-to-GDP, t-1 -0.214 -2.21* 0.366 -0.142 
  (0.193) (0.028) (0.196) (0.866) 
Unemployment, t-1 -1.665 4.810 0.123 4.899 
  (0.255) (0.502) (0.952) (0.358) 
Inflation, t-1 0.682 0.146 2.202 0.799
  (0.366) (0.908) (0.188) (0.708) 
Change in export to GDP ratio, t-1 0.634 2.101* -1.373* -1.715* 
  (0.342) (0.042) (0.020) (0.019) 
Investment to GDP ratio, t-1 1.126 -0.098 -0.0526 0.784 
  (0.332) (0.961) (0.957) (0.588) 
Current account to GDP ratio, t-1 0.003 -3.060 1.308 2.598 
  (0.998) (0.542) (0.355) (0.298) 
Observations 267 221 412 269 
Countries 54 38 59 40 
Time dummies No Yes No Yes 
Country dummies No Yes No Yes 
Pseudo R square 0.1 0.6 0.04 0.52 
Notes: Dependent variable for specifications (1) and (2) is exit from recession, 
defined the same as in previous models. Dependent variables in specifications (3) 
and (4) is exit from crisis. Other explanatory variables are also the same as defined 
above. Standard errors are clustered by countries to allow for autocorrelation. P-
values in parenthesis. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels.
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Figure 4.1 Evolution of per capita GDP in Argentina around Latin American Debt 
crisis 
Figure 4.2 Associations between exit from crises and recessions 
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Figure 4.3 Political constraint index globally 
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Figure 4.4 Marginal effects of change in structural balance on the probability of 
exiting recession 
Note: Horizontal axis shows the level of the fiscal stimulus, where the latter is 
defined as any negative change in structural balance as a percentage of GDP as a 
fiscal stimulus. To ease graphical illustration, we show absolute values of fiscal 
stimulus. 
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Figure 4.5 Impulse response functions of two lag Panel VAR for exiting recession 
Note: Left panel shows the impulse response of the probability of experiencing recession 
to the shock to the fiscal stimulus (measured as change in structural fiscal balance). The 
right panel shows the impulse response of the probability of experiencing recession to the 
shock to the fiscal stimulus dummy. 
Figure 4.6 Impulse response functions of two lag Panel VAR for exiting crisis 
Note: Left panel shows the impulse response of the probability of exiting crisis to the shock 
to the fiscal stimulus (measured as change in structural fiscal balance). The right panel 
shows the impulse response of the probability of exiting financial crisis to the shock to the 
fiscal stimulus dummy. 
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Summary and Conclusion Chapter 5:
Despite the abundance of the research conducted on financial crises, the political 
economy dimensions have received scant attention so far. A small number of studies 
addressing this issue suggest that countries’ policies remain one of the key 
determinants of the vulnerability to financial crisis, along with economic 
determinants. For instance, Koesel et al. (forthcoming) find that the fact that Turkey 
experienced 9 currency crises between 1973 and 2010, whereas Jordan had only one 
during the same period, could largely be attributed to the respective political regime. 
Rosas (2006) discusses the propensity of different political regimes towards bailing 
out troubled banks. The author concludes that bailouts are rarer event under the 
democratic setup in comparison to autocracies. Apart from the lead-up to the crises, 
some scholars show that political and institutional variables tend to be powerful 
determinants of response to financial crises. Drazen and Easterly (2001), for example, 
find that due to the presence of institutional and political veto players, the response to 
financial crises could be delayed.  
In addition, anecdotal evidence also suggests that economic crises at least have some 
institutional and political components. For instance, Chang (2007) argues that 
financial crises in Indonesia in 1982 and in Argentina in 2002 were primarily driven 
by social, political and institutional collapse. The quality of institutions has also 
contributed to markedly different responses to financial crises across different 
countries. Based on the importance of the political economy dimension of crises, this 
thesis establishes the relationship between macroeconomic variables and financial 
crises and examines the determinants of the policy choices in a large number of 
countries. 
The thesis consists of three empirical essays. The first essay studies the impact of 
political regime type on the probability of experiencing banking, currency or 
sovereign debt crisis. The influence of political regimes on financial crisis has 
received limited attention in the extant literature. Furthermore, existing papers have 
focused only on two extremes of the political spectrum i.e. autocracies or 
democracies. Given a large number of countries experiencing transition from 
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autocracy to democracy, and reverse transition, i.e. from democracy to autocracy, 
this paper expands the existing stock of knowledge by scrutinizing the impact of this 
particular regime switch on countries’ vulnerabilities to experiencing financial crises. 
In fact, empirical estimations suggest that the most vulnerable group of countries to 
experience financial crises are those in transition from autocracy to democracy. 
Interestingly, reverse transition is not associated with any financial crisis.  
The empirical estimations also reveal that being autocracy or democracy, per se, has 
no direct bearing on the likelihood of financial crisis. On the other hand, the duration 
of political regime tends to have an effect over the probability of financial crises. 
Interestingly, we find that this effect is heterogeneous across autocracy and 
democracy. Specifically, the results show that extended authoritarian rule in a 
country shrinks the probability of financial crisis. On the other hand, prolonged 
democratic regime makes a country prone to banking crisis.  
As a robustness check, the paper uses data on long-term government bond yields as a 
dependent variable. There is a strong correlation between the number of financial 
crises experienced and return on the bond yields. Therefore, we use this variable as a 
proxy for financial distress. The literature on “democratic advantage” suggests that 
due to accountability to the electorate, transparency, respect for the private property 
and other advantages of the democratic setup, the markets’ perception of risk for 
democracies are significantly lower. Taking this theory on board, we expect a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient for the duration of democracy 
variable. The analysis confirms our expectations and finds an evidence in favor of 
the presence of the “democratic advantage” hypothesis.   
One of the important implications of the first essay is that duration of democracy 
increases the likelihood of banking crises. Taking a cue from this finding, the second 
essay explores the political and economic determinants of banking crises in 22 
advanced economies, which have been democracy throughout the sample. High 
incidence of banking crises in advanced economies is the major reason why we 
concentrate on this particular crisis. In addition, real economic effects of banking 
crises are significantly higher in advanced economies due to deeper banking systems 
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(Leaven and Valencia, 2012). Moreover, aftermath of banking crises is associated by 
weakened fiscal positions (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2013), decline in availability of 
credit (Gupta, 2005) and lower output growth (Dell’Ariccia et al. 2013).  
   
We first establish the relationship between credit boom and banking crisis. For this 
purpose, we experiment with two ways of accounting for domestic credit boom. First, 
we use continuous change in credit-to-GDP ratio. As a robustness check, we use 
credit boom dummy. The latter variable was created following the methodology 
proposed by Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014).  
We then extend the analysis further and compare the effects of enterprise and 
household credit growth. This helps us to identify the driver of the relationship 
between aggregate lending and banking crises. The results suggest that aggregate 
credit growth leads to higher likelihood of the crisis in the banking sector. 
Interestingly, when we disentangle aggregate lending into enterprise and household 
credit, our estimates indicate that the established relationship between aggregate 
credit growth and banking crisis is mostly driven by the change in household credit. 
Depending on econometric specification, 1 per cent growth in household credit 
increases the likelihood of banking crisis by 6 to 8.2 per cent. The marginal effect of 
enterprise credit varies between 1.7 to 2.8 per cent.  
However, not all credit booms lead to banking crises. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014) show 
that only about a third of the boom episodes end up in financial crisis. This raises 
natural questions: why in some cases credit booms lead to banking crisis? Why 
incumbent government may allow for unsustainable credit growth despite having 
almost perfect information about whether it is a credit boom or credit bubble 
(Martina and Ventura, 2014). The literature suggests that due to the political business 
cycles, the governments may have a tendency towards relaxing credit conditions or 
increasing government expenditure. Hence, to answer these questions, this chapter 
incorporates proxies for domestic political conditions in the lead up to banking crises. 
By integrating several political and institutional variables, including time-to-elections, 
central bank independence and government stability, the paper investigates the 
determinants of credit boom.  
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To account for potential reverse causality, the paper employs recursive bivariate 
probit model. To the best of our knowledge, this model has not been employed in a 
similar setup. The first stage of the recursive bivariate probit model involves 
determining the factors behind credit boom by adding exogenous variables to the 
equation. The second stage estimates the relationship between credit boom (more 
specifically, estimated value of the credit boom from the first stage) and banking 
crises.  
The estimations show that when the incumbent is concerned about approval rates, the 
chances of credit boom is high, which in turn leads to higher probability of banking 
crisis. This could be interpreted as incumbent’s attempt to increase the chances of re-
election by relaxing credit conditions. On the other hand, we also find that the well-
functioning, independent central banks tend to reduce the likelihood of credit boom. 
In other words, a truly independent central bank dampens the negative effects of 
opportunistic behaviour of the government. Furthermore, we find that time-to-
elections has an inverse relationship with the probability of banking crises, i.e. the 
probability of crisis reduces in the lead up to elections. Given the political costs 
associated with banking crises, the incumbent tends to avoid it at any cost. More 
specifically, 73 per cent of banking crises in our dataset happens during the first two 
years after the elections.  
Overall, chapter 3 finds significant evidence on the notion that there is political 
business cycle, which suggests that politicians manipulate the economy to achieve 
personal goals, especially during election period. Moreover, it highlights the 
importance of the domestic veto players, particularly, well-functioning central banks. 
Having discussed the causes of financial crises in the earlier chapters, Chapter 4 
discusses the potential determinants of ending financial crises. More specifically, the 
paper examines if fiscal stimulus helps countries to exit banking, currency or 
sovereign debt crisis. There is both empirical and anecdotal evidence suggesting that 
financial crises are followed by large declines in per capita output. For instance, 
Claessens et al. (2010) identifies five groups of countries that entered recessionary 
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phase of the business cycle following subprime crisis in the United States. On the 
other hand, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) argue that both currency and banking 
crises are preceded by recessions, or at least, below trend growth. Given the evidence 
suggesting that in most of the cases crises and recessions go hand in hand, we re-
assess the effectiveness of expansionary fiscal policy at times of economic recessions 
as well.  
To measure fiscal stimulus we employ data on structural government balance, which 
reflects the fiscal balance devoid of the effects of automatic stabilizers and 
commodity prices. The paper uses two distinct variables as a proxy for fiscal 
expansion, including continuous negative change in the structural balance variable 
and fiscal stimulus dummy. As this variable is net of business cycle components, we 
assume any negative change in structural fiscal balance reflects discretionary 
expansionary policy. On the other hand, following Baldacci et al. (2014), the fiscal 
stimulus dummy is defined as an increase in the structural deficit by at least 1.5 per 
cent of GDP.   
The results suggest that the expansionary fiscal policy is effective in guiding 
countries out of both financial crisis and economic recessions. However, it has 
heterogeneous impact for recessions and crises. More specifically, stimulus measures 
have one year lagged effect at times of crises, whereas for recessions it becomes 
effective with two year lag. This result highlights the importance of immediate 
intervention by governments at times of financial crises. Given the panic associated 
with financial crises, corrective measures taken by governments tend to calm 
financial markets immediately.   
Apart from assessing the effectiveness of expansionary fiscal policy, we also attempt 
to explain its determinants. Since most of the stimulus packages require 
parliamentary approval, we consider political dimension along with macroeconomic 
variables. For this purpose, we collect data on political constraints and incorporate it 
into the model. The theoretical literature suggests that the incumbent government has 
an incentive to ease both monetary and fiscal policies to improve chances of re-
election (Herrera et al., 2014). In this setup, political constraints tend to be effective 
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to curb opportunistic behaviour of the incumbent government. This variable is 
defined as the ability of one party to alter legislation.  
The findings from our analysis indicate that political constraints have no statistically 
significant effect at times of financial crises. This suggests that due to the need for 
immediate action when the crisis hits, the significance of political constraints fades 
away. On the other hand, it is among the key determinants of the expansionary fiscal 
policy at times of economic recessions. We conclude that high political constraints 
reduce the probability of fiscal stimulus and hence, prolong the duration of recession.  
Overall, this thesis contributes to the stock of knowledge in financial crises by 
addressing several gaps identified in the literature. The first chapter contributes to the 
literature by exploring the effect of regime duration and transition of the regime to 
the probability of banking, currency and sovereign debt crisis. The second chapter 
looks at heterogeneous effect of enterprise and household credit on the likelihood of 
banking crisis. Analysing the potential factors behind unsustainable credit growth by 
taking care of reverse causality problem is another contribution of the second chapter. 
More precisely, we employ bivariate probit method to reveal the determinants of 
credit boom and assess its effect on the probability of banking crisis in a system of 
equations. Finally, the third essay reports a differential impact of fiscal stimulus on 
the probability of ending financial crisis and economic recessions. Along with this, 
the paper sheds some lights on the economic and political factors behind the decision 
to implement expansionary fiscal policy.  
The important implication of this thesis is that while macroeconomic variables 
remain significant in explaining financial crises, it would be incorrect to study these 
effects in isolation from institutional and political variables. For instance, there is a 
broad consensus in the literature regarding the leading economic and financial 
indicators of financial crises. However, in the absence of any accountability to the 
electorate in authoritarian regimes, there will be less incentive for economic reforms 
which may affect the likelihood of economic crises. Similarly, the extant literature 
has established the relationship between credit growth and banking crises (Aikman, 
2014; Schularik and Taylor, 2012). The literature suggests that poor lending practices, 
170 
weak supervision over the banking system, optimistic views on future may contribute 
to the bubbles in credit market, which leave a country exposed to banking crises. 
Nevertheless, there is very little academic explanation regarding why the incumbent 
government may allow unsustainable domestic credit growth at the first instance. 
The third paper of this thesis also makes a case for political economy aspect of 
financial crises. That is, the analysis finds that engaging in expansionary fiscal policy 
at times of downturns, which seems to be effective, requires political consensus. 
Hence, ignoring political dimension of fiscal stimulus would have resulted in 
incomplete understanding of its effectiveness.  
In general, this thesis suggests that the quality of institutions is as vital for economic 
stability as sound economic conditions. It makes a case for independence of central 
banks, stability of the political regime and agile and coordinated response at times of 
economic recessions and financial crises.  
Given the major findings from the papers, there are several avenues remaining for 
future research, including exploring the role of regime duration on the magnitude of 
financial crisis, investigating why household credit has higher impact on the 
probability of banking crisis compared to enterprise credit and examining the reason 
why fiscal stimulus tends to have differential impact at times of financial crises and 
economic recessions.  
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